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ABSTRACT 
 
IN PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE: 
 THE POLITICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL DISPARITY REFORM  
IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
Ellen A. Donnelly 
John M. MacDonald 
 
Overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities is a troubling fact in the U.S. 
criminal and juvenile justice systems. The scope and racial character of American 
criminal processing is critically shaped by politics. Scholarship has focused on the 
politics that helped to forge a large and racially disparate criminal justice system as well 
as recent political attempts to scale back criminal justice operations. This study examines 
the political development and consequences of policies aiming to reduce racial 
inequalities in the adult and juvenile justice systems. It introduces the concept of "racial 
disparity reform," or any policy that seeks to diminish unnecessary or adverse criminal 
processing differences among racial groups. Reforms range from exploratory studies and 
restrictions on using race as a decision-making factor to mandatory interventions 
throughout an entire justice system. These measures are based on policymakers’ beliefs 
about the consistent and legitimate application of the law. This research argues racial 
disparity reform is politically possible and consequential in curbing inequalities. Three 
methodological strategies support this claim. First, this study uses legislative and 
executive documents to qualitatively test how different problem definitions of racial 
inequality led to distinct national policy responses. Ideas of disproportionate impact 
motivated exploratory reform in capital punishment, beliefs of discrimination encouraged 
prohibitory reform in racial profiling, and constructions of disparity and discrimination 
prompted comprehensive reform in youth confinement. Second, it quantitatively 
identifies the socio-political factors associated with reform developments in the states. 
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Reform is more likely when Democrats control the elected branches, racial 
disproportionalities worsen, and judiciaries do not have active reform efforts. Finally, this 
study uses multivariate techniques to distinguish the racially egalitarian effects of 
acongressional mandate requiring states to reduce the disproportionate number of 
minorities processed throughout their juvenile justice systems. Intervention on behalf of 
this racial disparity reform diminishes the likelihood of punitive sanctioning and 
decreases the size of processed minority youth populations. This study concludes politics 
is important in generating more racially just criminal processing practices and redefining 
the future of American criminal justice.
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CHAPTER ONE - POLITICS AND RACIAL DISPARITY REFORM IN THE U.S. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minority groups in the U.S. adult and 
juvenile justice systems has stood as an enduring and pernicious issue.1 Since the 
establishment of integrated correctional structures, minorities have been 
disproportionately processed at all stages of the criminal justice continuum (Baldus & 
Woodworth, 2004; Mauer, 2013; Pope & Feyerherm, 1990; Spohn, 2000; Tonry & 
Melewski, 2008).2 Nearly 10% of all African American and 4% of all Hispanic citizens 
are under correctional supervision on any given day (Pew Center on the States, 2009, p. 
8). Over 50% of the nation’s incarcerated population identify as nonwhite (Guerino, 
Harrison, & Sabol, 2011). More disturbing estimates project that one in three African 
American males and one in six Hispanic males born in 2001 will spend time in prison 
during his lifetime (Bonczar, 2003; Mauer & King, 2007).  
Politics has been instrumental in defining the size and racial character of the U.S. 
criminal justice system. Policymaking accounts of the modern criminal justice system 
have traditionally linked the expansion of American crime controls with the exacerbation 
of racial inequality in criminal processing (Mauer, 1999; Simon, 1996; Tonry, 1995; 
Western, 2006). Demands for “law and order” following the end of the Civil Rights 
Movement were politically lucrative despite their racial connotations (Beckett, 1997; 
Murakawa, 2005; Weaver, 2007). Unanimous commitment to “getting tough” on crime 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, this dissertation uses the term “criminal justice system” to describe government 
processing of adults and juveniles for criminal or delinquent acts. It also refers to racial and 
ethnic minorities under the term “racial minorities.” This choice reflects policymakers’ frequent 
treatment of racial and ethnic inequalities as a singular problem. It likewise responds to criminal 
justice record-keeping practices, as many criminal justice and juvenile justice agencies do not 
differentiate between racial and ethnic categories (Mauer & King, 2007).   
2 Prior to the 1960s, Jim Crow segregation masked rates of minority overrepresentation (Ward, 
2012).  
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among Democrats and Republicans proliferated more stringent crime controls throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Such punitive policymaking would have devastating impacts on 
racial minorities (Clear, 2007; Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Western, 2006). The shear 
number of minorities entangled with the criminal justice apparatus and the acute 
disadvantages of a criminal record resulting from these measures have inspired some to 
allege the criminal justice system has produced a new Jim Crow order (Alexander, 2010; 
Wacquant, 2001, 2009)  
In the past ten years, political discourse on criminal justice has been changing. 
Amid dropping crime rates and economic recession, policymakers across the country 
have sought to decrease the size of the nation’s massive correctional population 
(Weisberg & Petersilia, 2010). States like Michigan, Mississippi, Washington, and 
Kansas have revised their sentencing practices and initiated new diversionary programs 
to curb their soaring imprisonment rates (Jacobson, 2006). In a few jurisdictions, these 
measures have even contributed to the closure of prisons (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). 
A growing corpus of literature has documented political efforts aimed at decreasing 
criminal justice operations (Dagan & Teles, 2014; Gottschalk, 2006). Today, it is 
uncertain whether these reforms are sustainable or if they are capable of eradicating the 
criminal justice apparatus’ various extensions of social control (Gottschalk, 2010).   
Since the 1970s, a distinct and under-explored politics has developed around 
concerns for racial inequality. Policymakers in the legislature, judiciary, and executive 
branch have actively supported policies to reduce racial inequities in the criminal 
processing of adults and juveniles (King & Smith, 2011). Notable reforms have ranged 
from President Bush’s ban on racial profiling (Bush, 2001), the passage of Racial Justice 
Acts prohibiting racially discriminatory capital sentencing in Kentucky and North 
Carolina (Mosteller, 2012), and the establishment of state commissions on racial 
disparities in criminal justice (Mauer, 2011; Neeley, 2008; Norris, 2011). More recently, 
racial inequality in criminal justice has captured national political attention in several 
ways. In 2013, the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the Trayvon Martin murder trial 
triggered a series of congressional attempts to eliminate racial profiling (Fox, 2013). The 
Obama administration announced revisions to mandatory minimum sentences for low-
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level drug offenders. A federal court also determined that the New York City Police 
Department’s stop-and-frisk policies were unconstitutional. The press has hailed these 
developments as “powerful signals that the pendulum has swung away from the tough-
on-crime policies of a generation ago” (Savage & Goode, 2013).   
This dissertation contends that the political system is capable of generating 
consequential reforms to redress racial inequalities in the adult and juvenile justice 
systems, particularly when political actors recognize that these inequalities are caused by 
illegitimate and inconsistent applications of the law or other criminal justice policies. It 
proposes a “racial disparity reform” refers to any policy that seeks to change the existing 
practices, policies, or structures of criminal justice institutions in a manner that 
diminishes unnecessary or adverse differences among racial groups. A racial disparity 
reform is marked by its focus on a racial subject matter and intent to mitigate differential 
treatment of or disparate impact upon minority groups (Amar & Caminker, 1996). Racial 
disparity reforms emerge from politically-defined problems of disparate impact, 
discrimination, and disparity. Reform assumes various forms ranging from additional 
studies of racial differences and guarantees of non-discrimination to technical 
adjustments to standing criminal processing practices. As policymakers increasingly 
recognize problems of bias and inconsistency in the application of the law, reforms 
promoting broader and more system-wide change are becoming important. This 
dissertation examines the political development and consequences of racial disparity 
reforms in the U.S. adult and juvenile justice systems with the aim of illuminating the 
potential for future racial justice reforms.  
This introductory chapter situates racial disparity reform within scholarship on 
politics and the criminal justice system. It begins by summarizing prevailing 
policymaking accounts of the rise of the modern criminal justice system and resultant 
racial inequalities. These accounts assert a tough-on-crime ideology derived from 
opposition to the civil rights movement and partisan realignment of the South. Crime 
became a convenient and profitable issue to displace disappointment with new racial 
egalitarianism without blatantly reversing civil rights gains. Given this linkage between 
crime and race, the racially disparate impacts of modern crime controls should come as 
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little surprise. Next, the chapter briefly describes contemporary political efforts to 
rollback the criminal justice apparatus. Economic considerations have motivated new 
public questioning of the scale of American criminal justice. Criticism of the criminal 
justice system has largely sprung from the right, raising the question of whether 
conservatives will genuinely abandon long-standing promises of “law and order.” The 
chapter then lays out the concept of racial disparity reform as an alternative to existing 
accounts of criminal justice politics and policymaking. It offers a definition of racial 
disparity reform and separates it from other types of criminal justice reform. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the six chapters ahead.  
 
Politics, Race, and Criminal Justice Reform (1964-2000) 
 
The role of politics in shaping the size and racial composition of the U.S. criminal 
justice system is deeply-rooted. Over the past fifty years, crime has become “a, if not, the 
defining problem of government” (Simon, 1996, p. 13). Dominant narratives of criminal 
justice policymaking have illuminated a corrosive relationship among politics, criminal 
justice, and race between 1964 and 2000. According to these accounts, the modern 
“carceral state” finds its origins in opposition to the Civil Rights Movement (Lerman & 
Weaver, 2014). The 1960s marked a transformative period in American politics. The 
extension of civil rights to African Americans and white resistance to desegregation 
fractured the reigning political order (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; King & Smith, 2005). 
Unrest due to large-scale protests, freedom rides, sit-ins, and repressive violence made 
civil rights an unavoidable issue (Lee, 2002).  
Throughout the 1960s, Southern political leaders defended their anti-egalitarian 
positions by claiming civil rights would incite criminal behavior. The fact that riots 
occurred in northern cities corroborated these assertions. If additional civil protections 
were granted, these events forewarned of a subsequent crime wave. After the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, politics strengthened this racialized connection between 
civil rights and crime. Crime rates climbed as a result of such instability in urban centers, 
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demographic shifts, changing capacities of law enforcement agencies, and technical 
revisions to crime reports. The accuracy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime 
statistics is contested, but it is likely these factors upwardly biased estimates of crime 
during this period (Weaver, 2007).  
The appearance of ubiquitous and unrelenting lawlessness fuelled public cries for 
the federal government to restore of order (Mauer, 1999; Tonry, 1995). Prior to this 
period, national policymakers had limited influence over criminal justice issues (Weaver, 
2007). Although issues of immigration, prohibition, juvenile delinquency, and 
prostitution had inspired calls for political action, no durable federal crime controls were 
promulgated because federal and state criminal justice institutions lacked the capacity to 
effectively address crime (Gottschalk, 2006). Federal involvement would decidedly 
change under the Johnson Administration. In 1965, President Johnson established the 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The commission 
concluded the nation’s growing crime rates derived from poverty, joblessness, residential 
segregation and widespread racial discrimination. To solve the nation’s crime problem, 
politicians would have to address the vast racial inequities in society. Based upon these 
findings, liberals too began to form their own connection between contentious racial 
issues and crime (Murakawa, 2005).  
A year later, Johnson proclaimed a “war against crime” in his message to 
Congress. Johnson called upon policymakers to take a two-pronged approach to crime. 
For Johnson, short-term investments in law enforcement had to be accompanied with 
long-term campaigns to eradicate poverty (Beckett, 1997). In his own words before an 
audience in Dayton Ohio,  
 
“The war on poverty… is a war on crime and a war on disorder. […] There is 
something mighty wrong when a candidate for the highest public office bemoans 
violence in the streets but votes against the war on poverty, votes against the Civil 
Rights Act, and votes against major educational bills that have come before him 
as a legislator” (L. Johnson, 1964). 
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The need to take action became more pressing after “long hot summer” of 1967 that 
sparked riots in 128 cities. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders’ report 
(also known as the Kerner Report) famously asserted “our nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal” unless government undertook 
considerable actions to reverse social decay. While the report emphasized Johnson’s 
long-term approach to correcting crime through social policy, Congress embraced the 
short-term approach of providing immediate federal government assistance to state and 
local law enforcement agencies. Debate on the resultant Safe Streets Act of 1968 was 
largely unconcerned about this extension of federal powers and concentrated on the 
proper means of allocating federal funds (Beckett, 1997). Congress and President 
Johnson thus forged a federal-state partnership that laid the foundation for contemporary 
criminal justice operations (Gottschalk, 2006). 
As violence and racial tensions continued into 1969, however, the anti-poverty 
and anti-discrimination strands of the war on poverty faded from political discourse. A 
“silent of majority” of Americans opposed liberal idealism, rights-based activism, anti-
Vietnam protests, and the contemporary counter-culture. Crime came to be seen less as a 
product of lingering discrimination and entrenched inequalities. Instead, crime was a 
byproduct of an overly lenient and generous society. A “culture of poverty” promoting 
under-education, single-motherhood, joblessness had to be extinguished. Astute 
politicians capitalized upon fermenting “law and order” sentiments. Republican Party 
leaders like Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon incorporated promises to clamp down 
on lawlessness into their political platforms (Murakawa, 2014; Tonry, 2011). These 
appeals particularly resonated among Southerners who felt betrayed by the Democratic 
Party over civil rights.  
The message of “getting tough” on crime ultimately reached its peak during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations. Reagan assumed office under the 1980 Republican 
Party platform of enhancing criminal penalties to deter violent crime and prevent a 
developing danger: drug offending. Decimated by deindustrialization (W. J. Wilson, 
1987) and the flight of affluent whites and blacks to the suburbs (Massey & Denton, 
1993), American cities became home to blossoming drug markets that enraptured idle, 
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able-bodied men seeking a sort of socio-economic mobility (Anderson, 1999; Western & 
Wildeman, 2009). Two years into his first presidential term, Reagan announced the 
beginning of the “War on Drugs” that solidified executive and legislative commitments to 
expansive crime controls (Tonry, 1994). Congress swiftly enacted harsher and more 
certain sanctioning schemes like sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums that 
lengthened 1 to 2 year sentences to 5 years to life in prison (Shane-DuBow, Brown, & 
Olsen, 1985; Tonry & Melewski, 2008). National policymakers further promulgated new 
drug statutes under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988. The War on Drugs became the most significant federal 
drug interdiction initiative since the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1917 (Zimring, Hawkins, 
& Kamin, 1994). George H. W. Bush continued these anti-drug campaigns, declaring 
drug use was “the most pressing issue facing the nation” during his first year in office 
(Alexander, 2010, p. 54). States too followed national policymakers’ leads in expanding 
prison capacities and combating drug use, particularly in Republican strongholds in the 
South and West (Western & Wildeman, 2009).  
Unchecked consensus among policymakers proliferated anti-crime initiatives over 
the next decade. While known for his assurances to create a “third way” to divisive 
problems of the day, 1992 presidential candidate Bill Clinton vowed to be tougher on 
crime than his Democratic and Republican opponents (Holian, 2004). At the time, public 
concerns for crime reached their highest levels since the late 1960s (Murakawa, 2014). 
Clinton endorsed “three-strikes” life sentencing laws, community-oriented policing, 
extended lists of capital crimes, and enlarged prison and jailing operations. The $30 
million Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was a source of pride 
for Democrats, who believed its passage would seize the issue of crime from the 
Republicans (Kramer, 1994).  During the Clinton years, state and federal governments 
experienced their largest increases in penal populations (Alexander, 2010; Justice Policy 
Institute, 2001).  
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Inequality and Race in Criminal Justice 
 
Punitive policymaking that consumed American politics during the later half of 
the twentieth century had immediate and devastating consequences. The U.S. 
incarceration rate soared, rising every year from 1973 to its peak in 2009 (Goode, 2013).  
Imprisonment rates became divorced from fluctuations in crime rates, as national and 
state penal populations grew by 430% while crime only increased by 3% over the course 
of three decades (D. Cole, 2011). Juvenile incarceration likewise doubled during this time 
amid steady declines in youth crime rates after 1994 (Western, 2006). Despite four years 
of dropping incarceration levels, more than 1.5 million adults are behind bars today. 
Nearly 7 million individuals are being supervised under probation, parole, jail, or prison. 
On any given day, 1 in 35 Americans are involved with the correctional system (Glaze & 
Herberman, 2013). The American penal population outnumbers those of other Western 
democracies by seven-fold (Tonry, 2011). To no surprise, the United States is the world’s 
leader in imprisoning its citizens (Gottschalk, 2006).   
 “Mass incarceration” or “mass imprisonment” that denotes the explosion of the 
American carceral practices only captures part of the criminal justice system’s 
transformative effects on citizens (Garland, 2001). The impacts of tougher crime controls 
have been decidedly concentrated among particular groups. Nine out of ten prison and 
jail inmates are male. Most criminal offenses are committed before the age of 40. 
Offenders typically do not possess a high school diploma, lack stable employment at the 
time of their incarceration, and earn average lower wages than similarly educated peers 
(Western, Kleykamp, & Rosenfeld, 2004). Drug laws are generally responsible for the 
majority of prison admissions by federal and state courts. Drug offenders alone constitute 
50% of the nation’s incarcerated male population and 58% of its female population 
(Carson & Golinelli, 2013).   
Race is the clearest marker of the criminal justice system’s disparate effects. Prior 
to the imposition of tough-on-crime measures, racial disparities in imprisonment were 
evident as early as the mid-1920s. Then, African Americans were admitted to state and 
federal prison at three times the rate as whites (Langan, 1991). Beginning in 1976, 
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differences between black and white imprisonment rates rapidly sharpened. Representing 
12% of the general population, African Americans constituted 44% of all prisoners in 
1986. Since 1993, the disproportionate racial composition of the nation’s correctional 
population has remained relatively the same (Western & Wildeman, 2009). Similar 
disparities reverberate in other parts of the criminal justice system. In juvenile processing, 
minorities represent 62% of detained and 67% of securely confined youths (Hsia, Bridges, 
& McHale, 2004). In the capital punishment system, African Americans make up 42% of 
all inmates sentenced to death and 48% of all executions since 1930 (Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics, 2010).  
 Racial disparities have primarily worsened as a result of criminal justice policies 
rather than differences in criminal behaviors (Blumstein, 1982; Tonry & Melewski, 2008). 
Historically, African Americans have been the overwhelming victims and perpetrators of 
violent crimes, yet such overinvolvement in these serious offenses has fluctuated over 
time (Tonry, 1995). Violent crime rose by 66% to just over 1.3 million offenses in 1990, 
but dropped to 1.1 million offenses in 2001. Violent crime imprisonment rates 
nevertheless tripled in size during this period. This disjuncture between criminal activity 
and imprisonment stems from shifts in policing and sentencing practices. The chance an 
arrest would lead to imprisonment doubled from 13% to 28% by the early 2000s. Lengths 
of imprisonment sentences also expanded from an average of 33 months in 1980 to 53 
months in 2001 (Western, 2006, p. 43).  
Elevated likelihoods of imprisonment and extended sentences likewise 
exacerbated racial inequalities in sanctions for non-violent offenses. Property crime 
imprisonment rates have doubled since the late 1980s. Although African Americans 
commit fewer property crimes than whites, blacks are apprehended and confined at 
higher rates for these offenses. Harsh drug policies have especially sharpened racial 
disparities. Available survey and drug-related emergency room visit data indicate whites 
have been the predominant users of all illicit substances except for crack cocaine (Tonry 
& Melewski, 2008). Historically, whites are half as likely as African Americans to be 
arrested for drug offenses (Western, 2006). Since the 1990s, drug offenses account for 
nearly a third of court commitments to prison among black inmates and a quarter of such 
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commitments among Hispanic inmates (Carson & Golinelli, 2013). While drug use and 
trade tendencies are difficult to approximate, the unequal apprehension of blacks and 
Hispanics for drug offenses has likely derived from concentrating drug enforcement on 
certain substances and areas in which minorities reside (Tonry, 2011).  
The collateral consequences of interacting with the criminal justice system have 
been steep. Offenders are disadvantaged with respect to most life course outcomes (Clear, 
2007; Pettit, 2012). The very experience of incarceration removes individuals from the 
labor market, eroding stable employment, work experience, and earnings (Holzer, 
Raphael, & Stoll, 2006). Upon returning to mainstream society, offenders face additional 
job search hurdles associated with hiring restrictions and the stigma of a criminal record 
(Weiman, 2007; Western et al., 2004). Social safety nets are thin. Congress has severely 
restricted offenders’ access to social services like welfare (Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families), public housing, food stamps, and Social Security benefits (Allard, 2002; Rose 
& Clear, 1998; Travis, 2002). States have introduced numerous other restrictions on 
offenders’ rights like termination of parental privileges and bans on firearms (Ewald, 
2012; Olivares, Burton, & Cullen, 1996). Offenders have limited political recourse to 
contest these proclamations. To illustrate, voting rights are denied for various offenders 
in every state except for Maine and Vermont (Burch, 2013; Meredith & Morse, 2014; 
The Sentencing Project, 2014; Uggen & Manza, 2002). Diffuse and “invisible 
punishments” therefore haunt offenders long after formal interaction with the criminal 
justice system ends (Travis, 2002).  
The prevalence of incarceration, disproportionate contact of minorities with 
criminal justice structures, and totality of disadvantage due to a criminal record have 
encouraged some to see American criminal justice as creating a perverse racial order. The 
criminal justice system has been portrayed as the latest “peculiar institution” descended 
from slavery and Jim Crow segregation that controls and restrains “nonwhite” 
populations (Wacquant, 2009). The so-called “New Jim Crow Order” places more 
African Americans under correctional control than under slavery in 1850 (Alexander, 
2010, p. 175). This characterization has a mixed reception, but scholars generally agree 
on two points (Forman, 2012). On the one hand, American criminal justice does not 
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begin to approximate the brutality and cruelties minorities endured under prior systems of 
racial control. On the other, changes to ideological thinking regarding race, equality, law, 
and criminality must occur to alter the course of American criminal justice.  
The path to forge a more racially egalitarian criminal justice system has divided 
scholars. Citing previous challenges to slavery and Jim Crow, some contend a new civil 
rights movement is necessary to topple the prevailing correctional system (Lerman & 
Weaver, 2014). Alexander (2010) laments racial inequality is so durable that “criminal 
justice reform efforts—standing alone—are futile” (p. 217). Such understandings of 
criminal justice policymaking may be overly pessimistic. Instead, politics can be a critical 
catalyst for ushering in new era of criminal justice and racial justice in America.   
 
Movement for Deescalation (2000-Present) 
  
In the recent decade, the politics of criminal justice has started to move away 
from unwavering commitments to more intensive crime controls (Gottschalk, 2010). 
National and state governments have backed away “lock ‘em up” arguments as a result of 
several changing political dynamics. First, the public has become decidedly less 
concerned with crime. Since their peak in the mid-1990s, crime rates have steadily 
decreased (Goode, 2013). As of 2012, the violent crime rate of 389.7 offenses per 
100,000 was just above half the rate of 666.9 per 100,000 in 1989 (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2011). Imprisonment rates have similarly dropped in the past three years, 
though the association between crime and imprisonment is loosely connected (Maruschak 
& Parks, 2012). Public fears of crime have quieted amid these declines. Twenty years ago, 
crime and violence stood as the nation’s most important problems (Dagan & Teles, 2014). 
Public opinion today no longer ranks crime as a top priority (Clear, 2011) 
Although policymakers do not always follow or correctly interpret public views 
of crime (Lyons & Scheingold, 2000; Scheingold, 1984), political elites no longer see 
political profit in toughening domestic crime controls. Following Clinton’s ascendency to 
the presidency, Republicans and Democrats were largely indistinguishable in their 
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approaches to criminal justice. Some conservatives devoted to re-owning “punitiveness,” 
have “exported” the war on crime to terrorist organizations and other nations (D. Cole, 
2011; McLeod, 2010). Immigration has especially contributed to the internationalization 
of crime controls. Through measures like the congressional Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act and Arizona’s S.B. 1070, ordinary police officers can 
enforce legal documentation and other immigration restrictions (King & Smith, 2011).   
Other political elites have sought to expose the unnecessary expenses of the war 
on crime. Fiscal pressure of skyrocketing imprisonment rates pressed many states to 
rollback incarceration practices in the early 2000s (J. Greene & Mauer, 2010). Economic 
recession since 2008 galvanized additional scrutiny of criminal justice spending and 
expenditures. Politicians have actively reframed crime control an unsustainable fiscal 
problem (Gottschalk, 2010). Arguments for a more austere criminal justice system have 
particularly resonated among Tea Party-affiliated elected officials and libertarian activists 
hostile to “big” government (Dagan & Teles, 2014). The Republican Party has thus 
become fractured by fiscal skepticism and historic commitments to criminal justice. As a 
result, bipartisan alliances between mass incarceration conscious liberals and fiscal 
conservatives have been developing.  
Consensus among the public and political leaders to scale back the U.S. criminal 
justice system have consequently given rise to various reform initiatives (Jacobson, 2006; 
Weisberg & Petersilia, 2010). Graduated sanctions for probation violations, alternatives 
to incarceration for nonviolent offenses, and increased access to parole and probation 
have emerged as common prescriptions for adult and juvenile offenders (Lerman & 
Weaver, 2014). Elimination of mandatory minimum sentences in Michigan, New York, 
and Kansas have greatly abated state prison populations (J. Greene & Mauer, 2010). The 
recognized failure of the War on Drugs to restrain drug use has also encouraged 
diversionary and treatment-based sentencing reforms for low-level drug offenses. Several 
states have taken steps to legalize or decriminalize the possession of marijuana under 
certain circumstances, including Colorado, California, Massachusetts, Kentucky, and 
Washington (D. Cole, 2011). Finally, “public health” approaches to criminal justice have 
sought to redirect government resources away from incarceration and toward rebuilding 
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communities devastated by crime. Approximately half of the states are experimenting 
with “justice reinvestment” programs aimed at reducing spending on incarceration and 
increasing public safety (Clear, 2011).3  
Taken together, the contemporary political environment has begun to reconsider 
the nature of American criminal justice. While policymakers and the public have grown 
more supportive of reduced criminal justice operations, politics’ ability to make 
transformative change has yet to be fully seen. Incarceration rates of the most progressive 
states remain extremely high relative to those of other developed nations (Tonry, 2011). 
Critics have called recent deescalation reforms “myth and ceremony” due to their limited 
impacts on poverty, joblessness, policing, and government social controls (Wacquant, 
2009). Others fear frustrations with government’s handling of crime could be parlayed 
into more submerged forms of crime control like private prisons (Gottschalk, 2014) or 
demands for decreased social services (Mauer, 2011). The deescalation movement has 
nevertheless been a sign of changing tides in the politics of American criminal justice.   
 
What is Racial Disparity Reform 
 
While deescalation efforts are striving to decrease the scope of American criminal 
justice following the law and order movement’s establishment of expansive and racially 
disparate crime controls, policymakers’ efforts to promote more equality for racial 
minorities interacting with the criminal justice system constitute a separate and 
consequential strand of criminal justice politics. Specifically, political attempts to reduce 
                                                 
3 Notable organizations like the Urban Institute, Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States, 
Vera Institute of Justice, and Council of State Governments Justice Center have likewise led 
multi-million dollar jail and prison-oriented reinvestment projects across the country. The Obama 
Administration has continued to broaden national leadership and support for justice investment 
through evidence-based practices (Ibid).  
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racial inequalities in criminal justice have been overlooked and remarkable.4 “Racial 
disparity reform” refers to any proposal, decision, or enacted provision that seeks to 
change existing criminal justice institutions in a manner that diminishes unnecessary or 
adverse differences among racial groups. “Criminal justice institution” means any entity 
designated by the state that exercises control over persons or objects with regard to crime 
and punishment (Orren & Skowronek, 2004, p. 123). These institutions include prisons, 
jails, juvenile and criminal courts, probation departments, and law enforcement agencies. 
“Racial group” refers to the classifications of persons into racial and ethnic categories 
that reflect historical context, social relations among groups, and meanings imported to 
an individual’s ancestry and/or affiliations with others (Banton, 1998; Omi & Winant, 
1994). Racial disparity reform thus presumes a sense of “racial order,” in which the state 
grants permissions and prohibitions based upon accepted beliefs about race (Hochschild, 
Weaver, & Burch, 2012; King & Smith, 2005). Such understandings of race do not 
respond to any real differences among individuals (Banton, 1998; Brubaker, 2004; R. 
Smith, 1993). Instead, race is a social construct, where its meaning is made and remade 
by institutions like the criminal justice system (Frampton, Lopez, & Simon, 2008; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1993).   
By shifting the practices of governing institutions to diminish problematic racial 
distinctions, racial disparity reform has two defining characteristics: 1) reform must 
address a racial subject matter and 2) reform must seek to reduce differential treatment, 
disproportionate impact, or harms incurred by minority groups (see “racial in character” 
jurisprudence, Amar & Caminker, 1996). Reform must first respond to issues affecting 
racial and ethnic minority communities. While any policy change is motivated by 
multiple interests, racial disparity reform makes racial problems its primary focus. Such 
consciousness of race is not simply apparent in the political rhetoric surrounding a reform, 
                                                 
4 This dissertation does not attempt to rebuke scholarly consensus that the opposition to civil 
rights, poverty reform, drugs, and crime fused to become a compelling political agenda that 
inspired the design of harsher and more expansive crime controls. It does assert that the politics 
of criminal justice policy development has been far more dynamic with regard to race than 
current accounts of the law and order movement’s ascendency would indicate.  
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but usually appears in the language of the reform itself. To illustrate, the proposed 
congressional Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997 called for the mandatory collection of 
race and ethnicity information for all individuals stopped for traffic violations. Its 
proponents made clear the bill was meant to extinguish “D.W.B.” or “driving while black” 
as a ground for stops (H.R. Rep. No. 105-435).  
The second hallmark of racial disparity reform is its egalitarian aims, or at least 
the appearance of a commitment to more fair and equal ends. Reforms strive to revise 
status quo practices by eliminating or moderating their detrimental consequences for 
minorities. Similar initiatives can proactively limit racial inequality by outlining undue 
racial effects of extant or proposed statutes, as recently seen in racial impact statements 
(Mauer, 2009). Racially-conscious, anti-egalitarian reform is a rare, but plausible 
alternative. For instance, in 2011, Governor Susana Martinez of New Mexico rescinded 
Executive-Order 2005-019 prohibiting state law enforcement officials from inquiring 
about criminal suspects’ immigration status (New Mexico Executive Order No. 2011-009, 
2011). Critics of Martinez’s order have equated it with racial profiling (McCoy, 2011).  
Whether racial disparity reforms actualize their goals of creating more equality 
among racial groups is a separate question. Watershed racial disparity reforms have been 
cast by critics as merely symbolic (see Neal, 2004 on the Kentucky Racial Justice Act), a 
claim sometimes unable to be tested empirically (see Liederbach, Trulson, Fritsch, Caeti, 
& Taylor, 2007 on anti-racial profiling legislation). Just as policies that try to correct 
poverty, but fail to make demonstrable reductions, are called antipoverty strategies, racial 
disparity reforms are identified by their goals rather than effectiveness in altering 
criminal justice practices.  
The fundamental purpose of solving racial inequality separates racial disparity 
reforms from other criminal justice reform initiatives. Racial disparity reform is first 
distinct from its precursor, disparity reform. A disparity reform seeks to eradicate 
distinctions in the treatment of individuals without regard to identity, social status, or 
group affiliations. Federal sentencing reform embodied this type of policy change. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, unwarranted disparity was a “rallying cry” for sentencing 
reformers and proponents of the federal Sentencing Commission (Stith & Koh, 1993, p. 
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105). In the courts, discretion had become synonymous with arbitrariness. In the prison, 
indeterminate sentences supposedly failed to deter crime and did nothing to rehabilitate 
offenders (Lipton, Martinson, & Wilks, 1975; Martinson, 1974). Advocacy for 
sentencing reform did have a racial dimension (Howard, 1975; Wicker, 1976). As 
Frankel (1972) summarizes in a footnote, “If it is not all tabulated in neat statistics, there 
is familiar evidence that race and class prejudice, personal views about specific crimes, 
deformed notions of patriotism, and all sorts of individual quirks affect sentences (pp. 42-
43).5 Concerns for certainty, leniency, and deterrence ultimately took precedence over 
racial considerations, however. In 1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
established federal sentencing guidelines with the expressed goal of broadly eliminating 
disparities among the convicted.6 Because the act did not intend to primarily target racial 
inequalities or e mention race as a source of disparity, federal sentencing guidelines in 
their original formulation do not meet the criteria of racial disparity reform. 
Racial disparity reforms also stand in contrast to race-neutral initiatives that may 
have profound impacts on the treatment of minorities. Consider movements for 
deescalating sentencing policies. Redefining imprisonment in terms of months for most 
offenses and single digit years for more serious crimes would undoubtedly affect all 
offenders and shrink the nation’s enormous incarcerated population. At the same time, 
reductions in the nation’s incarceration rate could dramatically cut the size of minority 
offender populations (Pew Center on the States, 2009; Raphael & Stoll, 2013; Western, 
2006). Tonry alleges if the U.S. prison population were scaled back to 1980s levels, the 
                                                 
5 Not all studies supported evidence of racial disparities during this time. In reports submitted to 
the Sentencing Commission, race was not a significant predictor of sanctions in federal courts 
prior to the introduction of sentencing guidelines (McDonald & Carlson, 1994; Stith & Cabranes, 
1998). 
6 Since becoming effective in 1987, many experts have faulted these measures for perpetuating, 
and in some cases, exacerbating disparities among offenders (Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, Light, & 
Kramer, 2011; Weisburd, 1992). It remains unclear whether disparities on the whole have 
increased or decreased as a result of these guidelines (Tonry, 1996).  
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black imprisonment rate would fall by 66%, or 700,000 persons (2011, p. 17) Although 
racial imbalances would likely still persist after radical reductions in imprisonment, 
African Americans would benefit most from diversionary and less punitive sentencing 
reforms. Carceral reform is nevertheless largely driven by non-racial concerns like 
economic cost or deterrence (Gottschalk, 2006). Race-neutral reforms thus do not 
prioritize or address racial disproportionalities in a manner that approximates racial 
disparity reforms. Race-neutral and ordinary disparity correctives may still serve as 
complements to racial disparity reforms in attempting to eradicate of racial inequalities in 
criminal justice.  
Racial disparity reform primarily originates from the executive and legislative 
branches. For instance, a governor can issue an order to examine the racial discrimination 
in the application of the death penalty or a legislature can pass a measure prohibiting 
racial profiling. Reforms can still come from other segments of government. Many state 
supreme court systems have developed racial fairness committees tasked with assessing 
issues of racial inequality and designing appropriate interventions (Norris, 2011; also see 
Chapter 4). Procedures like comparative proportionality review in capital punishment 
have also sought to eliminate disparate impacts (Baldus & Woodworth, 2004). Courts 
may even issue rulings that seek to eliminate racial disparities. As mentioned earlier, a 
federal court invalidated the New York City Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policies 
due to their racial discriminatory nature (Goldstein, 2013). Yet these rulings are 
circumscribed by constitutional questions and precedents allowing for racial disparate 
impacts in criminal processing, as further described in the case studies of national racial 
disparity reforms in Chapter 3 (O.C. Johnson, 2007).  
Criminal justice bureaucracies, such as state police forces or juvenile probation 
offices, may likewise choose to revise their practices on behalf of promoting more racial 
equity. Reform can even originate from non-governmental actors working with criminal 
justice system bureaucracies to change extant practices. For instance, nonprofit 
organizations like the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the American Bar Foundation have 
stood at the forefront of developing racially-conscious, alternative criminal justice 
programs such as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) and the Racial 
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Justice Improvement Project, respectively (American Bar Foundation, 2015; Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, 2014). Because a bureaucracy is often protective of its existing 
practices without regard to their racial consequences (J.Q. Wilson, 1989), however, 
legislative and executive oversight typically drives bureaucratic racial disparity reform.  
 This dissertation will focus on reforms promulgated by the elected branches, but 
these potential sources of racial disparity reform bear important consequences. While 
multiple venues could address racial inequalities in the criminal justice system, political 
and social context mediate the shape and potential of racial disparity reform.  
 
Overview of Dissertation 
 
 Racial inequality has been a troubling and complicated issue in the U.S. adult and 
juvenile justice systems. While policymaking accounts have focused on the rise of a large, 
racially disparate criminal justice system and on the newly emerging deescalation 
movement, this chapter has argued that policymakers’ endeavors to reduce racial 
differences in the criminal justice system’s treatment of offenders warrant further 
examination. It introduced the idea of racial disparity reform to capture policymaking 
attempts aimed at diminishing racial inequalities. The chapters ahead explore the various 
types of racial disparity reforms, problem definitions and emergence of racial disparity 
reform in politics, the socio-political factors associated with the enactment of racial 
disparity reform, and the effectiveness of racial disparity reform in promoting system-
wide change.  
Chapter 2 introduces a theoretical framework for racial disparity reform. It begins 
with an overview of racial inequality in criminal processing. It contends racial disparity 
reforms respond to problems of disparate impact, disparity, and discrimination that 
require distinct policy responses. These are differentiated by policymakers’ beliefs about 
the consistent and legitimate application of the law by criminal justice agencies. These 
problems of racial inequality are then discussed with respect to social science literature 
on race and criminal justice. The chapter finally identifies four types of racial disparity 
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reform: exploratory, prohibitory, policy-specific, and comprehensive measures. This 
typology is explained with examples from national and state politics.  
With an understanding of the different expressions of racial inequality and their 
policy solutions, this dissertation explores different aspects of racial disparity reform 
from the federal, state, and local levels. Chapter 3 traces the emergence of racial disparity 
reform in national politics. It tests the argument from Chapter 2 that different problem 
definitions generate certain types of racial disparity reforms. It qualitatively examines 
Congress and U.S. presidents’ treatment of racial differences in capital sentencing, racial 
profiling, and youth confinement. The chapter suggests policymakers’ beliefs about racial 
inequality in these three criminal justice areas are shaped by partisanship, judicial rulings 
concerning the constitutionality of racial considerations, controversial events, and 
criminological studies of racial differences. Stronger reforms develop when national 
elected officials believe in problems of inconsistency and illegitimacy in criminal justice 
decision-making.  
Given this qualitative assessment of reform politics at the national level, Chapter 
4 explores racial disparity reform within the states. As “laboratories of democracy,” states 
display a variety of policy approaches to racial inequalities in their criminal justice 
systems. This chapter first presents an inventory of enacted policies and various types of 
reform measures within policies. The chapter delves further into the policymaking 
process of racial disparity reform by quantitatively analyzing the social, economic, and 
political conditions predicting policy enactments. Event history results demonstrate that 
Democratic control of governing institutions, the absence of efforts to promote racial 
fairness within the judiciary, and racial disproportionalities in criminal processing are 
most strongly correlated with racial disparity reform. These findings affirm a linkage 
among elected officials recognizing unresolved problems of racial inequality, acting on 
civil rights ideals, and developing policy solutions.  
Finally, while federal and state institutionalization of racial disparity reforms 
represents an important political development, whether reforms alter the criminal justice 
system’s treatment of minorities is a vital concern. More pressingly, it remains unclear 
whether comprehensive racial disparity reform, an increasingly attractive policy 
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alternative requiring interventions throughout an entire system, can actually change 
criminal processing. Chapters 5 and 6 take a closer look at whether a racial disparity 
reform is capable of producing more racially egalitarian outcomes and under what 
conditions such a policy can be powerful. These chapters analyze the Disproportionate 
Minority Contact (DMC) mandate, a congressional provision demanding federally funded 
states to reduce the disproportionate number of minorities handled throughout their 
juvenile justice systems. This comprehensive racial disparity reform is specifically 
examined in Pennsylvania, a state known for its minority overrepresentation issues as 
well as for its dedication to addressing these problems. Descriptive statistics in these 
chapters show racial disparities remain present in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice 
system. Multivariate assessments indicate that intervention on behalf of the DMC 
mandate has nonetheless mitigated the disadvantaging effects of minority status in 
processing outcomes and curtailed the size of the state’s processed minority youth 
populations.  
Given these qualitative and quantitative assessments of past racial disparity 
reforms, Chapter 7 draws lessons about future scholarly, political, and policy efforts to 
reduce racial inequalities in criminal justice. Racial disparity reform as a framework 
underscores more attention must be given to the progressive and racial-targeted aspects of 
criminal justice policymaking in scholarship. Racial justice advocacy going forward 
should consider pursuing more broadly focused and system-wide reforms within the 
elected branches while attempts are made to reengage the courts under statutory and 
constitutional doctrines. Enacted policies from such advocacy are most successful when 
reform initiatives are localized, grounded in rigorous social science evidence, and involve 
multiple interventions throughout the criminal justice continuum. In the wake of the 
Trayvon Martin tragedy, the events of Ferguson, Missouri, and the Obama 
administration’s commitments to reducing disproportionate minority contact with the 
criminal justice apparatus, racial disparity reform will be instrumental in the political 
future of the U.S. criminal justice system.  
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CHAPTER TWO - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RACIAL DISPARITY 
REFORM  
 
Over the past four decades, policymakers have promulgated a diverse array of 
racial disparity reforms in the U.S. adult and juvenile justice systems. This chapter offers 
a theoretical framework for why and how elected officials develop policies that seek to 
diminish racial inequalities in criminal processing. The chapter proceeds in three parts. It 
first distinguishes the political motivations for racial disparity reform. Elected officials 
are prompted to initiate reforms given civil rights ideals and interests in socially efficient 
policymaking. Neither motivation is completely dominant, however, because policy 
responses vary in strength. Another theoretical step must be taken to explain why elected 
officials pursue weak reforms (e.g. studies) in some circumstances and stronger reforms 
(e.g. funding mandates to change criminal justice practices) in other circumstances.   
The next two parts of the chapter assert policymakers construct of problems of 
racial inequality and subsequently create reforms based on these beliefs. Specifically, 
consensus in policy debates about the shape of racial inequality, as approximated by the 
beliefs of the median elected official, will determine reform outcomes. The chapter 
asserts elected officials define problems of racial inequality in terms of consistency and 
legitimacy. Four problems of racial inequality emerging from perceptions of consistency 
and legitimacy are disproportionate impact, discrimination, disparity without 
discrimination, and disparity and discrimination. These constructions are forged with 
political and scientific information. While Chapter 3 explores the political process of 
problem definition and policy response, this chapter describes each of these four 
problems within regard to race and criminal justice scholarship. This chapter finally 
provides a typology of racial disparity reforms. Four types of reforms are exploratory, 
prohibitory, policy-specific, and comprehensive measures. Examples of national and state 
reform measures are provided for each of these reform types.  
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Motivations for Racial Disparity Reform 
 
A framework of racial disparity reform helps to elucidate how criminal justice 
policies targeting racial inequality emerge in politics. Policymakers adopt racial disparity 
reforms for two broad reasons. First, elected officials respond to racially egalitarian ideals 
entrenched in American politics. Second, they receive electoral and institutional benefits 
for solving problems. 
A primary motivation for racial disparity reform derives from prevailing ideals of 
civil rights and equality. Race is an integral part of American politics because governing 
institutions shape understandings of race, relations across racial groups, and the 
consequences of race on citizenship (Hochschild et al., 2012). Such “racial order” in 
American society comes from a tension between “white supremacist” and 
“transformative racially egalitarian” traditions (King & Smith, 2011). The former defends 
the subjugation of minorities under restrictive regimes like slavery or Jim Crow 
segregation. The latter endorses equal rights and equal opportunities for all based on 
natural rights doctrines (King & Smith, 2005, p. 85). While these two racial traditions 
underpin policymaking today, they can explain divergent criminal justice reforms by 
elected officials. Anti-egalitarian ideas inspire punitive policy change, but progressive 
ideals motivate racial disparity reform. These civil rights ideals are most likely to be 
endorsed by Democrats and black and Latino elected officials who tend to be more liberal 
and responsive to minority groups’ issues (Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran, 1996; 
Herring, 1990; Yates & Fording, 2005) 
A secondary motivation for racial disparity reform comes from elected officials’ 
need to develop socially efficient policies (Esterling, 2004; Sunstein, 1988). Politicians 
have strong incentives to respond to social concerns. First, reelection depends on 
satisfying the demands of constituents and interest groups. Policymaking provides 
opportunities for elected officials to take positions that separate them from other 
candidates (Krehbiel, 1992; Mayhew, 1974). It also allows elected officials to claim 
credit for solving problems and make “good” public policy for their electoral base (Fenno, 
1978). Second, elected officials can use policymaking as a way to maintain institutional 
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power. In a system of separated powers, the development of socially desirable laws can 
enhance the reputation, capacity, and governance of an elected official’s institution 
(Patashnik & Peck, 2015). A publicly supported institution can further yield electoral 
benefits for individual policymakers.  
 At the same time, elected officials wish to design “efficient” social policies. 
Reforms should address a problem in a way that does not produce controversy, waste 
resources, or otherwise fail to deliver promises. In criminal processing, new policies 
should not lead to increases in criminal behaviors or introduce new forms of injustice. In 
electoral politics, too much racial consciousness may alienate white voters who may not 
believe in the illegitimacies and inconsistencies elected officials see in the system (W.J. 
Wilson, 1987). Too progressive stances may encourage voters to see elected officials as 
too weak on crime, as seen in the derailing Michael Dukakis’ 1988 presidential campaign 
due to Willie Horton’s furlough (Tonry, 2011). Simply put, elected officials are 
conscious that any of these inefficiencies will make them vulnerable to political 
opponents (Sunstein, 1988). A major issue in designing efficient reforms is elected 
branches lack the internal capacity to discern the state-of-knowledge on a problem and 
sort through all available alternatives to design a technically elegant policy (Esterling, 
2004, p. 77). An issue like racial inequality in criminal justice especially raises 
tremendous challenges for elected officials to design publicly acceptable solutions. 
 
From Motivations to Problem Definition and Policy Response 
 
 While ideological and problem-solving motivations for reform may exist for 
elected officials, racial disparity reform varies in scope and character. Elected officials 
sometimes address racial differences through additional study or data collection. Other 
times, these measures are more substantive, such as creating a new commission tasked 
with improving racial fairness throughout the criminal justice continuum. If either civil 
rights ideals or socially efficient policymaking completely dominated the thinking of 
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elected officials, strong racial disparity reforms would be a more regular feature of 
criminal justice policymaking.  
 A framework of racial disparity reform must take into account the empirical 
reality of varying racial disparity reform responses in light of civil rights ideals and 
socially efficient policymaking reasons. Elected officials develop racial disparity reforms 
based upon their own political constructions of racial inequality in criminal processing 
(Blumer, 1971; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Schattschneider, 1960). As Loury (2002) 
observes, policymakers confronted with racial problems in law enforcement “need to tell 
themselves a ‘story,’ to adopt some ‘model’ of what has generated their data, to embrace 
some framework for gauging how best to respond” (p. 158). How a problem in criminal 
processing is cast determines a problem’s placement on a policymaking institution’s 
agenda, policy debate, and possible resolution among certain alternatives (Kingdon, 
1984; Petracca, 1992; Schattschneider, 1960). 
Problems are not purely defined by technical assessments (Rochefort & Cobb, 
1994; Wildavsky, 1979). Issues are also constructed by government actors and involved 
groups to reflect their interests, values and ideas (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977). Elected 
officials define their own problems by merging scientific information with relevant 
political information. While scientific information is based on expert or academic studies, 
political information includes the positions of other elite political actors (e.g. the courts) 
and the views of constituents (Whiteman, 1995, p. 40).  
Because policy enactments require a degree of consensus among elected officials, 
this information helps to develop shared constructions of racial inequality and point to 
socially efficient reforms. Consensus about what problem of inequality exists can be 
approximated by the views of the median electoral official (Downs, 1957). When a racial 
disparity reform is finally enacted, elected officials on the whole meet societal demands, 
improve the welfare of the criminally processed, and advance their own political 
interests.7 
                                                 
7 An emphasis is placed on aggregate benefits because socially efficient policies will not please 
all elected officials, interests groups, or constituents. As Esterling (2004) observes, socially 
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Perceptions of Racial Inequality in Criminal Justice Decision-Making  
 
For scholars, decision-making in the criminal justice system is generally 
understood as a product of a multiplicity of demands, a strong need for compromise, and 
a degree of unpredictability (Hagan, 1989). A singular understanding of how criminal 
officials—ranging from police officers and correctional staff to probation officials and 
judges—arrive at certain choices to handle adult or juveniles offenders has proven elusive. 
Decisions broadly embody some collection of principles and objectives esteemed by 
unequal actors that varies over time and place. No single interest, ideology, or belief 
entirely dominates criminal justice officials’ choices (Gibbs, 1986; Hagan, 1989; Sutton, 
1988, p. 244) 
For policymakers, two fundamental principles underlie their perceptions of 
inequality in criminal justice decision-making: consistency and legitimacy (Blumstein, 
Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983). These ideals are distinguished by Blumstein et al. (1983) 
with respect to any inequalities in sentencing by judges. This dissertation expands on this 
framework by 1) extending it to all forms of criminal processing and criminal justice 
officials and 2) focusing on inequality with respect to race. Consistency refers to the 
similar treatment of individuals under the law. All persons should expect a criminal 
justice official will handle their cases in manner that accords with the approaches to 
others presenting comparable circumstances. Similarity of treatment is based upon an 
individual’s prior contacts, the interactions of one’s acquaintances, and the experiences of 
the general public with the criminal justice system (MacDonald, 1997; Tyler, 1990). The 
concept of consistency thus presumes criminal justice officials apply the law with a 
degree of uniformity.  
Legitimacy refers to the legal permissibility of the criteria used in a decision to 
enforce a law or policy. Legitimate factors are attributes of a case that characterize an 
                                                                                                                                                 
efficient policies are “only hypothetical solutions to policy problems” that reflect overall political 
consensus (p. 78-79).  
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offense, an offender’s culpability, or an offender’s potential for future criminality 
(Blumstein et al., 1983). These factors are popularly accepted and legally sanctioned by 
governing officials (Fagan, 2008b). More importantly, these considerations underpin 
essential qualities of an ideal criminal justice system like procedural fairness, security, 
and proportionality (Meares, 2000; Tyler, 1990). By contrast, illegitimate criteria are 
inappropriate and morally objectionable considerations that bear little relevance to a case 
from a legal perspective. While race or national origin rank among the most suspect 
classifications in American jurisprudence (O. C. Johnson, 2007), other personal 
characteristics like gender, socio-economic status, or religious identity also have no 
legitimate place in criminal justice decision-making.  
Interacting the dimensions of consistency and legitimacy gives rise to four 
perceived types of racial inequality in criminal processing. Each outcome is represented 
by a distinct quadrant shown in Table 1. Outcomes in Quadrants III (discrimination) and 
IV (disparity and discrimination) generally follow the definitions of Blumstein et al. 
(1983), but Quadrants I (disproportionate impact) and III (disparity) are marked by a 
different set characteristics described in the following. Again, while the legitimacy and 
consistency of criminal justice operations can be seriously contested (Tyler, 1990), this 
2x2 framework is based on the views of the median elected official, whose perceptions 
reflect consensual beliefs of policymakers.  
First, when the median policymaker believes criminal justice officials consistently 
apply the law and ground their decisions in legitimate criteria (Quadrant I), criminal 
justice decisions appear to be just. That is, the criminal justice system functions properly 
according to legal standards set forth by government and society. While procedurally just, 
issues of disproportionate impact due to legal factors may still occur. An example is 
elected officials observing more African Americans being convicted for homicide 
offenses because blacks are the overwhelming victims and perpetrators of homicide.  
The remaining quadrants reflect departures from a system believed by the median 
policymaker to be operating from principles of consistency and legitimacy. If an elected 
official sees the steady, palpable influence of illegitimate criteria in criminal justice 
outcomes, the problem is indicative of discrimination (Quadrant III). The consistent uses 
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of gender or race in sentencing decisions are examples of discrimination. An example of 
discrimination is also sentencing all death-eligible black defendants to death if they killed 
a white victim (Baldus and Woodworth, 2004).  
Conversely, when the median elected official understands that enforcement of 
criminal justices policies is lawful, but inconsistent, disparity without discrimination 
exists (Quadrant II). Disparity generally refers to differences among cases with similar 
attributes without regard to any specific reason for such distinctions (Blumstein et al., 
1983, p. 72; Spohn, 2000, p. 432). Differences among like-cases can be manifested in 
outcomes (e.g. length of sentence) or changes in the likelihood a case is handled in a 
certain way (Bishop, 2005, pp. 24–25; Sickmund, 2004, p. 12). Yet in Quadrant II, 
disparity without discrimination suggests legitimate factors are unevenly applied without 
prejudice, bias, or the influence of illegitimate factors like race. For instance, a judge 
considers an offender’s prior record more heavily than another judge in the same 
jurisdiction. These disparities in criminal justice decision-making can become 
problematic under the guarantee of equal protection because they can inadvertently map 
onto racial lines. In the above scenario, racial inequality could be exacerbated if African 
Americans are more likely to possess prior records than other racial groups (Mauer, 
1995).  
Finally if the median elected official thinks criminal justice operations are marked 
by biases and the uneven administration of the law, criminal processing suffers from the 
dual challenges of discrimination and disparity (Quadrant IV). Disparity and 
discrimination could coexist, for instance, when some, but not all police officers use race 
as a pretext for stops and searches. In these situations, the boundary between these issues 
may be difficult to define.  
 
Prior Literature on Race, Inequality, and the Criminal Justice System 
 
 The four expressions of perceived racial inequalities in criminal justice decision-
making that emerge from the median policymaker’s beliefs of consistency and legitimacy 
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correspond to important divides in social science literature on significance of race in the 
U.S. criminal justice system. Prior to the 1940s, social scientists were relatively united in 
their conceptualizations of criminality. Crime was closely linked to contemporary 
doctrines of scientific racism. Many scholars of the 19th and early 20th centuries 
subscribed to biological or physiological explanations of criminal behavior. Criminal 
disposition was inheritable with signs of criminality marking the body 
(Gould, 1996; Lombroso, 2006). These “stigmata” of one’s nature rested upon, and 
signaled, the presumptive inferiority of “nonwhite” populations (Gabbidon, 2009; Merton 
& Ashley-Montagu, 1940; Rafter, 1997). Little by little, pioneering studies by Du Bois 
(1941), Johnson (1941), and Sellin (1928, 1935) questioned such widely held narratives 
of black and immigrant criminality. Prejudice and the low-social position of racial and 
ethnic minorities were instead identified as the key drivers of these groups’ 
disproportionate rates of arrest, jailing, and imprisonment. Minorities were believed to 
offend at higher rate than whites, yet racial animus and bigotry placed nonwhites under 
greater surveillance and harsher social controls (Tonry, 1995).  
Following the demise of Jim Crow segregation, the stark numbers of racial 
minorities processed by the criminal and juvenile justice systems relative to minority 
groups’ representation in the general population sparked new inquiries into the equality 
and fairness of the criminal justice operations. Debate over “discrimination,” “differential 
involvement,” or “disparity” as the chief source of minority overrepresentation in 
criminal justice institutions has since characterized modern criminological research on 
race. The appeal of one perspective over another has varied over time and with the 
development of methodological innovations (Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 1987).  
The following discussion of modern criminal justice research speaks to the claim 
that elected officials often use scientific evidence with political information to formulate 
their constructions of racial inequality problems. Relevant scholarly theories are 
presented for each quadrant of Table 1. In brief, Quadrant I (disproportionate impact) is 
best captured by consensus theory, Quadrant III (discrimination) by conflict, symbolic 
threat, and other theories of discrimination, Quadrant II (disparity without discrimination) 
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by loosely coupled systems and bureaucratic theories, and Quadrant IV (disparity and 
discrimination) by most empirical criminological research and the contextual approach.  
 
Consensus Theory 
 
Quadrant I of Table 1 finds its intellectual roots in the sociological tradition of 
consensus theory. This Durkheimian perspective maintains that society agrees upon a 
common set of norms and beliefs. Acts or persons that threaten collective values must be 
rebuked (Engen, Steen, & Bridges, 2002). The state, law, and legal principles internalize 
and seek to uphold societal values. Punishment is then essentially a “passionate reaction 
of graduated intensity that society exercises through the medium of a body acting upon 
those members who have violated certain rules of conduct” (Durkheim, 1997, p. 96). The 
courts and law enforcement agencies accordingly sanction criminal behavior given the 
seriousness of an offense and broadly-based social expectations (Bridges, Crutchfield, & 
Simpson, 1987; Leiber, 2003). By result, criminal justice decisions should be viewed as 
legal and socially acceptable. 
 Under the consensus perspective, social structure wields an important, yet indirect 
influence over criminal justice administration. Economic inequalities deprive individuals 
of resources and opportunities, driving society’s most disadvantaged towards strain, 
anomie, and criminality (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981; 
Merton, 1957). Impoverished areas generate the highest levels of crime and the highest 
levels of imprisonment (Rose and Clear, 1998; Western, 2006; W. J. Wilson, 1987). 
Social controls consequently have the greatest impact upon the poor. Proponents of 
consensus theory would acknowledge wealth disparities contribute to overrepresentation 
of the poor among society’s criminally processed population. Such disproportion is 
justified, however, as it derives from the differential involvement of the impoverished in 
crime.  
 Race should also never directly enter into criminal processing. Because all 
segments of society would not consent to incorporating racial considerations into 
  
 
30
deliberations of criminal responsibility, the consensus tradition rejects the possibility that 
race itself will introduce new inequities in criminal justice administration. Whites and 
nonwhites should be treated equivalently given the objectivity and universality of legal 
principles. Racial bias is a random occurrence (Leiber, 2003), and the existence of a 
racist criminal justice system is simply a myth (Wilbanks, 1987).  
Racial differentials will only appear in criminal justice outcomes under two 
conditions: 1) if race is correlated with legal factors like crime severity, prior records, or 
number of charges (Liska & Tausig, 1979) or 2) if race is associated with socioeconomic 
deprivation, which increases an individual’s propensity toward criminal involvement and 
results in higher probabilities of formal criminal processing (Sampson & Laub, 1993). An 
empirical model properly controlling for legal characteristics and socioeconomic status, 
though, will show race does not exert any additional influence on these decisions.  
A reality in criminal justice is that both differential offending behavior and the 
low socioeconomic positioning of racial minorities skew the racial composition of the 
nation’s criminally processed population (Hindelang, 1969). Legal characteristics 
elucidate a non-trivial portion of minority overrepresentation in modern American 
prisons (Blumstein, 1982; Langan, 1985), though their explanatory power has diminished 
in more recent years (Tonry & Melewski, 2008). From a consensus perspective, racial 
disproportion does not necessarily call into question the operations of the criminal justice 
system. If consistently enforced based upon legitimate principles, laws and criminal 
justice policies may have normatively permissible racially disproportionate impacts. A 
system is only unjust if it deviates from its socially-ordered legal functions.  
 
Conflict, Symbolic Threat, and Other Theories of Discrimination 
 
 In sharp contrast to the consensus tradition, Quadrant III encapsulates several 
theoretical perspectives purporting the discriminatory nature of the criminal justice 
system. The conflict tradition serves as the intellectual foundation for claims of 
systematic bias. Acquiring momentum with the rise of “new” or radical criminology in 
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the 1960s, conflict theory alleges a powerful, majority continually seeks to preserve its 
dominance over marginalized populations. Elites design social structures to maintain 
extant power hierarchies (Chambliss, 1973; Liska, 1992; Quinney, 1975). The struggle 
between the powerful and powerless is manifested in rulemaking, organizational 
processes, and interpersonal relations (Schur, 1971). Punishment is a vital instrument of 
social control (Garland, 2001; Liska, 1992; Lynch & Groves, 1989). The very label of 
“deviant” or “criminal” acts as a potent device, eliciting negative social responses and 
further circumscribing an individual’s access to social institutions (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 
1967).  
In a system of differential power, the law will excessively discipline the poor, 
uneducated, foreign, and otherwise marginalized to ensure their repression (Myers & 
Talarico, 1987; Tittle & Curran, 1988). With regard to race, racial animus will permeate 
all aspects of criminal justice administration. Minorities will incur disadvantages from 
police patrols to sentencing due to the acrimony of the powerful. The constant influence 
of racial prejudice coupled with a lack of any political, economic, or social recourse to 
discrimination heightens the likelihood of certain and harsh sanctions for minorities 
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971).   
Symbolic threat theories give nuance to the traditional conflict perspective. This 
literature problematizes the narrative of the powerful’s relentless suppression of the 
powerless by offering that struggle actually occurs when two groups approximate each 
other in economic or social status. Specifically, one group becomes increasingly 
threatened by another that competes for similar resources, opportunities, and positions 
(Hawkins, 1987). Extending this logic to race relations, white fears develop in response 
to the growing presence of minorities within a certain population or greater minority 
group visibility due to social gains (Blalock, 1967). Feelings of threat may especially 
intensify as economic differences among racial groups narrow (Frazier, Bishop, & 
Henretta, 1992, p. 199). More simply, threat may even originate from perceived 
violations of middle-class norms or values (Sampson & Laub, 1993; Tittle & Curran, 
1988).  
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Regardless of its origins in social hierarchy or social proximity, discrimination 
has had a demonstrable impact on criminal processing. Within social science scholarship, 
discrimination is evidenced by purposeful intent or by the persistent effect of illegitimate 
factors after relevant control variables are introduced (Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 1987). First 
wave criminological research on newly integrated correctional facilities documented 
lingering discriminatory practices in the processing of adults (Bedau, 1976; Wolfgang, 
Kelly, & Nolde, 1962) and juveniles (Arnold, 1971; Thomas & Sieverdes, 1975; 
Thornberry, 1979) upon these grounds. The conclusion of pervasive racial bias, though, 
was far from universally embraced. Methodologists like Cohen and Kluegal (1979), 
Hindelang (1969), and Meade (1974) quickly faulted discrimination studies for their 
weak methods, reliance on older datasets, and focus on Southern jurisdictions. Many of 
these scholars sought to sustain the differential involvement thesis of the consensus 
tradition (Zatz, 1987). The dramatic growth of the American criminal justice apparatus 
and the system’s exacting collateral consequences for minority communities have 
nevertheless instilled new life into scholarly accounts of entrenched racial hierarchy 
(Alexander, 2010; Wacquant, 2009). 
 
Loosely Coupled Systems and Bureaucratic Autonomy Theories 
  
Against the backdrop of the “discrimination” and “no discrimination” divide 
between consensus and conflict theorists, scholars in the 1970s began presenting an 
alternative view of differences in criminal justice outcomes. The structure and function of 
the criminal justice system did not tightly fit with dominant social beliefs, norms, and 
ideologies (Hagan & Leon, 1977; Sutton, 1988). “Disparity” rather than uniformity due 
to shared social principles characterized criminal justice decisions of the day (Stith & 
Koh, 1993; Tonry, 1996; S. Walker, 1993). While disparity is commonly tied to the use 
of illegitimate criteria like race and gender in decision-making (see Quadrant IV), 
disparity without discrimination (Quadrant II) arises when criminal justice officials 
legitimately, but unevenly apply social controls due to the norms, routines, or structures 
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of a particular criminal justice institution. This problem is grounded in public policy and 
political science literature emphasizing the importance of bureaucratic structure and 
action.  
According to Scheingold (1984), disparity is a consequence of criminal justice 
bureaucracies’ “political accommodation” to their local settings (p. 230). Law 
enforcement agencies, courts, prisons, jails, and juvenile detention centers as criminal 
justice bureaucracies express a significant degree of bureaucratic autonomy.8 Insofar that 
criminal agencies operate as autonomous institutions, criminal processing and decision 
outcomes will vary across jurisdictions. To better understand these disparities, autonomy 
in criminal justice bureaucracies can be analyzed according to three perspectives: the 
individual approach, the organizational approach, and the environmental approach 
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). Each level of analysis illuminates different dimensions of 
agency power and sources of disparity in processing outcomes.  
The individual approach posits key decision-makers are responsible for defining 
the goals, practices, and independence of an agency (G. F. Cole, 1973; Packer, 1968; J. Q. 
Wilson, 1989). In the criminal justice system, individuals and their contributions to 
agency autonomy arguably become more significant as one moves down the 
administrative hierarchy to the “street-level bureaucrat” (Lipsky, 1969; Thompson, 1962). 
These public officials handle the everyday affairs of citizens through involuntary 
interactions and deal with problems over which they have little control. Such danger and 
authority grant street-level bureaucrats a substantial degree of independence, discretion, 
and legitimacy within a community (J.Q. Wilson, 1968). As these figures develop their 
routines and simplifications of common situations, little may check the ways they arrive 
at their decisions.  
Autonomy also stems from the organizational structure of the criminal justice 
system. The criminal justice system is often described as a loosely coupled system 
(Bishop, Leiber, & Johnson, 2010; Hagan & Leon, 1977; Singer, 1997). According to 
                                                 
8 Bureaucratic autonomy is evinced by an institution’s development of its own organizational 
capacities, distinct interests, and legitimacy in public and political spheres (Carpenter, 2001) 
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Weick (1976), such a system is denoted by subparts that are responsible to each other but 
retain their own identities and physical or logical separateness. Subparts, like the police 
department or the criminal court, are connected to each other by only a few shared goals 
or responsibilities (e.g. ensure public safety). Each subpart, however, differs 
substantively in how these goals or activities are acted upon (Glassman, 1973; March & 
Olsen, 1975). These weak linkages among subparts afford an agency flexibility, distance 
from outside influences, and the opportunity to develop its own interests (Weick 1976). 
By result, the criminal justice system will suffer from poor coordination, frequent 
violations of rules, uneven implementation of policies, and barriers to changing everyday 
routines (Hagan, Hewitt, & Alwin, 1979; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Finally, the environmental approach asserts the autonomy of criminal justice 
bureaucracies derives from their unique expressions of political and social dynamics 
within their particular communities (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Eisenstein & Jacob, 
1977; Flemming, 1973; Ulmer, 1997). According to this view, a singular criminal justice 
system does not exist. Every town, city, county, and state has its own criminal justice 
system, and no two work in the same way (Presidential Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 7). Who gets justice and how it is 
administered depends upon conditions in the local setting (Eisenstein, Flemming, & 
Nardulli, 1988). Justice by geography, for example, illustrates this argument. Urban 
jurisdictions notably develop more streamlined processing procedures in response to 
greater caseloads, delivering divergent outcomes from suburban or rural courts with more 
limited resources, less experience with “routine types” of offenders, or fewer needs to 
maintain order (Feld, 1991; K. L. Kempf & Austin, 1986; Leiber, 2003; Miethe & Moore, 
1985).  
Putting these three approaches together, criminal justice bureaucracies exercise 
considerable discretion, independence, and authority that directly generate disparities in 
decision outcomes. Each criminal justice institution arguably promotes its own forms of 
justice. As Nardulli, Flemming, and Eisenstein (1985) explain,  
 
  
 
35
“[Bureaucratic justice] is a justice premised not on strict adherence to due process 
or committed to the refined, individualized treatment of individuals; nor is it 
wedded to the swift and severe punishment of defendants based upon some 
consistent ideology but rather one premised on strict adherence to bureaucratic 
routine grounded in relatively pragmatic concerns. That routine in a given county 
is the result of an adjustment to an amalgam of contextual and environmental 
factors” (p. 1129). 
 
In all, the development of bureaucratic justices assures some disparity in processing 
outcomes must be anticipated within the criminal justice system as a whole. Still too 
much disparity even without prejudice requires correction by policymakers.   
 
Empirical Criminological Research and the Contextual Approach 
 
The preponderance of criminological research has ascribed to Quadrant IV’s 
position that disparity and discrimination affect outcomes at all decision-points (Bishop, 
2005; Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Kansal, 2005; Spohn, 2000; Tonry, 1995). This 
general agreement arose during 1980s that marked a key turning point in the research 
design and statistical approaches to racial inequality (Zatz, 1987). Hagan (1974), Kleck 
(1981), and others launched rigorous empirical efforts to unpack the complexities of race 
in criminal justice decision-making. The introduction of previously unconsidered 
variables, interactions, and multivariate statistical techniques to richer datasets 
underscored the multifaceted influence of race on processing outcomes (Crutchfield, 
Fernandes, & Martinez, 2010; MacLean & Milovanovic, 1990). A main effect of race 
after controlling for relevant factors has continued to signify the possible influence of 
discrimination (Mitchell, 2005; Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989). Yet criminologists have 
distinguished several additional dimensions of racial inequality in criminal processing.  
First, race exerts indirect or conditional influences on decision-making through its 
relationships with other relevant variables (Pope & Feyerherm, 1990). The effects of race 
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may be mediated by another variable, such as a youth’s family status (Kempf-Leonard & 
Sontheimer, 1995), prior record (Bishop & Frazier, 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & 
Kramer, 1998), bail status (LaFree, 1985), or judicial procedures (Chiricos & Crawford, 
1995; DeJong & Jackson, 1998). Race may alternatively have interactive effects on 
decisions. Differences in treatment may exist within racial groups and between-racial 
group distinctions may vary across levels of key social or legal characteristics (Bishop, 
2005; Miethe & Moore, 1986). Models simply testing the main effects of variables can 
mask the reality that race is more meaningful for certain subpopulations (Klepper, Steven, 
Nagin, & Tierney, 1983; Spohn & Spears, 2003).   
Second, the inclusion of multiple social, legal, and environmental factors may 
cause a statistically significant coefficient for race to disappear. These changes do not 
necessarily point to the conclusion that racial considerations have no influence on 
offenders’ treatment, however (Leiber, 1994; Pope & Feyerherm, 1993). The 
phenomenon of cumulative disadvantage supports this contention. Race tends to become 
more important at later processing stages along the criminal and juvenile justice 
continuums. Small disadvantages due to indirect or understated forms of racial bias can 
accumulate at early decision-points. As racial minorities incur progressively more harsh 
treatment due to biased decision-making, severe inequities among white and nonwhite 
offenders will appear at the sentencing or disposition stages (Bortner & Reed, 1985; 
Fagan, Slaugther, & Hartstone, 1987).  
Criminological studies highlighting the existence of disparity and discrimination 
underscore the degree to which race matters depends upon the decision-making “context.” 
Context broadly refers to the structural conditions, political climates, and social processes 
that affect the shape and appearance of racial differentials (S. Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 
2011, p. 29). Although researchers share different beliefs about what contexts or 
conditions exactly matter in decision processes, the goal is to capture a range of legal and 
extra-legal factors into one’s framework or empirical model (Sampson & Lauritsen, 
1997). To illustrate, Ulmer (1997), Conley (1994), and Leiber (2003) among others 
combine processing record information with ethnographic observations of courts to show 
how court orientations sway sanctioning practices. The contextual approach forges an 
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especially important role for public policy. If racial inequality is not an immutable reality 
of decision-making, legislation (Nicosia, MacDonald, & Arkes, 2013; Petersilia, 1983; 
Ulmer & Kramer, 1996) or judicial decisions (Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011; United 
States Sentencing Commission, 2010) can diminish racially discriminatory or disparate 
practices. While criminological literature indicates disparity and discrimination exist—
even after reform—experts and scholars often have to convince policymakers of this 
problem-construction and the need for intervention.  
  
Types of Racial Disparity Reform 
 
Because each quadrant of Table 1 introduces a specific construction of racial 
inequality in criminal justice, policy interventions on behalf of promoting more 
egalitarian and just outcomes for racial minorities will assume distinct forms. As Table 2 
shows, racial disparity reforms fall into four categories: exploratory, prohibitory, policy-
specific, and comprehensive. These types are intended to generalize policymaking 
solutions to racial inequality, even though inequalities and their policy responses may be 
complex. 
Exploratory reforms are associated with a criminal justice system believed by the 
median policymaker to be properly and uniformly applying the law. Because Quadrant I 
permits racially disproportion given the procedural justice of the system’s operations, 
reform addressing any racial inequality will target potentially disproportionate impacts on 
minority groups. Without clear threats to consistency or legitimacy, society must ask to 
what extent and what types of racial disproportion are acceptable. More precisely, society 
must contemplate what racial equality means in numerical, proportional, and subjective 
terms (Hagan, 1983; Nettler, 1979).  
Exploratory reforms seek to illuminate differences among racial groups by 
requiring the collection of data and/or additional study of racial differences within a 
jurisdiction. An example is President Clinton’s directive to federal law enforcement 
agencies to track their activities with statistics relating to race, ethnicity, and gender 
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(Holmes, 1999). Racial impact statements, or required reports outlining the possible 
consequences of legislative proposals altering criminal justice procedures upon minority 
groups, represent a more forceful example of exploratory reform (Mauer, 1999). The 
motivation behind such reform is two-fold: policymakers and practitioners get a better 
understanding of the racial impacts of current policies and public awareness of racial 
differences can encourage more critical assessment of the criminal justice system.  
Exploratory reforms are a weaker reform strategy. Even while displaying racial 
differences, consensus about racial justice may differ according to the statute, practice, or 
institution in question. For instance, suppose American society seeks to rectify the known 
overrepresentation of young black males in its prisons. Members of this group are 
overwhelmingly the perpetrators and victims of violent crime. At the same time, black 
men are disproportionately prosecuted under federal crack-cocaine laws (Tonry, 2011). 
Responses to racial differentials under drug policies may diverge from those under 
violent crime provisions, as violence and drugs potentially present different types of 
threat to broadly-based social values. By result, “racial justice” in the processing of 
offenders represents an evolving and continually negotiated ideal, even when the criminal 
justice system functions in accordance with socially prescribed laws.  
Prohibitory reforms emerge when the median policymaker endorses the belief that 
race is inappropriately used as a decision-making factor in Quadrant III. Restrictions on 
the use of race as a category and other anti-discrimination measures are common 
solutions. The Bush administration’s ban on federal agencies considering race in 
investigations not relating terrorism and other threats to national security represents one 
such measure (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Sometimes racial imbalances or 
disparate impacts may be proscribed. Prohibitory reforms also typically stipulate judicial 
resources for continued acts of discrimination. For instance, the Kentucky Racial Justice 
Act bars the imposition of the death penalty if statistical evidence shows race may have 
influenced the decision to seek a capital sentence (Neal, 2004).  
The possibility of judicial intervention in prohibitory reform is crucial to 
emphasize. Historically, the courts have stood as the primary institution for championing 
the interests of the less powerful in modern times (Mucciaroni, 2009; Scheingold, 1974).  
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Landmark cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954), and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) sought to dismantle systems 
of racial discrimination when comparable policymaking activity in Congress and the 
executive would have never transpired (Epstein, 1985; Hochschild, 1984; Scheingold & 
Sarat, 2004). Although discrimination in criminal justice used to be fought on 
constitutional grounds (i.e. violation of the Equal Protection Clause), cases like 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) have prompted legislatures to ensure non-discrimination in 
criminal justice through additional statutory protections like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
or Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. When judicial enforcement 
does not exist, prohibitory reforms can become toothless. Under circumstances of judicial 
non-intervention, elected officials can could also attempt to enforce prohibitory measures 
through federal funding sanctions (Simmons, 2008).   
Next, the median policymaker introduces policy-specific reforms to resolve 
perceived disparities without discrimination. Policy-specific reforms intend to promote 
consistency by revising the practices of criminal justice bureaucracies. The legislative or 
executive branch that created the bureaucracy usually introduces measures to reign in an 
agency’s deviations from politically accepted standards. Typically, reform is 
accomplished by making new legislation (Ferejohn & Shipan, 1990), but it may also 
include renewing or withdrawing agency appropriations, confirming agency appointees, 
and eliminating a service all together (Aberbach, 1990; Howell & Lewis, 2002; S. K. 
Snyder & Weingast, 2000). The scope of such reform is usually narrow, obtaining to only 
a certain subset of offenses, penalties, or criminal processing stages. Reforms tend to be 
more technical and structural in nature to ensure the practices of criminal justice 
bureaucracies are altered. In this regard, these policies intend to make incremental change 
rather than overhaul an entire criminal processing system. The Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010 typifies policy-specific reform.9 The law reduced the 100:1 crack and power 
cocaine sentencing disparity that resulted longer federal drug law sentences for African 
                                                 
9 Also see the rollback of New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, under which 90% of the state’s 
drug offenders were black or Hispanic (D. Cole, 2011).   
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Americans, who are the predominant users of crack cocaine. The new 18:1 statutory ratio 
has made sentencing fairer, but it does not eliminate the disparity in sanctions for two 
forms of the same drug (Mauer, 2011) 
When the median policymaker recognizes problems of bias and the uneven 
application of the law (Quadrant IV), comprehensive reforms advancing more systematic 
changes in criminal processing are formed. Comprehensive reforms call for regular 
assessments of racial disproportionalities within an entire system, intervention given 
these findings, and evaluation of introduced correctives. An emphasis is placed on the 
reform’s system-wide focus that motivates institutional changes within multiple criminal 
justice bureaucracies. Examples include providing cultural sensitivity training to 
probation officers, redefining “zero tolerance” juvenile detention policies, and improving 
local courts’ data collection on offenders (Coggs & Wray, 2008). Sometimes 
comprehensive reforms also incorporate local communities into reform initiatives 
(Griffith, Jirard, & Ricketts, 2012). Such measures are becoming increasingly popular. 
Since 2003, seven states have initiated comprehensive reform processes by establishing 
commissions tasked with analyzing and developing plans to amend racial and ethnic 
disparities.10 Similar comprehensive reform strategies have been applied to public health 
and environmental justice (Bullard, 2007; Clear, 2011; D. B. Smith, 1999).  
While policymakers’ endorsements of multi-pronged and system-wide solutions 
to the complexities of racial inequality sound promising, it remains unclear what 
comprehensive reform looks like within a system and whether such politically 
fashionable measures generate meaningful changes in criminal processing. Theses gaps 
becomes more glaring as most criminologists believe Quadrant IV best reflects the 
current state of criminal processing. This point is revisited in Chapters 5 and 6 that assess 
a potential model of comprehensive racial disparity reform.  
 
                                                 
10 These states include Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. See Figure 2.  
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Summary   
   
 This chapter has laid out a theoretical framework for racial disparity reform. It has 
asserted elected officials are motivated to adopt these policies based on civil rights ideals 
and interests in socially-efficient policymaking. Because elected officials are not entirely 
committed to following either of these motivations, the framework then explains why 
policymakers develop weaker and stronger racial disparity reforms. Policy responses are 
crafted based on the policymakers’ beliefs of legitimacy and consistency in criminal 
justice decision-making. These beliefs are made using scientific and political information. 
Inequality affecting racial minorities can appear in the forms of disproportionate impact, 
disparity without discrimination, discrimination, and disparity and discrimination. All of 
these problems map onto important divides in social science literature on race and 
criminal justice.  
Potential solutions to these politically-defined problems of racial inequality in 
criminal justice are varied. Exploratory reforms call for additional data collection or 
studies.  Prohibitory reforms ban the use of race as a category and other discriminatory 
practices.  Policy-specific reforms narrowly target a set of criminal justice practices or 
programs while comprehensive reforms call for evidence-based interventions throughout 
an entire criminal processing system. The next two chapters assess the emergence of 
racial disparity reforms in their exploratory, prohibitory, policy-specific, and 
comprehensive forms. Specifically, Chapter 3 qualitatively tests how differences in the 
definitions of racial inequality led to the construction of different national racial disparity 
reforms. Chapter 4 distinguishes the social and political factors that encourage racial 
disparity reform policymaking.  
  
  
 
42
CHAPTER THREE- THE EMERGENCE OF RACIAL DISPARITY REFORM IN 
POLITICS: A NATIONAL POLITICS ANALYSIS 
 
 Since the end of the Civil Rights Era, national policymakers have produced 
punitive policies with obvious racially disproportionate impacts. As Chapter 1 discussed, 
Congress and U.S. presidents actively developed numerous and expansive initiatives to 
“restore” lawfulness in society. Although the national politics of criminal justice was 
decidedly committed to “getting tough” at seemingly any cost, policymakers have not 
been immune to the racial disparate consequences of their enacted crime controls. Over 
the course of criminal justice policymaking during this period, the racial justice of 
criminal processing has been regularly questioned and addressed by various remedies. 
This chapter examines the emergence of racial disparity reforms enacted by U.S. 
presidents and Congress in three areas of criminal justice: capital punishment, racial 
profiling, and youth confinement. These selected issues first capture different aspects of 
criminal processing. More importantly, variation in policymakers’ definitions of racial 
inequality across these areas allows us to test Chapter 2’s assertion that these visions 
produce distinct policy responses. These cases studies indicate national elected officials 
came to a consensus about racial disparity reform based on 1) partisanship, 2) judicial 
rulings concerning the constitutionality of racial considerations, 3) controversial events11, 
and 4) studies of race in criminal processing. When the median national elected official 
saw racial inequality as a more glaring problem, reforms assumed more potent forms.  
 
Capital Punishment 
 
 While the influence of race on death sentencing has been long established in 
criminological research (Baldus, Woodworth, & Charles Pulaski, 1994; Baldus, 
                                                 
11 I follow Mayhew (2007) in defining a controversial event as an incident or occurrence that 
changes a political context by creating a new sense among policymakers about the importance of 
certain ideas, the urgency of societal problems, and the desirability of proposed solutions (p. 101).  
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Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990; Gross & Mauro, 1989; Kleck, 1981; Klein, Berk, & 
Hickman, 2006), political treatment of racial differences in capital punishment has been 
contentious. National elected officials have often acknowledged great racial disproportion 
in death sentencing, but remain deeply divided over whether such disproportionality is 
acceptable. Although some policymakers have attempted to respond to the Supreme 
Court’s call to legislatures to redress racial inequalities in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 
most national elected officials have accepted racial inequality in capital punishment as a 
form of disproportionate impact. This vision continues because policymakers, like the 
courts, have rejected the premise that statistical evidence can show illegitimacy and 
inconsistency in the application of the death penalty. Such a vision of disproportionate 
impact also quelled fears of the death penalty’s abolishment. Without a foundation to 
convince the median elected official of injustices in capital punishment, prohibitory or 
stronger remedies have yet to take shape in national politics.  
 
The Court’s Closure and Congressional Opportunity for Reform after McCleskey  
 
Impetus for racial disparity reform in capital punishment came from the Supreme 
Court’s approach to inequality and the death penalty. Judicial concern about the uneven 
application of the death penalty first became evident in Furman v. Georgia (1972). The 
Supreme Court determined “untrammeled” discretion within American death sentencing 
procedures and resultant arbitrary patterns of capital sentences had violated Eighth 
Amendment guarantees against cruel and usual punishment. The Court halted the 
imposition of the death penalty until new procedural and constitutionally acceptable 
standards that diminished risks of arbitrariness could be developed (Baldus et al., 1994). 
While Furman touched off a flurry of state legislation to codify death sentence 
criteria, the decision left open the possibility of questioning the death penalty on the basis 
of race. A majority of the Furman opinions hinted at the possibility that racial 
discrimination would create risks of capriciousness and arbitrariness forbidden under the 
Eighth Amendment. A similar logic appeared in Zant v. Stephens (1983), in which the 
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Supreme Court identified race as an impermissible and irrelevant “aggravating” factor in 
death eligible cases (Baldus et al., 1990, p. 308). 
Other race-based litigation implied the death penalty could be challenged under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of non-discrimination. Since the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, race-based violations of equal protection were successfully 
litigated with the help of statistical evidence in jury exclusion, school administration, and 
employment cases.12 The Supreme Court ultimately set a high bar for establishing claims 
of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
(1971) and Washington v. Davis (1976), the Court proclaimed known racially disparate 
impacts in employment do not definitely prove the existence of racial discrimination. 
Defendants had to further show discriminatory intent in employers’ decisions in order to 
substantiate civil rights violations. For death penalty opponents, these precedents were 
unclear regarding whether the courts would invalidate capital sentences if classwide 
evidence of race of defendant or race of victim discrimination existed.  
 The courts would firmly close their doors to constitutional challenges to racial 
disparities in death sentencing and other penalties in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987). 
Sentenced to death for killing a white police officer, McCleskey contested his 
punishment on the grounds that the renowned Baldus study showed cases involving white 
victims significantly increased a defendant’s likelihood of receiving the death penalty. 
The Rehnquist Court consequently faced the question of whether statistical analyses 
displaying the importance of race in capital sentencing demonstrated violations of the 
Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell pronounced that the proffered 
statistical evidence, while valid, did not prove purposeful discrimination or 
discriminatory effects in McCleskey’s sentence. The Court proclaimed racially disparate 
                                                 
12 Disparate impact litigation typically invoked Title VII and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The former bans discrimination by employers on the basis of race, color, or national origins 
while the latter prohibits such discrimination in federal agencies and all other public institutions 
receiving federal funds. Title VI was specifically praised as “the sleeping giant of civil rights” as 
it was designed to dismantle state-maintained inequalities (O. C. Johnson, 2007).  
  
 
45
impact did not deem the death penalty unconstitutional based on either amendment. If 
ruling otherwise, the Court feared statistical evidence would “throw into serious question 
the principles of the entire criminal justice system.” Instead, the Court charged 
legislatures with the task of evaluating statistical studies. It was the responsibility of 
elected officials to weigh such evidence against local conditions and redesign any penalty 
that disproportionately impacted particular groups. 
 
Exploratory Reform as a Congressional Response  
 
Over the next year, McCleskey and the question of congressional responses to 
racial equality in death sentencing would figure prominently in deliberations of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Congress sought to reinstate federal death sentences in an 
omnibus crime bill and redefine procedural standards to ensure the penalty would not be 
imposed in an arbitrary manner. Senator Kennedy, death penalty opponents, and other 
liberals took this opportunity to assert racial minorities were disproportionately sentenced 
to death without any sign of relief. “Racial discrimination is intolerable,” Senator 
Kennedy proclaimed, “…it is a wrong that cries out to be remedied by the Congress” 
(134 Cong. Rec. 13978). Representative John Conyers censured the Court’s conclusion 
that racial discrimination is an “inevitable part of the judicial process” as 
“unconscionable” (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Amendments of 1988, 
1988, p. 1).  
Racial disparity reform proponents opted for a multi-pronged, prohibitory strategy. 
The proposed Racial Justice Act of 1988 first prohibited the racially disproportionate 
application of the death penalty. It then required the systematic collection of data on 
death sentencing in states and localities. Based upon these data, a prima facie case of 
discrimination could be made if a greater frequency of capital sentences involved 
defendants or victims of a particular race. Any defendant of a death-eligible case could 
access these data. Defendants also reserved the rights to appoint counsel, investigative 
experts, and other parties with financial support from the courts to initiate challenges of 
racial discrimination. The defendant never had to show how discriminatory intents 
  
 
46
affected his or her specific decision. Experts applauded this congressional effort. The 
focus on collecting more data was key, as it could lead to more subsequent corrective 
action. Testifying before Congress, University of Miami Law Professor Steven Winters 
summarized the importance of this exploratory dimension of the bill, declaring  
 
“Proving that [racial disproportionate sentencing] is occurring, it puts on the 
public record in a demonstrable and irrefutable way that the system is not working 
properly. That is always the first step to fixing it, to bring into public 
consciousness that blacks are not being protected by the criminal justice system 
the ways are being protected” (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Amendments of 1988, 1988, p. 39).  
 
In the death penalty deliberations that followed, other members of Congress 
accepted well-established statistics showing the death penalty was more often applied to 
blacks defendants, especially in cases involving white victims (134 Cong. Rec. 13978-80). 
Yet many disagreed with the conclusion that such disproportionate impacts demonstrated 
the illegitimate or inconsistent application of capital punishment. Senator Alfonse 
D’Amato (R-NY) noted differential involvement in crime could easily drive these racial 
statistics. He observed it would be fallacious to assert prejudice affects the prosecution of 
those engaged in securities fraud because such offenders are disproportionately white. “I 
do not believe you can simply take a statistic and say that because there are more people 
of one race who have the death penalty applied to them…it is discrimination,” he 
concluded (134 Cong. Rec. 13980).  
Legislators also pointed to judicial precedent that statistics could not prove 
discrimination in death sentencing. Senators invoked the Supreme Court’s decision that 
the unprecedented Baldus study presented in McCleskey was detailed, but “far from 
conclusive” (134 Cong. Rec. 14098). It would be a leap to say statistical evidence could 
illuminate racial bias in specific cases when courts heavily scrutinize any claims of 
discrimination (134 Cong. Rec. 13988). Other cases like Spinkellink v. Wainwright 
(1978) highlighted the possibility that omitted factors may account for differences in 
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outcomes between death-eligible “black victim” and “white victim” cases (134 Cong. 
Rec. 14097). In light of these immeasurable conditions, the courts could not firmly say a 
deleterious racial effect was real. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) urged his colleagues to 
follow judicial approaches to statistics by succinctly stating, “The courts have been 
unanimous: statistical justice is no justice” (134 Cong. Rec. 13988). 
As Quadrant I of Table 1 predicts, acceptance of disproportionate impact in 
capital punishment by the median elected official led to exploratory reform as Congress’ 
preferred policy solution. On June 9, 1988, Senator Kennedy offered a two-part 
amendment to reduce racial inequality in the state and federal capital punishment systems. 
The amendment first introduced the Racial Justice Act. Second, the amendment required 
the Comptroller General to conduct a study that investigated whether race represented a 
“significant risk” that influenced sentencing outcomes. Race of victim and race of 
defendant effects would be thoroughly examined using ordinary statistical methods. The 
amendment went nowhere.  
The following day, Senator Kennedy reintroduced his amendment without the 
Racial Justice Act. Moreover, he emphasized the commissioned General Accounting 
Office (GAO) study was purely exploratory. The study could only assist Congress in 
“studying” and “fashioning appropriate responses” to any revealed racial inequalities 
(134 Cong. Rec. 14096). It could not be used for legal proceedings concerning 
discrimination and otherwise would have no effect beyond gathering more information. 
This revised, exploratory amendment passed the Senate with little fanfare. 
In February 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its 
requested report on race and capital sentencing to the House and Senate Committees of 
the Judiciary. The findings were clear. Surveying 28 criminological studies of varying 
quality and relying on 23 distinct datasets, race had substantial impacts on charging, 
sentencing, and application of the death penalty in the years following Furman. The race 
of the victim had consistently strong punitive effects, as cases involving white victims 
were more likely to impose a death sentence. The race of the offender had more 
inconsistent and less harmful consequences, yet many studies indicated being black or 
Latino generally elevated the likelihood of receiving the death penalty (U.S. General 
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Accounting Office, 1990). Although the GAO document did not offer any policy 
prescriptions, it solidified for Congress that capital punishment was marked by patterns 
of racial disproportion (Edwards & Conyers, 1994).   
 
Attempts at Prohibitory Reform: The Congressional Racial Justice Act  
 
 Given the exploratory reform foundation of the GAO capital punishment study, 
several members of Congress designed several politically-charged, prohibitory remedies. 
The Racial Justice Act first reappeared in the House under new terms in 1990, but 
acquired national significance in the 1994 debates on the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act. Introduced by Representative Conyers, the act sought to proscribe 
“racially discriminatory” rather than racially disproportionate capital sentencing. The bill 
maintained its reliance on ordinary statistics to establish discrimination, though the 1994 
version removed the requirement for data collection on all death eligible cases 
(Schoeman, 1995).   
 The discrimination-focus of the bill had polarizing effects. For anti-death penalty 
advocates and liberals, the legislation was an extension correcting trends of racial 
disproportion formally announced by the GAO study (140 Cong. Rec. S6113, daily ed. 
May 19, 1994).13 Yet Congress as a whole could not be convinced of persistent 
illegitimate uses of race in capital punishment. Instead, many members of Congress held 
on to the vision of disproportionate impact for two reasons. First, congressmen saw death 
sentencing as being consistently applied to offenders using the legal criteria of offense 
severity. For instance, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) noted that the death penalty is 
sanction narrowly applied in response to a crime and nature of an offender. “Today, each 
death sentence is rigorously reviewed for adherence to constitutional norms, sometimes 
even to the point of excess. At least those reviews are based on the facts of the case and 
the culpability of the offender,” he observed (140 Cong. Rec. S5210, daily ed. May 5, 
                                                 
13 I use daily editions of the Congressional Record because these were available via the Library of 
Congress website. Statement of Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL).  
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1994). Representative Steven Horn (R-CA) repeated this point in voicing his opposition 
to the Racial Justice Act. According to Representative Horn, “this Act disregards the 
fundamental principle of our criminal justice system that an individual is tried on the 
facts of his or her case” (140 Cong. Rec. H3272, daily ed. May 11, 1994). Senator 
D’Amato went further, adding the Racial Justice Act would “shatter the entire foundation 
of the criminal justice system” by rejecting “the most basic principle in criminal justice 
that the punishment must fit the crime” (140 Cong. Rec. S9562, daily ed. July 22, 1994).  
 Second, congressmen believed statistical evidence could never be employed to 
show discrimination in the case of an individual, but could be used to wrongly invalidate 
all capital sentences. Representative Bill McCollum (R-FL), who supported strengthening 
prohibitions on racial considerations in capital sentencing through the Equal Justice Act, 
rejected the assumption that statistics could prove discriminatory decision-making. 
Stating prosecutors and juries would not be able to impose the death penalty in the right 
proportion, Representative McCollum concluded, “The proponents of this bill, knowing 
that we cannot and will not play such a number game, fully expect the legislation to 
effectively end capital punishment in this country” (140 Cong. Rec H2532, daily ed. 
April 20, 1994). Senator Hatch expressed even stronger objections. “[The Racial Justice 
Act will] convert every death penalty case into a massive sideshow of statistical 
squabbles and quota quarrels,” he declared, “As prosecutors already recognize, they 
would ultimately have no choice but to adopt a death penalty quota that equals zero--in 
short, to abolish the death penalty” (140 Cong. Rec. S4979, daily ed. May 5, 1994).  
With a vote of 217-212, an omnibus crime bill containing racial justice guarantees 
barely passed the House in the summer of 1994. Backed by victims’ rights and prosecutor 
advocacy organizations,14 death penalty supporters in the Senate and House motioned 
their commitments to “totally reject” the Racial Justice Act in conference (see 140 Cong. 
                                                 
14 Organizations rejecting the Racial Justice Act included the National Association of Attorneys 
General, the National District Attorneys Association Board of Directors, Citizens for Law and 
Order, Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys’ Advisory Counsel, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys 
Associations, and the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (Lungren & Krotoski, 
1994, p. 660).  
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Rec. S5526, daily ed. May 17, 1994 and 140 Cong. Rec. H4619, daily ed. June 16, 1994). 
Deadlock over the crime bill prompted President Clinton to strike a deal with House 
Democrats and Congressional Black Caucus members who endorsed the Racial Justice 
Act. If proponents would eliminate the Racial Justice Act from the crime bill, Clinton 
vowed to enact similar act through an executive order (Cooper, 1994; Davidson, 1994). 
The conference committee subsequently dropped the Racial Justice Act from the omnibus 
bill and President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
into law.15 The promise of an executive order never materialized, however. This final 
failure of the Racial Justice Act signaled Congress could not achieve prohibitory racial 
disparity reform in capital punishment.  
 
Further Exploratory Reform from the Executive Branch 
  
Despite the “great controversy” of the Racial Justice Act and Clinton’s broken 
assurances for executive-led prohibitory reform16, the executive branch soon emerged as 
the primary venue for further racial disparity reform in capital punishment. The Clinton 
and Bush administrations continued to view racial inequality as a form of 
disproportionate impact. Thus U.S. presidents have extended exploratory policymaking 
efforts.  
Concerns for the racial neutrality in capital sentencing resurfaced at the tail end of 
the Clinton administration. In August 2000, Juan Raul Garza, a convicted drug trafficker 
and murderer under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, was scheduled to be first person 
                                                 
15 An executive order would have likewise proven difficult as the Dole, D’Amato, and Hatch 
Amendment prohibited the U.S. Justice Department from using its funds to support any policy 
supporting statistical assessments of race in death penalty cases (140 Cong. Rec. S9531, daily ed. 
July 22, 1994). The popular costs of Clinton coming to the rescue of those convicted of 
committing serious and heinous crimes may have also been far too great (Edwards & Conyers 
1994). 
16 See the remarks of Senator Moseley-Braun (140 Cong. Rec. S9540, daily ed. July 22, 1994).  
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executed by the federal government since 1963. As a final plea, Garza appealed his 
sentence on the grounds that the decision was unfairly based upon his ethnicity. The 
publicity of the first post-Furman execution by the federal government and the memory 
of the failed Racial Justice Act produced a presidential response. Clinton delayed Garza’s 
execution to December 2000. He then ordered the Justice Department to describe their 
decision-making processes in death penalty cases with an emphasis the racial, ethnic, and 
geographic characteristics of defendants and victims.  
On September 12, 2000, Attorney General Janet Reno published the 
administration’s federal death sentencing report. The manuscript affirmed the federal 
death sentencing system too manifested clear racial disproportionalities. More poignantly, 
the report underscored drug sentencing had disparate impacts on Hispanics. Hispanic 
defendants, particularly those tried in Texas like Garza, were overwhelmingly sentenced 
to death relative to whites. Despite these results, Clinton did not affirm any illegitimacies 
or inconsistencies in recent death sentencing. He called for a follow-up study to 
determine whether racial or ethnic bias may have affected Garza’s or other current 
federal death penalty cases. While the Justice Department would share its study by April 
2001, Garza’s execution would be stayed until June 2001 when the president could make 
a fully informed decision.   
In between the Justice Department’s exploratory study and Garza’s execution, 
George W. Bush assumed political office. During his confirmation hearings, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft answered with an unequivocal “yes” to the question of whether he 
agreed with President Clinton that there is a need for continuing study of possible racial 
and regional bias in the administration of the federal death penalty (Confirmation Hearing 
on the Nomination of John Ashcroft to be Attorney General of the United States, 2001). 
Not without controversy, the Bush administration would assume a different approach to 
the importance of race in capital sentencing. In January 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft 
among other high-ranking Justice Department officials met to discuss the future of the 
race and death penalty study. While the exact contents of the meeting remain disputed, 
most accounts relay Ashcroft proclaiming such a study could not authoritatively show the 
influence of race in capital sentencing deliberations. “There was sort of a consensus, as I 
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understand it, that perhaps the study as contemplated would not give a definitive answer 
to the problem of these disparities,” Assistant Attorney General Larry Thompson testified 
before Congress (Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System, 
2001).  
Under intense political pressure, the Justice Department released a supplementary 
analysis of the federal death sentencing system on June 6, 2001. The Ashcroft report 
acknowledged minority overrepresentation in federal capital cases relative to the racial 
and ethnic composition of general U.S. population. The high proportion of nonwhite 
federal defendants was attributed to “normal factors” affecting federal and state 
prosecution practices, such as the nature of an offense, demographics of the jurisdictions 
in which the crime was committed, and activities of federal and state law enforcement 
authorities. The report concluded the Department of Justice found “no evidence of bias 
against racial and ethnic minorities” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001).   
For the Bush administration, the bottom-line was the federal death penalty could 
not be contested with assertions of insidious bias and apparent racial disproportionalities 
in sentencing outcomes were acceptable.17 In the following days, Ashcroft announced 
there was no reason to delay the execution of Juan Garza (Thomas, 2001). Garza was 
executed eight days after Timothy McVeigh by lethal injection.  
The release of the Ashcroft report and the completion of the first post-Furman 
federal executions marked an end of significant racial disparity reform policymaking in 
capital punishment. After the botched execution of Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma, 
                                                 
17 The Ashcroft report sparked immediate criticism and skepticism. The American Civil Liberties 
Union launched one of the greatest attacks, documenting numerous methodological flaws. 
Among its shortcomings, the Ashcroft report only examined cases with capital punishment 
charges rather than all death eligible cases, omitted charging and plea decision information. It 
further failed to consider a range of factors like geography or aggravating circumstances in 
explaining why these non-biased sentencing patterns occurred (American Civil Liberties Union, 
2001). Subsequent statistical analyses of the cases contained in the Reno report conducted by 
Klein, Berk, and Hickman (2011) maintained race was not factor in federal death penalty 
decisions.  
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President Obama recently ordered the Department of Justice to examine death penalty 
procedures in the states in light of racial bias arguments (Goad, 2014). Beyond this study, 
the Obama administration and Congress have not announced any proposals to remedy 
racial inequalities in capital sentencing.  
 
Racial Profiling 
 
In the mid-1990s, racial profiling by law enforcement officials burst on to the 
national political agenda.18 Racial profiling, or selection by law enforcement for stops or 
searches that relies on an individual’s presumed race, is an early form of processing in 
which minority overrepresentation can occur (Fagan, 2002; Ramirez et al., 2000). 
National policymakers took an exploratory turned prohibitory approach to addressing 
racial profiling. Growth in consensual beliefs about the consistent, illegitimate use of race 
in police stops and searches, also known as discrimination, were based on limited relief 
from the courts, mounting evidence of racially-biased policing, and public outcry against 
such practices. Just when a bipartisan policy to “end” racial profiling seemed likely, 
concern for national security after the September 11th terrorist attacks reoriented political 
dialogue on racial profiling and left the nation with a moderated ban on racial 
considerations by federal law enforcement officials. Nevertheless, the idea of racial 
profiling as a problem of discrimination has left a durable mark on policymakers, who 
continue to pursue prohibitory strategies.  
   
                                                 
18 Although unwarranted and abusive police targeting of minorities has occurred for centuries, 
racial profiling as a concept has only developed within the past twenty years. Prior to 1994, the 
practice only showed up a handful of times in newspapers from around the country. By 1999, 
racial profiling has regularly generated over 1,000 hits in media content searches (Skolnick & 
Caplovitz, 2001). 
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Limited Relief from the Courts  
  
 Racial profiling emerged as a problem for national elected officials due to decades 
of limited or no relief from the courts. Prior to being deemed “racial profiling,” the use of 
race by law enforcement initially raised legal concerns in the 1970s. The Supreme Court 
first reviewed the appropriateness of race in U.S.-Mexico border patrol stops and 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Mexican ancestry alone did not support a “founded 
suspicion” of illegal immigration under the Fourth Amendment. The decision thus 
established police stops had to be based upon other “reasonable” factors related to 
suspicions of illegal activity.  
The courts notably stopped short of prohibiting any use of race or ethnicity in 
immigration enforcement, however. A year after Brignoni-Ponce, the Court declared 
ethnicity could be a legitimate factor in recommendations for additional border patrol 
inspections in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976). The majority asserted that 
selective diversion of motor vehicles that led to defendant Amado Martinez-Fuerte’s 
arrest for transporting illegal aliens were based on numerous factors besides Mexican 
ancestry. This fact also implied disparate stopping and questioning of drivers with 
Mexican appearances was constitutional. The Court concluded, “Even if it be assumed 
that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we 
perceive no constitutional violation.” 
 These early border patrol precedents would motivate further judicial scrutiny of 
race in federal and state law enforcement decisions. Race-based profiling by law 
enforcement officials slowly emerged as a civil rights problem during the late 1980s and 
1990s. The primary question concerned the role of race in pretextual traffic stops to 
initiate searches of vehicles suspected of being involved in criminal activity. Pretextual 
stops were a central component of law enforcement efforts to combat drug trafficking. At 
the height of the War on Drugs, the Drug Enforcement Agency launched Operation 
Pipeline, a drug interdiction training program for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers patrolling U.S. highways. The program trained officers to stop 
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automobiles and drivers matching the “typical” traits of drug couriers. While criteria like 
drivers who “do not fit the vehicle” and “wearing lots of gold” had racial overtones, it is 
contested whether the race of an automobile’s occupants was identified as a factor for 
drug courier profiles (Harris, 1999). 19  
 Anecdotal evidence of disproportionate stops and searches of black and Hispanic 
surfaced, but lawsuits in New Jersey and Maryland sparked a national dialogue about 
racial profiling. State of New Jersey v. Pedro Soto, et al. originated from a motion to 
suppress evidence against 17 African American defendants who faulted discriminatory 
traffic enforcement along the New Jersey Turnpike for their arrests between 1988 and 
1991. Wilkins v. Maryland State Police was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union 
on behalf of Robert Wilkins, an African American attorney, and three others who were 
unfairly detained and searched along the I-95 corridor.  
These cases rested upon the first systematic assessments of race, stops, and 
searches conducted by John Lamberth. The premise of Lamberth’s first-wave studies was 
simple: compare the racial composition of motorists detained and searched by law 
enforcement to the racial composition of motorists traveling on the highway and 
motorists violating traffic laws. The studies featured stationary and rolling surveys, in 
which researchers stopped/drove along the highway recording the race of drivers passing 
them by (speeders) and drivers they passed (non-speeders). Using these observations, 
Lamberth approximated the percent of all motorists and of traffic violators who were 
black, Hispanic, white, or other. The states of New Jersey and Maryland then provided 
information about their law enforcement stops. 20  
                                                 
19 Official statements by the Drug Enforcement Agency and a review by the Justice Department’s 
Civil Rights Division, however, allege racially-biased profiles were not apart of the program (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, 2004).   
20 These data contained the race of the searched motorist and whether the search led to the 
recovery of any illicit substance. The records did not identify the race of motorists stopped by 
Maryland State Police. Consequently, Lamberth had to operate from the assumption that the 
racial composition of traffic violators should approximate the racial composition of motorists 
actually detained by law enforcement officers.  
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Percentage-wise comparisons of traffic violators and searched individuals 
revealed glaring disparities. In New Jersey, blacks represented 13.5% of all motorists and 
15% of traffic violators, but constituted 35% of motorists stopped by police. Given this 
discontinuity, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled such racial imbalance in stops 
violated the state and U.S. constitutions (Lamberth, 1998). In Maryland, blacks made up 
17.5% of the eligible traffic stop population, but constituted 74.9% of all searches. When 
additional evidence suggested that recovery rates for contraband in searches were 
identical for blacks and whites, this gross disparity in search decisions became 
extraordinary (Lamberth, 1996). Following the study, Maryland State Police promised to 
reform its policing practices under consent decree.  
 Although class-action concessions and consent decrees within state courts seemed 
to signal judicial willingness to sanction racial disparate law enforcement practices, the 
constitutional question of whether pretextual traffic stops and searches, particularly those 
motivated by race, violated the Fourth Amendment worked its way up to the Supreme 
Court. Filing an amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties Union cautioned any defense 
of pretextual stops would effectively “invite discriminatory enforcement” (Harris, 1999).  
 In Whren v. United States (1996), the Court proclaimed traffic violations constituted a 
legitimate pretext for drug searches. In a sweeping movement, the majority distinguished 
the Fourteenth Amendment as the sole constitutional means for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory applications of stops and searches. While police cannot selectively enforce 
the law, the Fourth Amendment could not be used to redress claims of racial 
discrimination in policing. In light of McCleskey, this decision implied evidence of 
racially disproportionate stops and searches like the Lamberth studies also could not 
show racial discrimination without proof of discriminatory intent. Racial profiling 
lawsuits would continue throughout the 1990s, but the courts refused to ban the use of 
race in law enforcement decisions on a constitutional basis (Gross & Livingston, 2002).  
 
Exploratory Reform as a First Step in Addressing Racial Profiling  
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The Supreme Court’s delivery of Whren prodded Congress take immediate action. 
Representative Conyers and the Congressional Black Caucus took the lead in crafting 
new legislative remedies. Within the year, the Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997 (H.R. 
118) was introduced before the House. The bill compelled the Attorney General to 
conduct a study of routine traffic violations by law enforcement officials and share its 
findings with Congress. The study would identify the race and ethnicity of stopped 
individuals its primary goal. The measure was purely exploratory. Data could not be used 
in any legal or administrative proceeding to establish the inference of discrimination. 
Moreover, additional data collection was meant to explore the nature and extent of racial 
profiling given few existing studies on subject (H.R. Rep. No. 105-435). Optimists about 
the legislation like Professor David Harris of the University of Toledo School of Law 
raved the act would “put to rest once and for all the idea that African Americans who 
have been stopped for ‘driving while black’ are just imagining that this is a common 
practice” (Drake, 1998).  
Although doing nothing to regulate stops or ensure the equal application of the 
law, every attempt to pass the Traffic Stop Statistics Act would be thwarted. In March 
1998, the Traffic Stop Statistics Act initially passed a Republican-controlled House by 
voice vote. Strong opposition to the bill came from the Senate. Police organizations 
especially denounced the bill as a means of punishing officers for performing their duties 
(Harris, 1999). Unable to pass through the Senate Judiciary Committee, the measure died. 
Nearly identical versions of the bill proposed by Representative Conyers and Senator 
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) never made it out of committee during the 106th Congress (see 
H.R. 1443 and S.821).   
  With Congress in gridlock over a traffic stops statistics study, President Clinton 
launched the nation’s first exploratory initiative to examine racial profiling by federal law 
enforcement officials via executive order. On June 9, 1999, President Clinton directed the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Treasury to design 
data systems that gathered information on the race, ethnicity, and gender of all persons 
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processed by their respective law enforcement agencies within 120 days.21 All affected 
agencies were ordered to then devise a report summarizing the racial characteristics and 
results of their investigations. The President in consultation with the Attorney General 
would evaluate federal data collection and processing efforts. Opponents to the directive 
cited Clinton’s study had nothing to do with ordinary police interactions. As Richard 
Gallo, the Federal Law Enforcement Officer Association Director, put it, “[f]ederal 
agencies don’t do traffic stops” (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2004, p. 13). 
Clinton’s executive order still effectively challenged policymakers to uncover racial 
profiling by law enforcement “anywhere it exists” (Holmes, 1999). The directive led to 
field testing in nearly thirty locations at national parks, train stations, and airports 
throughout the country (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).  
During that same summer, the Bureau of Justice Statistics began to implement its 
own data collection initiative to approximate the prevalence of racial profiling. Under the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, BJS was required to document 
incidents of police misconduct to Congress in an annual report. BJS used this mission 
statement add new questions about police-citizen contact during traffic stops to its 1999 
nationally representative survey of 90,000 adults. Results of the survey indicated blacks 
had higher chances of being stopped than whites or Hispanics. Specifically, 12.3% of 
African American drivers compared to 10.4% of white drivers were stopped by police 
officers (Langan, Greenfeld, Smith, Dunrose, & Levin, 2001, p. 13). Overrepresentation 
of blacks in multiple traffic stops was also noticeable. BJS concluded that while these 
racial differences were real, they did not demonstrate whether race was used as a factor in 
police decision-making or confirm the existence of racial profiling (Ibid).  
 
                                                 
21 Across the Departments of Justice, Interior, and Treasury, five federal agencies were affected 
by this order. These agencies were the Drug Enforcement Administration and Immigration and 
Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, the National Park Service of the Department 
of the Interior, and the U.S. Customs Service and the Secret Service of the Department of 
Treasury (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).  
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Racial Profiling As a Form of Discrimination 
 
By the end of 1999, the median national policymaker could no longer believe 
racial profiling was simply an unfortunate result of disproportionate impact. The offense 
of “driving while black” had decidedly captured public attention. Popular magazines like 
Time and People exposed law enforcement mistreatment of minorities across the country 
(Fields-Meyer, 1996). Gallup polls reported an increasing percentage of African 
Americans indicating unfair treatment by police and a majority of Americans (59%) 
saying racial profiling was widespread (Gallup & Gallup, 1999). Police violence had also 
ignited public outrage. The killing of West African immigrant Amadou Diallo by New 
York City Police Department officers after mistaking his wallet for a handgun incited the 
denouncement of unbridled law enforcement power and further interrogation of the racial 
neutrality of police-citizen interactions. This incident was sharpened by the sanctioning 
of two police officers for beating and sexually assaulting Haitian immigrant Abner 
Louima  just a few weeks earlier (Holmes, 1999). Following these events, the ACLU 
deemed racial profiling the “lead civil rights issue of the 1990s” (Chaffin, 2005, p. 17) 
National elected officials began to cast racial profiling as an issue of 
discrimination, or the consistent use of race as an illegitimate decision-factor. “We no 
longer need just a study. We now have the facts that show us racial profiling is… a real 
and measurable phenomenon,” Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) observed in proposing the 
End Racial Profiling Act (H.R. 2074; S. 989) (147 Cong. Rec. S5892, daily ed. June 6, 
2001). The measure sought to eliminate racial profiling by any law enforcement officer or 
agency. Law enforcement agencies at all levels of government found engaging in 
prohibited racial profiling practices would be sanctioned by federal funding reductions. 
Any individual injured by racial profiling could seek relief in the courts. Proof of racial 
profiling could be evidenced by disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities in any 
routine investigatory activity. Other congressional variations of the provision like the 
Racial Profiling Prohibition Acts (H.R. 965; H.R.1907) went further, imposing federal 
aid restrictions upon any state whose highway patrols inappropriately enforced the law 
based upon race, ethnicity, or national origin.  
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Beliefs in racial profiling as an issue of discrimination affected Republicans too. 
“Too many citizens have cause to doubt our Nation’s justice when the law points the 
finger of suspicion on groups instead of individuals,” President George W. Bush 
observed in his 2001 State of the Union Address. Earlier that morning, Bush issued a 
memorandum to Attorney General Ashcroft to assess federal law enforcement agencies’ 
use of race in stops, searches, and other investigations. The order went on to encourage 
Ashcroft to work with Congress to develop data collection and study methods to 
determine the extent of race-based profiling in federal law enforcement. The 
administration affirmed its commitments to putting an end to racial profiling as a 
wrongful practice without compromising safety. Because problems of discrimination 
motivate prohibitory reform (Quadrant III in Table 1), bans on the use of race as a 
decision-making factor seemed imminent.  
 
Racial Profiling as Discrimination? : The Events of September 11th  and Prohibitory 
Reform 
 
Just as a national bipartisan, prohibitory solution to racial profiling seemed 
possible, policymakers backed away from completely rejecting race as a decision-making 
factor. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fractured American perspectives on 
the proper scope of law enforcement activities (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
2004). Polling evidence indicated nearly 70% of the public approved of racial profiling as 
a tool to prevent terrorism. Over 50% of Americans supported requiring those of Arab 
descent to incur “special, more intensive security checks” and carry “special I.D.s”  
(Weinstein, Finnegan, & Wantanabe, 2001). “Politely and respectfully” using race and 
ethnicity in investigations was accepted as a means to prevent further tragedies (Taylor, 
2001; Higgins, 2003). Backlash against the racial unfairness of profiling was quickly 
silenced, as challenges to racially-conscious investigations would be seen as unpatriotic 
or even sympathetic to the causes of terrorists.  
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The events of September 11th muted congressional anti-racial profiling efforts, but 
profoundly shaped the Bush administration’s racial profiling initiative. The resultant U.S. 
Department of Justice’s guidance on racial profiling internalized two reform sentiments. 
On the one hand, the directive reflected a national consensus to eliminate racial profiling 
as a widespread and discriminatory criminal justice practice. The document stipulated 
race and general stereotyping could not be used “to any degree” in a routine law 
enforcement activities. On the other, it conceded race could be considered in national 
security investigations “in accordance with Constitution and law of the United States.” 
This caveat was non-trivial. Standing judicial precedent affirmed that race could 
constitutionally be apart of law enforcement decision-making. The policy was also silent 
on the administration’s plans to enforce the ban or address complaints of continued racial 
profiling practices.  
While the Justice Department set new national standards for appropriate 
investigatory practices, the executive’s commitment to racial profiling reform was 
unconvincing for many. Critics saw the administration’s racial profiling policy as 
symbolic. The director of the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office, Laura Murphy, 
denounced the administration for “trying to get the public relations benefits of a new law 
without actually creating a new law” (Lichtblau, 2003). Controversy surrounding the BJS’ 
2005 study of police and citizen interactions likewise raised concerns. Lawrence 
Greenfeld was reportedly demoted by the administration for refusing to minimize 
findings of racial disparity in police stops and searches. The incident called into question 
the insularity of research agencies within the executive as well as the administration’s 
interest in eradicating racial profiling (Lichtblau, 2005). 
Prohibitory reform remains the preferred strategy for national policymakers, who 
attempt to extinguish racial profiling as a form of discrimination. The End Racial 
Profiling Act (H.R. 2851; S.1038) reemerged after George Zimmerman was found not 
guilty for the murder of Trayvon Martin. Although Martin was not killed by a police 
officer, Representative Conyers explained Martin’s death exposed the need to redress the 
linkage between race and reasonable criminal suspicion that underpins law enforcement 
debates (Fox, 2013). The Obama administration has also largely preserved federal bans 
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on racial profiling practices and narrowed acceptable uses of race for security purposes 
(Horwitz & Markon, 2014).   
 
Youth Confinement 
  
As political attention turned to the legitimacy of racial imbalances in death 
sentencing in 1980s, minority youth confinement also worked its way on to the national 
political agenda. Confinement here refers to the jailing, detention, confinement, and other 
commitments of youths to secure public facilities during or after determinations of 
delinquency (Hsia et al., 2004). Like adult incarceration, confinement in the juvenile 
justice system has been historically marked by sharp racial disproportionalities (Bishop, 
2005; Leiber, Peck, & Rodriguez, 2013; Pope & Feyerherm, 1990). Problems of minority 
youth confinement have roused national policymakers to make significant, yet generally 
underappreciated policy-specific and comprehensive reforms. Stronger ideas of disparity 
(i.e. the inconsistent application of the law) and disparity and discrimination (i.e. the 
illegitimate and inconsistent application of the law) have allowed Congress to take 
exemplar acts of racial disparity reform.  
 
Policy-Specific Reform in the Disproportionate Minority Confinement Mandate  
  
 Between 1968 and 1988, massive changes to juvenile justice had occurred. The 
Supreme Court’s due process revolution of the 1960s had accorded numerous protections 
to juveniles, including the right to counsel in In re Gault (1967) and proof of guilt by a 
standard of reasonable doubt in In re Winship (1970) (Butts & Mitchell, 2000). The Court 
strengthened procedural restrictions on parens patriae and judicial “treatment” of youths, 
effectively “constitutionally domesticating” juvenile processing (Feld, 1999, p. 79). 
Congress too cemented institutional safeguards in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974. All states were required to 1) separate juvenile 
defendants and delinquents from adults by sight and sound, 2) deinstitutionalize status 
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offenders, and 3) remove all juveniles from adult jails and detention centers. In 
conjunction with declining juvenile arrests, national juvenile justice policymaking 
triggered a 21% decline in youth detention and confinement rates between 1974 and 1982 
(Krisberg et al., 1987).  
At the same time, the fall of the Jim Crow order ended separate institutional 
treatment of minority youths. Historically, black children were barred from Houses of 
Refuge and other reformatories addressing juvenile delinquency because of scientific 
beliefs of their injurious presence to white youths. In the North, African American youths 
were often sent to adult working houses, jails, and prisons until “colored sections” of 
existing juvenile institutions or separate facilities were constructed (Pisciotta, 1983). 
Southern treatment of African American delinquents was strongly modeled after 
“plantation discipline.” Black boys were required to complete hard manual labor while 
black girls learned to perform domestic work and other house servant duties (Ward, 
2012). Segregation, poor treatment, and disproportionate classification as “unredeemable” 
also affected Native-American and Hispanic youths (Chavez-Garcia, 2012). Later in the 
20th century, African American and other minority communities devised their own 
“child-saving” institutions to promote social order and racial uplift outside of the state 
(Ward, 2012). Given such institutional practices of minority exclusion, minority contact 
with the juvenile justice system would be substantially underreported until racial 
integration occurred.  
The confluence of the “due process revolution” and desegregation led to dramatic 
transformations in the size and racial composition of incarcerated youth populations. 
While community-based alternatives to incarceration proliferated for white youths who 
were eligible for secure confinement, these sanctions were not consistently extended to 
similarly situated minority youths (Krisberg et al., 1987). In fact, the number of 
incarcerated minorities steadily rose (Krisberg et al., 1987). By 1977, blacks and 
Hispanics made up 41% of juveniles held in public facilities. When youth incarceration 
rates escalated during the 1980s, black, Hispanic, Asian-American, and Native American 
youth represented 93% of incarceration increases (National Coalition of State Juvenile 
Justice Advisory Groups, 1989, p. 4).  
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 Minority overrepresentation issues in juvenile justice reached Congress in the 
late 1980s (Krisberg et al., 1987, p. 33). Testifying before the House Subcommittee on 
Human Resources in 1986, former OJJDP administrator Ira Schwartz first distinguished 
minority youth confinement as “a potentially very explosive issue” (Oversight Hearing 
on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 1986 p. 73). Schwartz stressed 
policymakers must take a harder look at these inequalities and use Congress’ 
“particularly strong a unique position” to address the issue now before racial disparities 
severely worsened (Ibid).  
Schwartz’s warning shook members of Congress, who began contemplating that 
disparity was a problem government should solve. Representatives Dale Kildee (D-MI) 
and Thomas Tauke (R-IA) held a series of hearings on minority overrepresentation in 
youth confinement. “Data in this area is [sic] alarming. It indicates minority juveniles are 
disproportionately incarcerated,” Representative Tauke explained, “we need to figure if a 
dual juvenile justice system is emerging” (Hearing on H.R. 1801 To Reauthorize the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 1987, p. 3). Experts like Barry 
Krisberg of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency confirmed that the high 
numbers of incarcerated minorities in the system were not just because of discrimination 
but also due to disproportionate involvement in crime. The very doctrine of parens 
patriae also contributed to problematic differences in juvenile processing outcomes (Ibid, 
pp. 12-13).  
A vision of disparity stemming from troubling inconsistencies in the treatment of 
juveniles grew among members of Congress. Responding to high ratios of black and 
Hispanics in secure facilities, Representative Pete Visclosky (D-IN) observed, “My sense 
is you what you want to try to do is to find that balance, to maintain flexibility of that 
system, but to prevent what would almost appear to be an abuse that has occurred here 
(Hearing on H.R. 1801 To Reauthorize the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, 1988, p. 170). Congressional intervention that changed secure confinement practices 
was then thought to be necessary. “We’re dealing with young people who are just now in 
the process of developing their personal, some of which is already damaged. That’s a 
very high priority to promote human dignity,” Representative Kildee proclaimed 
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(Hearing on H.R. 1801 To Reauthorize the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, 1988, p. 172). 
Juvenile justice reform advocates urged Congress to see the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as a source of institutional reform. At 
minimum, they proposed the office could lead educational campaigns or demonstration 
projects to reduce minority youth confinement. Others imagined a more forceful OJJDP 
presence based on JJDPA requirements. “If OJJDP is going to continue with the 
requirements for State plans,” William Bogan of the National Coalition of Hispanic 
Health and Human Services Organizations stated, “put some language in that increases 
their accountability for minority issues” (Hearing on H.R. 1801 To Reauthorize the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 1988, p. 116).  
Congress was receptive to a new JJDPA amendment due to controversy 
surrounding OJJDP. The office had first come under fire under its administrator, Alfred 
Regnery, a former Republican staff aid with limited experience in juvenile affairs. 
Regnery had expressed interest in addressing racial inequality in juvenile justice. In fact, 
he convened the federal government’s first two-day national conference on minority 
youth crime and ways to relieve the “common knowledge” problem of racial disparity 
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1985, p. 2). Regnery upset 
Congress, though, by censuring its deinstitutionalization of status offenders as “anti-
family” because emancipated truants, runaways, and youth-in-conflict remained in the 
streets rather than in correctional facilities. He further alienated youth advocacy 
organizations by basing official reports on crude statistics, misrepresenting scholarly 
work on juvenile crime rates, and funding ideological projects “outside the spirit” of the 
office (National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups, 1986).22 The 
message was clear that only Congress could initiate juvenile justice reforms, especially 
with regard to minority overrepresentation issues (I. M. Schwartz, 1989).  
                                                 
22 In his own words, Schwartz comments, “During his tenure as administrator, Regnery managed 
to repoliticize the office, mislead the American people, and destroy the credibility of the entire 
federal juvenile justice effort” (1989, pp. 109-110). 
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Believing in problems of disparity (Quadrant II of Table 1) and seeing a political 
opportunity to revise the JJDPA, Congress would pursue policy-specific reform. During 
the developmental stages of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress formulated a 
JJDPA amendment demanding states to reduce minority overrepresentation within public 
custody facilities. Specifically, states had to decrease the proportion of a given minority 
group of youth detained or confined in detention facilities, secure correctional facilities, 
jails, and lockups if this amount exceeded the proportion of that group in the general 
population (Hsia et al., 2004).  
 Congressional proponents of this Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) 
amendment had high hopes. The provision was intended to provoke states to approach 
racial disparities “in a comprehensive manner” (H.R. Rep. No. 100-605, p. 10). To meet 
the provision’s goals, states were to examine various aspects of minority 
overrepresentation like arrest differentials, improving minority access to diversionary 
programs, and reaching out to community-based organizations serving minority 
communities (Ibid). Unlike the contemporary Racial Justice Act prohibiting racially 
disproportionate capital sentencing, the DMC amendment was signed into law as part of 
the omnibus crime bill of 1988.  
 
Comprehensive Reform in the Disproportionate Minority Contact Mandate 
 
Once the DMC mandate was ratified into law, federal and state juvenile justice 
bureaucracies began efforts to diminish racial disparities in secure confinement. At the 
national level, OJJDP took the lead in helping states make sense of this unprecedented 
policy. Almost immediately, the agency initiated a technical assistance campaign to 
provide instruction on fulfilling all aspects of the DMC mandate (Leiber 1992). OJJDP 
similarly launched DMC pilot programs in five states to find promising reform strategies 
(Coleman 2010).23 Congress hoped the mandate would allow practitioners and 
researchers to identify, publish, and replicate interventions that produced more race-
                                                 
23 These five states were Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, and Oregon (Coleman, 2010).  
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neutral results (H.R. Rep. No. 100-605, p. 10). Yet several factors would inspire the 
revision of this policy-specific measure.   
First, Congress began to reevaluate the DMC mandate because criminological 
research continued to reveal severe minority overrepresentation among securely confined 
youth populations. Racial disproportion in detention and secure confinement facilities 
continued to swell, as over 60% of juveniles in custody belonged to a minority group 
(Minority Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System, 1991). By 1999, 7 out of 10 
juveniles in confinement were nonwhite (145 Cong. Rec. S5560, daily ed. May, 1999). 
Unexplainable racial inequalities were also remarkable at prior decision-points like 
referral to juvenile court and adjudication (Pope and Feyerherm, 1990). Interest groups 
like the National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups expressed 
frustration with the “infancy” of the DMC mandate. “There is enormous frustration in 
addressing this agenda,” its chair Vicki Neiberg observed, “[but] enormous pride when 
we chip away” (Juvenile Justice, A New Focus on Prevention, 1992, p. 12). 
Findings of enduring racial imbalances in youth confinement irked national 
legislators. For instance, a four-fold disparity in the racial composition of California’s 
general and confined youth populations prompted Representative Matthew Martinez (D-
CA) to sigh, “You know, I imagined that because this is a mandate, a study would be 
done and something constructive would be done about disproportionate minority 
confinement” (Proposed Legislation for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, 1997, p. 45). Juvenile justice advocates and liberals in Congress believed in the 
DMC mandate, but hoped for a more expansive measure. Liberal policymakers saw 
minority overrepresentation as part of larger problems within society. Describing a new 
generation of truly disadvantaged children, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) notably praised 
the DMC mandate as a tool to  “incorporate the special needs of minority youth” in a 
broader national response to juvenile delinquency (Ibid, p. 3). In his testimony, OJJDP 
administrator Shay Bilchik acknowledged some states were working hard to meet the 
revised DMC mandate. Uncertainty about what the measure intended to accomplish and 
what type of changes were necessary had thwarted substantive shifts in state processing. 
Bilchik agreed that enlarging the scope of the provision to include disproportionate 
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minority “contact” with any part of the juvenile justice system would emphasize the 
importance of intervention through the entire system and better align the provision with 
congressional intentions (Proposed Legislation for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, 1997, pp. 46-47).  
Second, policy developments in affirmative action raised doubts among 
legislators that the Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate could lawfully 
produce more racially equal processing practices. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 
(1995), the Supreme Court designated race as a category whose use requires strict 
scrutiny by the courts. The federal government could only rely on race-based numeric 
standards to further a “compelling state interest.” A month after the decision’s 
announcement, the White House announced new federal government standards for 
gender, racial, and ethnic considerations. President Clinton called for the elimination of 
any program that creates racial quotas, preferences for unqualified individuals, reverse 
discrimination, or unnecessary benefits after equal opportunity has been achieved. Any 
use of race or ethnicity in decision-making would otherwise have to meet constitutional 
standards (Clinton, 1995).   
These events figured prominently into public and political views of Congress’ 
minority youth confinement corrective. Juvenile justice practitioners complained the 
DMC mandate’s imperative to reduce disparities in the racial composition of securely 
confined youth populations effectively amounted to an unconstitutional quota. One 
Oklahoma juvenile justice administrator testified before Congress that “quotas are not the 
answer. Youth are placed in a system based on their acts, not their race” (H.R. Rep. No. 
107-203, p. 29). Some worried the policy would inspire states to make illogical 
interventions like ignore racial inequalities at previous processing stages or release 
dangerous offenders in the name of racial equality (H.R. Rep. No. 105-155).  
In pondering the fate of the DMC mandate, members of Congress largely invoked 
issues of disparity and discrimination in the juvenile justice system. Following expert 
testimony that inequalities in confinement partly derive from crime and partly from 
discriminatory practices like disproportionate surveillance of black communities, 
Representative Michael Castle (R-DE) proclaimed, “This is a fact which I think I can 
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understand” (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: Preventing Juvenile 
Crime at School and in the Community, 1999, p. 50). Senators like Paul Wellstone (D-
MN) drew more detailed conclusions from disproportionate minority confinement studies 
and congressional discussion on the topic. “I do not think this whole problem of 
disproportionate minority confinement is the product of bigoted or racist authorities, 
though there is too much bigotry and there is too much racism,” he observed. Differences 
in poverty, education, and political connections created “unconscionable” racial 
distinctions as well (145 Cong. Rec. S5560, daily ed. May 19, 1999). Senator Kennedy 
added an ideal response to minority youth confinement should make states “more 
sensitive” to the everyday socioeconomic and racial challenges individuals face in 
American society (145 Cong. Rec. S5565, daily ed. May 19, 1999).  
Not all members of Congress endorsed a race-focused, system-wide corrective to 
inequalities in juvenile justice. The most vocal opponents to an expanded DMC mandate 
were Senate Republicans. Party leaders like Senator Hatch and Senator Jeff Sessions (R-
AL) asserted the measure first violated the Constitution and federal government 
restrictions on using racial categories. Overrepresentation in confinement first only 
applied to minority groups. The measure implied that non-minority classes could not be 
disproportionately processed or even disadvantaged by the juvenile justice system. 
Second, critics claimed there was no compelling interest in correcting racial 
discrimination because no youths were alive during the Jim Crow era. Finally, the 
measure could possibly be used to justify other forms of disproportionate attention to 
minorities like racial profiling by police officers (145 Cong. Rec. S5564, daily ed. May 
19, 1999). Summarizing objections to the DMC mandate, Senator Hatch lamented,  
 
“This is what you call a bleeding heart amendment. They can’t show the facts; 
they don’t have the facts on their side. They are using statistics. They are ignoring 
the facts that people are convicted of these crimes and need to serve time for them, 
regardless of skin color. It is nice to talk about civil rights… If anyone can show 
me where there is prejudice, if they can show me where these people are not justly 
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convicted, that is another matter. I will be right there marching with them. But 
they can’t and they know it” (145 Cong. Rec. S5574, daily ed. May 19, 1999). 
 
For these reasons, DMC mandate opponents modified the extant provision to 
prohibit the disproportionate contact of any segments of the juvenile population with 
juvenile justice structures (see the Violent and Repeat Offender Accountability and 
Rehabilitation Act, H.R. 1501). Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) retorted juvenile justice 
reform was fundamentally a racial issue. “When we get to the question of sentencing, you 
don’t think that has anything to do with race,” he charged, “You are sleepwalking 
through history… This is all about race. This is a civil rights issue and this is a civil rights 
vote” (145 Cong. Rec. S5572, daily ed. May 19, 1999). While a race-neutral, contact-
reduction measure later passed the Senate in summer 1999, Representatives Carolyn 
Kilpatrick (D-MI) and Conyers successfully reinstated an expanded DMC mandate in a 
House amendment (145 Cong. Rec. H4553, daily ed. June 17, 1999). Unresolved 
differences like the fate of the DMC mandate in the two chambers’ bills ultimately 
derailed the enactment of any national juvenile justice legislation.  
With continued support in the House and a coalition of liberal Senators, 24 the 
DMC mandate reappeared as a comprehensive racial disparity reform in 2001. Debates in 
the Senate affirmed the need for comprehensive reform. Child advocacy organizations 
like the Youth Law Center and the Children’s Defense Fund worked extensively with 
Democrats to “put ideology aside” and preserve the JJDPA’s core protections that help to 
prevent “physical and emotional scars” among detained youths (147 Cong. Rec. S222, 
daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001).  
With the median member of Congress endorsing a vision of racial inequality in 
youth confinement as a problem of disparity and discrimination, Congress expectedly 
developed a comprehensive reform (Quadrant IV of Table 1). It expanded the DMC 
mandate from “confinement” to “contact” with the juvenile justice system. Addressing 
                                                 
24 These six senators included Senator Kennedy, Senator Wellstone, Senator Feingold, Senator 
Diane Feinstein (D-CA), and Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL).  
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disparities, the Disproportionate Minority Contact mandate intended to ensure individuals 
charged with the same crime and same circumstances would be treated uniformly. 
Tackling discrimination, the measure promised to “eliminate true bias” throughout the 
juvenile justice continuum (H.R. Rep. No. 107-203, p. 29). The comprehensive DMC 
mandate was enacted in the reauthorized Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act of 2001. The provision requires federally-funded states to reduce the disproportionate 
number of minorities handled at all decision-points in the juvenile justice system without 
the use numeric standards or quotas. It became the nation’s first racial disparity reform to 
tackle inequalities throughout an entire justice system. Today, it is a model for 
comprehensive reform proposals for adult criminal processing (Racial Disparities in the 
Criminal Justice System, 2009). For instance, an adult-focused version of the DMC 
mandate can be found in the proposed Justice Integrity Act of 2014 (Lerman & Weaver, 
2014).  
 
Summary 
 
Over the past four decades, issues of racial inequality have pressed policymakers 
to act against growing racial imbalances in criminal justice. National elected officials 
have devised numerous correctives that vary in scope and character.  This chapter used 
the racial disparity reform framework to explain why U.S. presidents and Congress 
develop certain policy responses. Case studies of reforms in capital punishment, racial 
profiling, and youth confinement revealed three findings. First, reforms are products of 
policymakers’ beliefs of about racial inequality in the U.S. criminal justice system. 
Second, the median national elected officials’ beliefs about racial inequality are forged in 
light of partisanship, judicial decisions concerning the constitutionality of racial 
considerations, controversial events, and studies of race in criminal processing. Given 
these two dynamics, different racial disparity reform policies emerged in these three areas 
of criminal justice. An exploratory reform targeted racial differences in capital 
punishment because national elected officials accepted the penalty’s disproportionate 
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impacts. A prohibition on racial profiling developed as policymakers increasingly came 
to believe in the prevalence of discriminatory law enforcement practices. Recognition of 
continuing disparities and discrimination in youth confinement ultimately prompted 
Congress to adopt a comprehensive reform reducing disproportionate minority contact 
with juvenile justice structures.  
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CHAPTER FOUR - PREDICTING THE ENACTMENT OF RACIAL DISPARITY 
REFORM: A STATE POLITICS ANALYSIS 
 
As “policy laboratories,” states have also enacted a diverse array of reforms 
addressing racial inequalities in their adult and juvenile justice systems. While Chapter 3 
showed how differences in problem definitions explain the emergence of different types 
of racial disparity reform using three case studies, more variation—like that seen at the 
state-level—is needed to identify the specific social and political factors that underpin 
racial disparity reform policymaking. This chapter examines racial disparity reforms 
established by state legislatures and executives from 1998 to 2011. It first discusses how 
to operationalize the theoretical explanations for racial disparity reform introduced in 
Chapter 2. It then describes reform data for all fifty states. Next, it employs a series of 
event history models to identify the socio-political factors associated with the reform 
activities of state elected officials. Event history models reveal severe racial 
disproportionalities in incarceration and arrests significantly elevate the likelihood of 
racial disparity reform enactments. The absence of ongoing racial fairness efforts within a 
state judicial system and Democratic control of governing institutions also strongly 
predict policymaking. These results support arguments for ideological and problem-
solving motivations for racial disparity reform.  
 
Testing Social and Political Explanations of Racial Disparity Reform 
 
This chapter evaluates the importance of the two motivations for racial disparity 
reform previously described in Chapter 2. To recap, elected officials should promulgate 
reforms due to racially egalitarian ideals entrenched in American politics. Second, 
policymakers receive electoral and institutional benefits for solving pressing social 
problems.  
Motivation for racial disparity reform first derives from prevailing civil rights 
ideals (King & Smith, 2011). Again in today’s contemporary racial order, anti-egalitarian 
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ideas encourage punitive policy change, but liberal principles motivate racial disparity 
reform (King & Smith, 2005; Hochschild et al., 2012). The influence of the racially 
egalitarian tradition on public policy is arguably best approximated by partisanship. 
Across the two major political parties, Democrats endorse more progressive ideals and 
remain key civil rights proponents for minorities (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Democratic 
Party members also tend to see crime as a symptom of structural inequality. Offenders 
cannot be held responsible for the failing schools, residential segregation, discrimination, 
and joblessness that put them under correctional supervision (Beckett & Sasson, 2000). 
By contrast, Republicans continue to emphasize choice and equal opportunity. Offenders 
freely choose to break the law and should incur the consequences for their behaviors 
(Scheingold, 1984).  
Empirical evidence generally supports the literature’s argument that partisanship 
is crucial to anti-egalitarian criminal justice policymaking. At the national level, 
Republican control of the elected branches is associated with greater justice expenditures 
(Jacobs & Helms, 1999). In the states, harsher sanctioning, as seen in more death penalty 
laws or higher incarceration rates, increase under Republican governors and with more 
Republicans in the legislature (Jacobs & Jackson, 2010; Greenberg & West, 2001; Yates 
& Fording, 2005). This difference in ideological outlooks suggests racial disparity reform 
is more plausible when Democrats control the legislative and/or executive branches. 
Partisan explanations lend to three different hypotheses:  
 
H1 : Unified control of the executive and legislative branches by Democrats elevates the 
probability of racial disparity reform. 
 
H2 : A large Democratic presence in a state legislature increases the likelihood of racial 
disparity reform.  
 
H3 : When a state governor is a Democrat, racial disparity reforms are more likely to be 
adopted.  
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A second motivation for racial disparity reform comes from politicians’ needs to 
address social concerns. To ensure their reelection, elected officials must take positions 
on pressing issues and claim credit for developing policy solutions (Krehbiel, 1991; 
Mayhew, 1974). These activities allow elected officials to distinguish themselves from 
other candidates. Making “good” public policy further affirms politicians’ fitness for 
office among voters and interest groups (Fenno, 1978; Sunstein, 1988).  
Given such electoral interest in solving problems (Esterling, 2004; Fenno, 1978; 
Mayhew, 1974), the severity of racial disproportion within a state criminal justice system 
should stimulate reform. Problem severity is a key motivator for policy innovation within 
states (Nice, 1994; Sapat, 2004; J. L. Walker, 1969). Racial inequality in criminal justice 
is an obvious challenge for state policymakers. From arrests to sentencing, racial 
minorities are overrepresented in every aspect of criminal processing (Mauer, 2011; 
Tonry, 1995; Western, 2006). Such disproportionate minority contact cannot be entirely 
explained by differential involvement in crime (Tonry & Melewski, 2008).  
Problems of racial disproportion can vary within and across states. 
Disproportionality is typically measured by taking the ratio of minority criminal 
processing rates to white criminal processing rates at a particular decision-point (Leiber, 
2002). For example, the black-to-white ratio of incarceration was 12.1:1 in Pennsylvania 
and 6.3 to 1 in California for 2011 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012). Racial 
disproportion tends to worsen at later criminal processing stages such that disparities in 
arrests do not perfectly predict disparities in incarceration (Blumstein, 1982; Tonry & 
Melewski, 2008). Historically, states like Kentucky and Illinois have possessed the 
highest black-to-white ratios in arrests. Meanwhile, Iowa, Connecticut, and Wisconsin 
boast the highest levels of racial disproportion in incarceration (Mauer & King, 2007). 
Reform may then respond to racial disproportionalities at different processing points 
along the criminal justice continuum, which suggests a fourth hypothesis:   
 
H4 : As a state experiences worsening problems of racial disproportion in its criminal 
justice system, elected officials are more likely to develop racial disparity reforms.  
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Policymaking in response to social problems also accords benefits to elected 
branches as governing institutions. A system of separated powers prompts each branch to 
preserve and assert its authority (Patashnik & Peck, 2015). Struggles over institutional 
power encourage one branch to monitor the decisions of the others. When a governing 
institution fails to take action on an important issue, other branches will respond in hopes 
of enhancing their reputation (Blackstone, 2013). “Governance as dialogue” is strong 
between the judicial and elected branches because notions of judicial supremacy have 
grown over time (Miller, 2009; Whittington, 2006).  
The interplay among the judicial and elected branches should be another source of 
racial disparity reform. While courts have retreated from racial issues in criminal justice 
on constitutional grounds (see Chapter 3), several judicial systems have launched 
campaigns to redress racial inequalities in criminal proceedings. Starting in New Jersey 
in 1983, state court systems have created racial fairness commissions tasked with 
improving minority access to justice (National Consortium of Racial and Ethnic Fairness 
in the Courts, 2014). These commissions are typically led by a state’s highest court or in 
conjunction with a mandatory state bar association (National Center for State Courts, 
2014). Twenty-nine states have established least one racial and ethnic bias commission in 
their judicial systems (Neeley, 2008).  
While developing racial fairness commissions within a state court system requires 
considerable “momentum” (Neeley, 2008), reform efforts of these bodies vary. In 
Washington, the State Minority and Justice Commission has initiated numerous reforms, 
including a drug-charging study in three countries, a regular newsletter on racial issues, 
and annual reports on its progress to reduce racial inequalities. Others like Michigan’s 
Racial and Ethnic Fairness Commission have yet to publicly publish a set of reform goals 
and recommendations. Most commissions create a research agenda, complete a system-
wide review of racial inequalities, and offer preliminary remedies. Regular release of 
these reports is the primary means by which the courts educate the public and other 
policymakers about their racial justice activities (Norris, 2011). Nevertheless, not all 
commissions or judicial systems take steps to share their reform plans, pointing to a fifth 
hypothesis:     
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H5 : Elected officials are less willing to adopt racial disparity reforms when state 
supreme court systems are active in introducing their own corrective efforts.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
 
Citizen Ideology. In addition to the political orientations of elected officials, citizen 
ideology may affect criminal justice policymaking. States possess different policies 
across issue areas due to variation in public attitudes (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993). 
Empirical evidence is mixed on the influence of citizen ideology on criminal justice 
reforms. Some studies indicate states with more conservative citizens possess higher 
incarceration rates (Greenberg & West, 2001; Yates & Fording, 2005), more death 
penalty laws (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), and stronger restrictions on offenders’ rights 
(Ewald, 2012). Other studies do not find significant impacts of citizen ideology on state 
criminal justice practices (Christie, 2014; K. B. Smith, 2004). Because racial egalitarian 
ideals are stronger among liberals, states with more liberal citizens should be more likely 
to promulgate racial disparity reforms.  
 
Social Threat. Scholarship has recognized that perceived threats from marginalized 
groups motivate the tightening of crime controls (Garland, 2001). Two commonly cited 
“dangerous classes” are the poor and racial minorities. Poverty can destabilize social 
order and proliferate criminal activity. To deter further disorder, policymakers may adopt 
more punitive criminal justice policies. An association between the threat of the poor and 
incarceration has been demonstrated empirically (Greenberg & West, 2001). Poverty may 
likewise signal to elected officials that crime is an issue of economic disadvantage rather 
than a problem of race. In this respect, racial disparity reform should be less likely to 
occur in states with high poverty rates.  
The presence of racial minorities within a state is traditionally cast as another 
social threat. Increases in black populations can stir fears that whites may lose political 
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power or access to economic resources (Blalock, 1967; Key, 1949). Given the 
inconsistent role of racial threat in punitive criminal justice reforms (Jacobs & Jackson, 
2010), the effect of a strong African American presence in a state on racial disparity 
reform is ambiguous. Racial threat theories suggest states with smaller black populations 
will be more likely to enact racial disparity reforms. Yet theories of policy responsiveness 
would predict the opposite (Keech, 1968; Keiser, Mueser, & Choi, 2004). Greater black 
electoral strength due to population size may inspire more racially egalitarian criminal 
justice reforms by politicians.  
 
Crime and Punitiveness. Criminal justice reforms might reflect a state’s crime problems 
and punitiveness. When crime rates rise, policymakers toughen criminal laws (Yates & 
Fording, 2005). It is expected elevated crime rates will deter elected officials from 
advocating for more racially fair processing practices. A state’s approach to criminal 
justice may likewise shape the reform activities of elected officials. The most visible 
form of state punitiveness is its incarceration rate (Uggen & Manza, 2002). A state with 
high levels of incarceration may be culturally and structurally more resistant to altering 
criminal justice policies in order to reduce their harms on racial minorities.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Data on racial disparity reforms adopted between 1998 and 2011 by state 
legislature and executives were collected for all fifty states. This time period is selected 
for several reasons. During the late 1990s, race and criminal justice issues became salient 
concerns. Racial profiling was barely mentioned before 1997 (Skolnick & Caplovitz, 
2001), yet nearly 60% of Americans believed the practice was widespread by 1999 
(Gallup 1999). Police violence likewise decidedly captured public attention, inspiring 
significant questioning of racial injustice (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2004). 
Second, elected officials began to reverse their commitments to tougher crime controls 
(Jacobson, 2006). Even conservatives started to advocate for reduced criminal justice 
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operations and enhanced prisoner reentry programs due to the enormous societal costs of 
criminal processing (Dagan & Teles, 2014). Lastly, states began to systematically collect 
data on race in arrests and imprisonments (Mauer & King, 2007). Table 3 presents the 
mean and standard error of all variables for all state-year observations. Appendix 2 
displays the number of racial disparity reform policy enactments and measure enactments 
for each state.  
 Enacted racial disparity reform policies were identified by electronic searches of 
enacted laws from state legislatures and executive orders passed by state governors. 
Appendix 1 details the process for coding racial disparity reforms. Legislation was found 
using a combination of searches of state “regulations, administrative codes, and statutes” 
on LexisNexis and state legislatures’ databases. A total of 94 pieces of legislation were 
enacted into law between 1998 and 2011. Executive orders issued by governors were also 
examined using electronic executive and state government archives. A total of 24 
executive orders responded to racial problems in criminal justice. Together, 118 distinct 
racial disparity reforms were ratified in law during this fourteen-year period.  
Figure 1 presents the total number of racial disparity reform policies adopted by 
each state between 1998 and 2011.  Two trends become immediately apparent from this 
figure. Policies are not concentrated in any one region of the country. They also do not 
appear with greater frequency in ideologically more liberal or “blue” states (i.e. states 
that usually vote Democratic in national elections).  
Provisions in legislation and executive orders were then coded according to the 
type(s) of reform measures the policy introduced to address racial inequalities. The 
contents of enacted policies were classified as exploratory, prohibitory, policy-specific, 
or comprehensive measures. A total of 150 reform provisions were identified from 118 
distinct policies. Of these, 58 were exploratory, 38 were prohibitory, 37 were policy-
specific, and 17 were comprehensive. Most policies with multiple reform provisions 
target racial profiling. For instance, in a single 2000 law, the California legislature 
banned racially-biased policing (prohibitory reform), introduced new racial and cultural 
sensitivity standards for law enforcement officers (policy-specific reform), and required a 
legislative report on racial profiling (exploratory reform) (see Appendix 1).  
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Figure 2 displays the distribution of these four types of racial disparity reform 
measures within the states. This figure shows policy-specific and prohibitory reform 
measures are prevalent throughout the country. Many states have established two or more 
exploratory reform measures. Few comprehensive reform measures were enacted, but 
these provisions are more common in southwestern states.  
 
Major Independent Variables 
 
Partisanship. This study tests partisan theories of racial disparity reform using three 
variables. Partisan control of both elected branches is captured by a dummy variable for 
whether or not there is unified Democratic control of the executive and legislature 
(unified Democratic control). Partisanship in the legislature is measured by the change in 
the percentage of Democrats within a legislature from a previous year (percent 
Democrat). Partisanship in the executive is represented by a Democrat in control of the 
executive branch (Democratic governor, where 0 = Republican or non-major party and 1 
= Democrat, following Klarner, 2011).  
 
Racial Disproportion in Criminal Processing. This study relies on two measures to test 
whether racial disproportion in criminal processing influences racial disparity reform 
enactments. Due to limitations in criminal justice agencies’ information on race and 
ethnicity (Mauer & King, 2007), this study focuses on disproportionalities in criminal 
processing that affect African Americans. Black-white disparity in arrest rates is 
measured annually by dividing the arrest rate of African Americans by the arrest rate of 
whites. An arrest rate is estimated by dividing a racial group’s number of arrests by its 
total population in a state. Black-white disparity in incarceration rates similarly 
compares the annual incarceration rate of African Americans to the incarceration rate of 
whites. Again, an incarceration rate is determined by dividing a racial group’s number of 
incarcerated persons by its total population in a state.   
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Judicial Racial Disparity Reform Efforts. The judicial non-intervention hypothesis is 
tested using the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts’ and the 
National Center on State Courts’ data on state court system efforts to improve racial 
fairness. A dummy variable is constructed for whether a state had a racial fairness 
commission that published a report or plans to improve racial inequalities in the courts 
between 1998 and 2011. Publishing a report indicates Judicial racial disparity reform 
efforts are ongoing (1) rather than non-existent (0).   
 
Other Independent Variables 
 
Citizen Ideology. A one-year lagged measure of citizens’ ideological orientation is 
included to determine the influence of public opinion on reform enactments. The log of 
Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson (2012)’s electorate liberalism scores is used to 
make hazard ratios more interpretable.  
 
Social Threat. To test social threat theories, this study relies on three variables capturing 
states’ economic and racial characteristics. Percent poverty gauges the annual percentage 
of a state population living below the poverty line (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012b). 
Unemployment rate measures a state’s annual unemployment rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2012). Racial threat is approximated by the annual percentage of a state’s 
population that is African American (percent black) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012a).  
 
Crime and Punitiveness. This study uses two variables to determine whether crime and 
punitiveness shape racial disparity reform development. Crime rate is measured by the 
log of the annual total number of offenses per 100,000 residents in a state (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2011). Incarceration rate approximates states’ approaches to 
criminal justice. It is measured by the annual total number of prisoners per 100 state 
population (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012).   
 
Method 
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This study relies on event history analysis to discern the socio-political factors 
associated with racial disparity reform policy and measure enactments. Event history 
analysis is a “survival time” process by which one can observe whether a state’s elected 
officials enacted a racial disparity reform within a specific period of time. Once the event 
of a reform enactment has been experienced, a state is no longer observed or becomes at-
risk for another event (Cleves, 2010; Golder, 2014).  Observations of whether a state’s 
elected officials developed a racial disparity reform policy are made for every year 
between 1998 and 2011. Observations are also made for each type of racial disparity 
reform measure within enacted policies.  
Event history analysis provides two important advantages in evaluating influences 
on racial disparity reform enactments. First, the technique’s reliance on state-year 
observations permits us to measure changes in relevant political or social variables over 
time. Other multivariable methods using policy or measure counts as an outcome variable 
can mask such variation in the explanatory variables. Event history models can then 
provide a more dynamic account of racial disparity reform policymaking. 
To show the benefits of the event history analysis method, Figure 3 displays the 
survival functions associated with a Cox regression model of racial disparity reform 
policy enactments for a select set of the twelve independent variables discussed above. 
These functions show the predicted probability a state will “survive” never passing a 
racial disparity reform policy with respect to 1) unified Democratic control of the elected 
branches, 2) judicial racial disparity reform activities, 3) black-white disparities in arrest 
rates, and 4) black-white disparities in incarceration rates holding all other predictors at 
their means. These figures plainly show states with Democrats governing the legislature 
and executive, judiciaries lacking intervention, and increasing disproportionalities at 
different criminal processing points are more likely to adopt racial disparity correctives.  
While ordinary Cox regression findings give preliminary support for this 
chapter’s hypotheses, event history analysis has the additional benefit of being able to 
take into account the repeatability of reforms. Once a policy or measure has been 
established, the likelihood of a subsequent reform enactment will change. Specifically, 
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elected officials will not adopt the same policy/measure twice and they will have 
different views on the necessity of multiple reforms. Event history models can adjust for 
dependency among repeatable events by changing the baseline hazard rate of developing 
a racial disparity reform given the occurrence of any previous reform enactment. Related 
empirical models like logistic regression predicting elected officials’ adoption of a racial 
disparity reform do not adjust for these policymaking considerations.  
More technically, a repeatable events model stratifies state-year observations of a 
policy/measure enactment by the number of previously adopted policies/measures. A 
baseline hazard rate is created for each strata of previous enactments and all coefficients 
are restricted to be the same. A general model for the hazard of enacting a racial disparity 
reform is given by 
 
ℎ| = ℎ	
 exp , if  is in strata n   
 
where ℎ| is the overall hazard of reform, ℎ	
 is the baseline hazard rate for a 
strata, n is the number of previous reforms, and x is the set of independent variables 
(Cleves, 2010).  
 
Results 
  
Table 4 presents Cox regression results predicting the enactment of racial 
disparity reforms. The first two columns distinguish the socio-political factors associated 
with state elected officials’ development of racial disparity reform policies. Column 1 is a 
first event model showing estimates of the conditions leading up to a state’s first racial 
disparity reform policy. Once a state has promulgated its first policy addressing racial 
inequality in criminal processing, the rest of its data are censored. Column 2 is a 
repeatable event model displaying estimates of the conditions influencing the 
development of any racial disparity reform policy given the presence of any previous 
policy enactment.  
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Across the models predicting racial disparity reform policymaking, racial 
disproportion is a strong and consistent predictor of policy enactments. Black-white 
disparities in arrests and incarceration consistently increase the likelihood of reform. As 
the ratio of black to white incarceration rate ratio increases by 1 (e.g. an increase from a 
1:1 to 2:1 ratio), state elected officials are 22% more likely to promulgate an initial policy 
and 17% more likely to do so for any policy. Similarly, a one unit increase in the black to 
white arrest rate ratio increases the probability of policymakers making their state’s first 
policy by 40% and any policy by 15%. As racial disproportion in a criminal justice 
system grows, one or more policy solutions are likely to emerge from a state’s elected 
branches. Support for the fourth hypothesis is thus found.  
Judicial efforts to introduce racial disparity reforms also have profound impacts. 
When judiciaries take steps to improve racial equality within the courts, elected officials 
are 90% less likely to establish a first policy response. These policymakers are 66% less 
likely to promulgate other policies. Decreases in the hazard of developing racial disparity 
reforms policies given the presence of judicial correctives are statistically significant. 
These results affirm the fifth hypothesis.  
Partisanship has more mixed effects. Unified control of the executive and 
legislative branches almost doubles the probability state elected officials adopt policy 
correctives. Democratic composition of the legislature has no effect on a state’s first 
policy enactment, but becomes more somewhat more important in subsequent 
policymaking. Democratic control of the executive, however, does not appear to affect 
policy developments. These findings provide support for the first and third hypotheses.  
The effects of citizen ideology, social threats, and crime and punitiveness on 
racial disparity reform policies are more unexpected. Liberalism among the electorate has 
no influence on policy outcomes. Social threats have uneven effects. Low poverty and 
large African American populations do increase the hazard of producing an initial racial 
disparity reform policy. These social circumstances are unimportant, though, when all 
policy developments are considered.  An increased unemployment rate does not change 
the likelihood of producing reforms. Lastly, crime encourages the adoption of policies. 
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High crime rates make a state more prone to developing one or more policies, but high 
incarceration rates have no such effect.   
The remaining four columns of Table 4 show the socio-political factors tied to the 
creation of the four kinds of racial disparity reform measures within enacted policies. 
Like Column 2, these estimates allow for repeatable instances of reform. Namely, a new 
baseline hazard rate for the enactment of each type of measure is created given the 
adoption of any previous measure. For instance, the baseline hazard of a comprehensive 
reform measure may change based upon the previous adoption of an exploratory reform. 
Simply stated, the likelihood elected officials mandate system-wide changes in their 
criminal justice system may vary depending upon whether elected officials previously 
commissioned study on racial differences in criminal processing.  
 Columns 3-6 of Table 4 show each type of racial disparity reform measure is 
likely to be generated under slightly different circumstances. Some support is found for 
each of the five hypotheses, where racial disproportion in criminal processing, judicial 
non-intervention, and/or partisanship matter in the adoption of at least one of the four 
measures types. The severity of black-white disparities in incarceration is once again one 
of the strongest predictors, increasing the probability of enacting three of the four 
measure types. Elected officials are 24% more likely to design prohibitory measures, 
17% more likely to adopt policy-specific measures, and 19% more likely to introduce 
comprehensive measures given a one-unit increase in black-white incarceration ratios. 
Racial disproportion in arrests increases the risk of prohibitory reform adoptions by 33%. 
These measures are also more likely to be promulgated when crime is high. These 
findings may reflect political division over disproportionate minority contact with police. 
Arrest disparities are hotly contested as results of discrimination or legitimate law 
enforcement, so elected officials may prefer to adopt weaker correctives.  
The absence of judicial racial disparity reform efforts in criminal proceedings also 
encourages the development of more intensive reform measures types. Judicial reform 
activities decrease the hazard of policy-specific reform and comprehensive reform by 
75% and 72%, respectively. Exploratory and prohibitory measures are less affected by 
such judicial interventions. Studying racial differences and strengthening anti-
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discrimination measures may be symbolically “good” policymaking for any elected 
official. Such provisions may then emerge from the elected branches without regard to 
similar remedial efforts by the judiciary.  
Partisanship further shapes the creation of various racial disparity measures. 
Exploratory reform is nearly three times more probable to occur under a unified 
Democratic government. A strong Democratic presence in the legislature also increases 
the probability of elected officials adopting prohibitory provisions. As a final note, a 
more liberal electorate further induces comprehensive reform policymaking concerned 
eradicating system-wide racial inequalities.  
 
On Alternative Multivariate Modeling 
 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 present alternative multiple regression models of 
racial disparity reform enactments. Appendix 3 displays Poisson regression estimates of 
the factors affecting the number of racial disparity reforms enacted by state elected 
officials. State-year observations of the number of adopted racial disparity reform 
policies and number of enacted measures by type are made for all fifty states between 
1998 and 2011. The Poisson models generally conform to the event history results. As 
Column 1 shows, more policies are created under unified Democratic control of the 
elected branches and more Democratic representation in the legislature. The party of the 
state's executive has no effect. Columns 2 through 5, predicting the development of the 
four measures types, show more exploratory reforms and prohibitory reforms emerge 
when Democrats are in power. Racial disproportion has the expected effect of increasing 
racial disparity reform policymaking. As disparities become greater in arrests and 
incarceration, state elected officials take more remedial actions. This is especially true for 
comprehensive and prohibitory measures. Surprisingly, the effect of judicial racial 
disparity reform effects disappears. With the exception of crime rates that marginally 
increase policy developments, no other social or political conditions consistently affect 
the number of racial disparity reform policies or measures generated. While these Poisson 
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results confirm ideological and problem-solving reasons motivate state elected officials to 
adopt racial disparity reforms, these findings are tempered by a major limitation. 
Specifically, there is little variation in the number of policies and measures a state adopts 
each year. On average, less than two policies and one of each measure type is developed 
annually. By implication, event count models may not precisely estimate the 
contributions of relevant social and political factors to the racial disparity reform 
policymaking process. 
Appendix 4 shows logistic regression estimates of the factors affecting the 
likelihood of racial disparity reform enactments in the states between 1998 and 2011. 
State-year observations of whether state elected officials promulgated at least one racial 
disparity reform are made for all fifty states during this fourteen-year period. Coefficient 
estimates in Column 1 indicate Democratic strength in the legislature and a unified 
Democratic government increase the probability of a policy enactment. In Columns 2 
through 5 predicting the passage of the four measure types, only exploratory reforms 
seem to respond to party control of the elected branches. Racial disparities in 
incarceration and arrests substantially elevate the likelihood of policy adoptions. 
Columns 2 through 5 further show elected officials are more likely to adopt 
comprehensive and prohibitory reforms when racial disproportion in imprisonment is 
high. Judicial racial disparity reforms have little influence on the probability of reform by 
elected officials. Other social and political factors have inconsistent impacts. In all, some 
support is found for ideological and problem-solving theories. Unlike the event history 
models, logistic regression findings are constrained by the fact that the models do not 
adjust for changes in the likelihood of reform given the existence of previous reforms.  
 
On Alternative Model Specifications 
 Repeatable event history analysis models containing the addition of other 
potentially important social and political variables were also examined. Two of these 
variables were racial disproportionalities in black-white homicide offending rates and the 
percentage of state elected officials who are Latino. The former might suggest that racial 
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disparity reform may be less likely because high disproportion in homicide offending 
may raise racial fears and reduce propensities to modify sanctions for minorities (Jacobs 
& Jackson, 2010). The latter might show elected officials who are racial or ethnic 
minorities may be more willing to endorse civil rights ideals and support racially-
conscious modifications to disparate criminal justice policies (Cameron, Epstein, & 
O’Halloran, 1996; Swain, 1993; Yates & Fording, 2005). Results for these variables are 
reported in Appendix 5.  
Overall the direction and magnitude of the main independent variables from the 
previous event history repeatable event model remains the same across the supplemental 
models. Black-white disparity in homicide offending has little discernible effect on the 
likelihood of enacting a racial disparity reform policy. This holds true when the other 
crime rate variable is omitted (not shown). This variable was not selected for the final 
model because missing data would eliminate the entire state of Florida (that does not 
document the race of homicide offenders) and another year’s worth of observations. A 
one percent increase in the percentage of Latino elected officials in a state government 
produces a 2% increase in the hazard of racial disparity reform policies. Data were sought 
for black elected officials, but could not be obtained for every year between 1998 and 
2011 due to changes in the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter tests the racial disparity reform framework by examining reforms 
enacted by legislatures and executives in the states. From Chapter 2, elected officials are 
motivated to adopt racial disparity reforms first in response to civil rights ideals and 
second due to electoral and institutional benefits in solving pressing social problems. 
Operationalizing these ideological and problem-solving theories, this chapter postulated 
that racial disparity reform emerges from elected branches when 1) Democrats are in 
power 2) judiciaries do not initiate their own reform efforts, and 3) disproportionalities in 
criminal processing worsen. The chapter relied on an original database of policies and 
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various corrective measures within each policy enacted by state legislatures and 
executives between 1998 and 2011.  
At first glance, reforms do not appear to be concentrated by geography or political 
ideology across states. Event history analyses uncovered racial disparity reform is a 
product of partisanship and elected officials’ responsiveness to the unresolved problems 
of racial inequality. Policy response is more probable when Democrats control both 
elected branches and sometimes when Democrats have a large presence in the legislature. 
Politicians are more likely to promulgate remedial policies when racial disparities in 
arrests and imprisonment widen. Corrective action also tends to occur when courts do not 
offer relief. These ideological and problem-solving dynamics also shape the creation of 
the four types of racial disparity reform measures within policies, with the development 
exploratory measures being explained more by the former and the development of more 
intensive measures being explained more by the latter.  
 
Limitations of Data and Analyses 
  
 Because this present study represents an initial attempt to document and predict 
racial disparity reform by state policymakers, it is limited by several factors. First, the 
study only analyzes enacted policies by elected officials. This study does not examine the 
political process by which racial disparity reforms are proposed or evaluated by elected 
officials. For instance, it cannot generalize the process of enactment to the processes of 
bill proposal, committee passage, or floor voting in the legislature. Proposals alone may 
be motivated by a distinct set of political factors, such as ideology and personal interests 
in criminal justice reform. 
 Next, this particular chapter identifies racial disparity reforms based upon their 
explicit mentioning of race with regard to criminal justice issues (see Appendix 1). It is 
possible a reform may be intended to alter criminal justice institutions’ treatment of racial 
minorities without invoking race in the policy. For instance, reductions in New York’s 
Rockefeller Drug Laws may be considered racial disparity reforms because state elected 
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officials distinguished the statutes’ racially disparate impacts as grounds for change (D. 
Cole, 2011). Yet the revised drug laws do not mention race or the racial considerations 
that motivated their enactment. Racial disparity reforms may then be undercounted if a 
policy was intended to achieve racially egalitarian change, but makes no mention of this 
purpose in its actual language.  
 Finally, this study does not fully capture the influence of other relevant 
policymaking factors like interest group advocacy and issue salience. The trade-off of 
large N rather than small N analysis of state reforms is the inability to detail the 
particulars of reform processes. Other work like O’Brien and Grosso (2011)’s study of 
the North Carolina Racial Justice Act identifies how a diverse coalition of anti-death 
penalty and civil rights organizations came together to highlight the unfairness of capital 
punishment procedures and successfully demand more racially egalitarian ways. While 
this study suggests the racial disproportionalities in criminal processing elevate the 
likelihood of racial disparity reform, selected case studies can further distinguish the 
mechanisms by which problems of racial inequality become political concerns. More 
importantly, such qualitative process-tracing can highlight the coalitions and 
compromises that helped to define the nature of various racial disparity reforms.  
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CHAPTER FIVE - DOES RACIAL DISPARITY REFORM WORK? : THE CASE OF 
THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT MANDATE I 
(METHODOLOGY) 
 
Given the proliferation of racial disparity reforms from the legislative and 
executive branches over the past four decades, it is essential to determine whether 
enacted reforms effectively generate more racially egalitarian outcomes in criminal 
processing. Such inquiry is pertinent as national and state elected officials are 
increasingly considering and promulgating comprehensive racial disparity reforms 
requiring system-wide changes. The present research examines these issues from the 
context of juvenile justice and whether the Disproportionate Minority Confinement 
(DMC) mandate of 2002 has successfully diminished extant racial inequalities in the 
juvenile justice system. As discussed in Chapter 3, this federal provision requires states 
receiving federal funding to reduce the disproportionate number of minority youth who 
come into contact with the juvenile justice system without the use of numeric quotas or 
standards (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended) 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the significance of the DMC 
mandate as a case to consider the effectiveness of racial disparity reform in altering the 
justice processing of minority offenders. It also outlines previous research on the DMC 
mandate’s impacts on juvenile justice decision outcomes. The chapter then moves toward 
the present research analyzing juvenile processing in Pennsylvania before and after 
intervention on behalf of the DMC mandate. It introduces the two central hypotheses 
underpinning subsequent empirical analyses. It then details the selection of Pennsylvania 
as a case, the state’s DMC reduction activities, and the major characteristics of the state’s 
juvenile processing data. With this backdrop, the chapter concludes with a description of 
the present research’s analysis plan.   
 
The Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Mandate of 2002 
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The Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) mandate of 2002 represents a 
landmark reform in criminal justice for several reasons. At its core, the measure is 
racially-conscious and unequivocal about decreasing minority overrepresentation in 
juvenile processing. Unlike ordinary disparity reforms such as mandatory minimums or 
sentencing guidelines that could target racial inequities indirectly through “race-neutral” 
language (W. J. Wilson, 1987), the DMC mandate fits squarely within the definition of 
racial disparity reform, as it is narrowly directed at the treatment of minority youth. At 
the same time, this policy stands in contrast to other racial disparity reforms aimed at 
prohibiting discriminatory behavior or raising awareness about racial problems through 
the mandatory data collection or additional study. Enacted in 1988, the original 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement mandate was innovative in demanding states to 
reduce racial disproportion among juvenile populations confined in jails, detention 
centers, and other secure facilities. Since its congressional revision in 2002, the DMC 
mandate is far more comprehensive, obliging states to address the disproportionate 
processing of minorities throughout the entire juvenile justice system.  
To actualize this end, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) requires states to take four steps. State must initially identify racial imbalances 
within their juvenile justice systems. If minority overrepresentation is revealed, states 
must assess the sources of these issues and design plans for intervention. Once 
interventions have been implemented, states must evaluate their corrective programs and 
re-identify lingering racial disproportionalities (Hanes, 2012) This four-part strategy 
pushes states to confront racial disparities while affording states a significant degree of 
discretion in going about implementing these directives (Hamparian & Leiber, 1997; 
Kempf-Leonard, 2007; Leiber, 2002). No other national measure orders states to 
continually monitor and reduce system-wide racial disparities within public institutions.  
The requirement to rectify racial disproportion without regard to a juvenile justice 
system’s contribution to such conditions also makes the DMC mandate noteworthy. 
Historically, most government institutions have avoided dealing with racial disparities by 
questioning evidence of these structures causing these problems and citing reasonable 
interests for why imbalances exist (Boardman & Vining, 1983). Within the courts, such 
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concerns for “causality” and “justifiability” have allowed public institutions to perpetuate 
racially disparate practices without judicial injunctions. These arguments have narrowed 
the space for reformers seeking to challenge disparate impacts in the public sphere. 
Although elected officials tend to skirt issues of civil rights, the DMC mandate 
exemplifies a much sought after legislative response to an absence of judicial recourse. 
This development too marks a departure from touted political indifference to racial 
inequalities (O. C. Johnson, 2007, p. 411; Loury, 2002).  
Beyond simply compelling states to amend their juvenile processing practices, the 
DMC mandate carries heavy sanctions for non-compliance. States failing to make a good 
faith effort in assessing, monitoring, and amending minority overrepresentation in their 
systems risk losing 20% of their federal grant funds for the fiscal year and having their 
remaining funds reallocated towards meeting compliance standards (Hsia et al., 2004). 
Although few states have been formally reprimanded for making insufficient progress 
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2014), the threat of sanction is 
arguably credible.25 With the exception of Wyoming, all states have taken federally 
approved action against existing racial disparities since the policy’s introduction (Hanes, 
2012).26  
Finally, the DMC mandate warrants attention as it may serve as a possible model 
for racial disparity reform in the future. A version of the mandate was offered in a 2009 
hearing before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland as a 
plausible national remedy for redressing racial inequalities in the criminal justice system 
(Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 2009, p. 16). Specifically, one the 
DMC mandate’s original proponents, Barry Krisberg of the National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, endorsed legislation requiring federally funded jurisdictions to conduct 
                                                 
25 Only Mississippi has been sanctioned for poor reform activity in the past five years (OJJDP 
2014). 
26 Wyoming does not participate in OJJDP’s federal formula grants program and therefore does 
not have to meet JJDPA requirements like the DMC mandate. Wyoming has still asserted, 
however, it has sought to comply with the JJDPA’s provisions given the importance of the 
problems the act has intended to resolve.  
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disparity analyses and introduce good-faith interventions. Such emphasis on affirmatively 
approaching racial disproportionalities signals a faith in public policy as an effective 
means to administer, but also improve justice within society.  
 
Prior Literature on the DMC Mandate and Its Consequences 
  
Despite federal requirements for states to assess problems of racial disparity in 
their juvenile justice systems at least every three years, rigorous empirical evaluations of 
the DMC mandate’s impacts on juvenile processing outcomes are surprisingly limited 
and uneven in quality (Leiber, 2002). Too often, states lack easily accessible record-
keeping systems that track the basic characteristics of processed youth. In the early 2000s, 
many states could only report minority overrepresentation statistics for a few decision-
making points or share data for a handful of selected counties. Other states like Florida 
and Delaware do not differentiate processing outcomes among minority groups, as they 
simply document whether their juveniles are “nonwhite” or “minorities.” A nontrivial 
proportion of states continue to omit relevant legal and social information about their 
juvenile cases due to existing data practices, limited staffing, or concerns for youth 
confidentiality (Hamparian & Leiber, 1997; Kempf-Leonard, 2007). Given such data 
restrictions, multivariate assessments of juvenile processing decisions are difficult to 
complete. Longitudinal studies are more rare, as even the most comprehensive state 
records can vary in content, electronic format, and availability for disclosure to social 
scientists.  
 In spite of these empirical challenges, criminologists have recently undertaken the 
task of evaluating effects of the DMC mandate on juvenile justice decision-making with a 
degree of success. Prior academic studies have suggested the policy-specific DMC 
mandate concerning minority confinement has been consequential. Analyzing processing 
decisions in single county in Iowa, Leiber et al. (2011) assert the DMC mandate of 1988 
had decidedly mixed effects on black and white youth processing between 1989 and 2000. 
This conclusion is based upon reviewing the relative importance of race in predicting 
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intake and placement decisions before and after the mandate’s introduction. Across both 
periods, African Americans had significantly greater odds of facing formal processing. 
The effect of being black on recommendations for formal court review also remained 
constant over time. The DMC mandate had stronger impacts at the placement stage. 
Although being black had no influence on placement decisions before the DMC 
mandate’s enactment, African Americans became significantly less likely than whites to 
receive out-of-home placements after the policy went into effect. These findings lead 
Leiber et al. (2011) to conclude the DMC mandate in its original form did alter decision-
making processes, but “…irrespective of the intentions of Congress, racial distinctions 
are highly resistant to change” (p. 487).  
 Davis and Sorensen (2013) convey more promising results. Comparing arrest and 
placement (i.e. commitment to secure confinement) proportions over time, their ten-year 
analysis of OJJDP national census of incarcerated children figures purports that black-
white disparities in confinement have declined since Congress elevated the DMC 
mandate to a core requirement in 1992. At the national level, black youth are nearly 3 
times more likely to be securely confined than white youth. Between 1997 and 2006, 
national black to white confinement ratios decreased by nearly 20% after controlling for 
the groups’ arrest rates. This non-trivial drop in secure confinement ratios occurring post-
arrest therefore underscores a system-wide change in juvenile justice processing. 
Although unable to pinpoint specific DMC interventions within states driving these 
findings, Davis and Sorensen are optimistic that compliance with the DMC mandate has 
resulted some important declines in the disproportionate confinement of black youth. 
Curiously, the study makes no attempt to compare confinement disparities before and 
after the 2002 expansion of the original DMC mandate to include minority contact with 
the juvenile justice apparatus.  
  While these two studies capture elements of the DMC mandate’s influence, no 
study has analyzed the consequences of the DMC mandate as it currently pertains to 
disproportionate minority contact. No study has used an entire state as a unit of analysis. 
Finally, no study has evaluated DMC intervention upon achieving the policy’s stated goal 
of reducing the disproportionate number of minorities processed at each decision-making 
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stage. This dissertation responds to these gaps in the DMC literature by distinguishing the 
impacts of DMC intervention on juvenile processing in Pennsylvania.  
 
Main Hypotheses of Present Research 
 
This dissertation posits that the DMC mandate of 2002 has effectively reduced 
minority overrepresentation within the juvenile justice system. Success in diminishing 
minority overrepresentation is assessed in two ways. Following previous DMC studies, it 
is first hypothesized intervention on behalf of the mandate should moderate the 
importance of race in juvenile justice decision-making. Secondly, in accordance with the 
language of the current DMC mandate, it is hypothesized intervention should decrease 
the number of minority youth handled at all decision-points along the juvenile justice 
continuum.  
 
Why Pennsylvania 
 
This dissertation specifically assesses juvenile processing outcomes in 
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania represents an intriguing case for analysis. First, the state has 
historically ranked among the top five states with the highest minority confinement rates 
in the country. According to OJJDP’s 1999 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, 
Pennsylvania’s minority confinement rate to nonminority confinement rate exceeded 10 
to 1 (Sickmund, 2004, p. 11). As of 2010, this outstanding ratio has tapered to 8 to 1, but 
Pennsylvania retains its position as one of four states with the greatest rates of racially 
disproportionate confinement in the country (Hockenberry, 2013). Due to such 
longstanding and significant problems with minority overrepresentation in its juvenile 
structures, Pennsylvania must seriously consider the DMC mandate (Griffith et al., 2012; 
K. Kempf, 1992; Kempf-Leonard & Sontheimer, 1995).  
Next, Pennsylvania stands out for its geographic and demographic diversity. Of 
its 67 counties, the state contains a mix of rural, suburban, and urban jurisdictions. 
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Geography produces meaningful changes for juvenile justice, as urban courts tend to 
operate with more streamlined, impersonal, and often more punitive decision-making 
routines relative to the processes of suburban or rural institutions (Feld, 1991). Likewise, 
geography may have significant indirect effects over juvenile court decisions. For 
instance, race tends to be more salient in the decisions of rural and suburban courts 
because residential populations tend to be more homogenous and white (K. L. Kempf & 
Austin, 1986; Leiber, 2003). If justice should vary by geography, Pennsylvania allows 
one to explore how different types of counties may react to the DMC mandate in distinct 
ways.  
Pennsylvania’s youth population is remarkable in its diversity as well. During the 
2000s, approximately 79% of Pennsylvanians ages 10-17 were white, 14% were African 
American, and 6% were Hispanic (see Table 11). The racial composition of 
Pennsylvania’s processed juvenile population is more diverse as black and Hispanic 
youth constituted 37% of all juvenile court referrals, 44% of cases with determinations of 
delinquency, and 54% of all out-of-home placements in 1997 (see Table 5 through Table 
10). Together, geography and demography generate interesting expressions of racial 
disproportion. For example, Philadelphia and Allegheny counties produce the greatest 
numbers of nonwhite juvenile delinquents, but the counties’ racial compositions mitigate 
the extent of disproportionate minority representation at each of their processing stages. 
Pennsylvania is also attractive because of its comprehensive record-keeping. 
Record-keeping is an essential component of meeting the DMC mandate’s requirements, 
as the state must determine whether and where racial disparities occur. In 1959, the 
legislature created the Juvenile Court Judges Commission, charged with producing 
juvenile court statistics for the Commonwealth among other responsibilities. JCJC 
standardized record-keeping practices by introducing the Juvenile Court Statistical Card 
in 1981 (Hsia & Hamparian, 1998; Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, 
2008). By the 1980s, most counties constructed records that identified minority youth and 
their processing outcomes. In addition to basic charge and case information, these records 
noted key social characteristics like a child’s schooling status, family structure, and living 
arrangements. In the language of criminologists studying race and ethnicity, these 
  
 
98
“contextual variables” provide a fuller portrait of how social factors affect delinquency 
and processing decisions. The longitudinal span and fullness of Pennsylvania’s juvenile 
processing records thus make the state especially appealing for empirical analysis.  
 
Minority Overrepresentation Issues and DMC Intervention in Pennsylvania 
 
The history of the DMC mandate in Pennsylvania is unique. The state stands out 
for its keen interest in issues of racial disproportion in its juvenile justice system. In 1986, 
the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) declared minority 
overrepresentation in entrance and advancement through the state’s juvenile justice 
system as a pressing concern (Clouser, 1994).27 Following other processing trends across 
the country, Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice institutions began handling a growing 
number of minority youth that far outpaced changes in the state’s youth population (K. 
Kempf, 1992). Although this promulgation did not effectuate any immediate 
interventions, it encapsulated political interest in addressing racial inequalities. What 
PCCD did not anticipate is that this statement would prime Pennsylvania juvenile justice 
officials for recognizing and executing the DMC mandate of 1988.  
                                                 
27 In Pennsylvania, juvenile justice policymaking is closely connected to the state’s criminal 
justice planning structure. Following the passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974, all states were mandated to establish State Advisory Groups (SAG) 
tasked with formulating regional juvenile justice plans, monitoring reform, and avoiding potential 
backsliding in fulfilling federal mandates. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Advisory Committee (JJDPAC) serves as Pennsylvania’s SAG, but remains a subcommittee of 
PCCD. Every year, JJDPAC submits annual recommendations, budgets, and priorities to the 
governor and PCCD as its overseeing agency. In technical terms, PCCD has ultimate authority in 
promulgating guidelines, dispersing federal and state funds, and otherwise shaping the direction 
of juvenile justice administration in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, JJDPAC stands as the primary 
entity for juvenile justice officials seeking financial and technical assistance in implementing 
juvenile justice reforms. (Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, 2013; R. 
Schwartz, 2013). 
  
 
99
Following the passage of this federal provision, Pennsylvania promptly sought to 
redress its minority overrepresentation issues. While many states struggled to get a 
handle on their existing racial disparity problem over the next four years (Coleman, 2010), 
Pennsylvania juvenile justice officials swiftly introduced new studies, programs, and 
structures targeting racial disproportionalities in juvenile processing. In 1990, the 
Juvenile Advisory Group, a subcommittee of PCCD and official liaison between the state 
and OJJDP, created its own Disproportionate Minority Confinement subcommittee. 
During its first year of operation, the DMC Subcommittee commissioned the Kempf 
(1992) empirical study of racial disproportion in the state’s juvenile justice system.  
The Kempf study comprehensively investigated issues of racial inequality using a 
variety of statistical methods. The study relied upon a sample of juvenile processing data 
from 1989. The sample featured cases from 14 counties with the largest proportions of 
black and Hispanic youth populations.28 Descriptive statistics revealed black and 
Hispanic youth were overrepresented at all points along the juvenile justice continuum. 
Statistical tests demonstrated race had a persistent effect in enhancing a youth’s 
likelihood of receiving more punitive outcomes after controlling for legal, social 
condition, and demographic factors. Overall, the study confirmed the reality of 
disproportionate minority processing in Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system and 
underscored the necessity for intervention. As Kempf (1992) closes, “Policy makers in 
Pennsylvania are well advised to institutionalize the objective of juvenile justice free 
from racial and sexual bias as a long term goal and pursue a policy agenda explicitly 
aimed at reaching that goal” (p. 77). 
In light of the Kempf study’s findings, PCCD and the DMC Subcommittee began 
to develop strategies to curb racial imbalances. Pennsylvania officials approached the 
issue of disproportionate minority confinement with two priorities: 1) concentrate reform 
efforts in specific counties showing the greatest levels of racial disproportion and 2) 
introduce community-based interventions that holistically seek to tackle the causes of 
                                                 
28 These counties are Allegheny, Beaver, Berks, Chester, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie, Lancaster, 
Lehigh, Mercer, Montgomery, Northhampton, Philadelphia, and York.  
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delinquency among minority youth in the first place. Once again, Pennsylvania juvenile 
justice officials and practitioners preceded members of Congress in acknowledging that 
racial disparity at late processing stages should be remedied through more systematic 
reform. The DMC Subcommittee decided to fund local youth programs in which 50 to 
75% of all participants were referred by juvenile justice officials while the remainder 
could be classified as “at risk” for future involvement with the juvenile justice system. 
Programs would be fully funded with federal and state resources for two years and 50% 
funded for an additional year. Local practitioners were encouraged to partner with one 
another to build strong community commitments to reducing minority youth delinquency. 
This structure was intended to foster programs’ self-sufficiency. Throughout the process, 
the DMC Subcommittee would help to coordinate community partnerships, explain grant 
processes, and strengthen DMC-specific programming (Clouser, 1994).   
From 1991 until the early 2000s, Pennsylvania fulfilled the DMC mandate of 
1988 with this strategy. PCCD developed three DMC reduction sites in the counties 
showing the greatest minority overrepresentation problems. Dauphin County, containing 
the state capitol of Harrisburg, became the first target area in 1991. PCCD supported five 
programs for 30 months that offered educational, after-school, and vocational 
opportunities to minority youth. By 1993, local civic and youth organizations in Dauphin 
County formed the Youth Enhancement Services (YES) Coalition that actively sought to 
forge alliances with local stakeholders, secure additional funding, and formulate contracts 
with county youth services to reduce youth arrests and rearrests.  
A year later, PCCD initiated DMC correctives in Philadelphia County. Here, 
DMC activities were primarily focused on arrests, as the county produced the most 
number of minority youth arrests in the state. Delinquency and conflict prevention 
programming began in the 25th Police District of Philadelphia. The East Division 
Coalition of probation officers, school officials, police, and community activities directed 
these efforts.  
In 1996, Allegheny County became the third DMC reduction site. As in the 
previous PCCD-supported DMC reduction sites, a newly formed Youth Coalition of 
Western Pennsylvania worked closely with the Allegheny Youth Crime Prevention 
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Council located in the Pittsburgh mayor’s office to implement programming in minority 
neighborhoods (Hsia & Hamparian, 1998; Welsh, Jenkins, & Harris, 1999) 
As initial DMC intervention funding expired in the late 1990s, PCCD 
commissioned Temple University to ascertain the effectiveness the state’s community-
based programs. (Welsh, Harris, & Jenkins, 1996; Welsh et al., 1999) completed 
assessments of 9 DMC reduction programs in Dauphin and Philadelphia Counties. The 
overarching goal was to maximize the potential of such programs in preventing 
delinquency. Per PCCD’s directive, the recommendations of these studies were to be 
incorporated into Philadelphia’s corrective programming plans and shared with 
Harrisburg officials, whose funding had already elapsed (Welsh et al., 1996, p. 90). The 
Welsh et al. studies expressed a particular interest in understanding how program 
participation affected the development of delinquent youth. Although having little impact 
on truancy, academic performance, and school drop out rates, exposure to DMC 
reduction programs considerably lessened minority youth recidivism over a three-year 
period. While 53% of youth who never participated in DMC programs were rearrested, 
nearly 26% of the highest attending youth recidivated during this period. These studies 
had a clear message: minority overrepresentation still remains a problem, but DMC 
reduction programs were working. As Welsh et al. (1999) 
 observe, “community-based programs do at least as more secure detention facilities in 
reducing recidivism” (1999, p. 105). This conclusion affirmed state commitments to not 
simply curtail disproportionate minority confinement, but disproportionate minority 
interactions with juvenile justice structures.  
Over the next four years, DMC intervention in Pennsylvania would decidedly 
intensify under new requirements, partnerships, and evidence-driven approaches to racial 
disparities. Beginning in 1999, the Pennsylvania General Assembly compelled JJDPAC 
to submit comprehensive plans outlining the aims and needs of the juvenile justice 
system at least once every two years (R. Schwartz, 2013). The DMC Subcommittee also 
began convening annual “Promising Approaches” conferences for juvenile justice 
officials throughout Pennsylvania to share their disparity reform strategies (Griffin, 2008). 
Interest in conducting rigorous evaluation of racial disproportionalities, improving 
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performance outcomes, and developing new strategies in minority youth processing 
would remain key components of the state’s approach to juvenile justice.  
These priorities would ultimately become common ground for the state’s 
partnership with the MacArthur Foundation. In the early 2000s, the MacArthur 
Foundation wanted to reorient its funding priorities from supporting the research of 
national juvenile justice organizations to developing and evaluating state-based reforms. 
The organization thus sought to align with reform-minded and capable states. After 
recognizing the potential for innovative and extensive juvenile justice reform, the 
MacArthur Foundation named Pennsylvania as its first Models for Change site in 2003 
(R. Schwartz, 2013). Models for Change initiatives in Pennsylvania were officially 
announced in early 2004 along with collaborations with the National Coalition for 
Juvenile Justice and the Juvenile Law Center. Since then, state interventions on behalf of 
disproportionate minority contact among other juvenile justice issues have been 
inextricably linked to activities and resources of these organizations.29  
 
Current DMC Intervention Efforts 
 
Following the passage of the DMC mandate of 2002 and the unfurling of Models 
for Change initiatives over the next three years, five counties in Pennsylvania have been 
have been designated as DMC reduction sites. These counties are Allegheny, Berks, 
Dauphin, Lancaster, and Philadelphia. DMC intervention within these counties has come 
as a mix of institutional and community-based reforms. Beginning in late 2003, all five 
counties have regularly held community forums in which minority youth discuss their 
experiences and relations with school administrators, juvenile court and probation 
                                                 
29 With MacArthur Foundation investments alone, federal funds for juvenile justice fell by 65% 
from over $16 million to $6 million while state funds were slashed by 85% from nearly $13 
million to just over $2 million between 2002 and 2011 (R. Schwartz, 2013, p. 5). This shift in 
financial resources underscores the MacArthur Foundation alliance has heavily shaped 
Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice reforms in the recent decade.  
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officials, and police officers. The intention of forums has been to quell discontents, 
hostilities, and misperceptions among youth and authorities to reach a better 
understanding of the role of law enforcement in the lives of juveniles (Griffith et al., 
2012). These meetings have become increasingly more structured with discussion panels, 
videos, role-playing scenarios, and pre/post attitudinal tests introduced by JJDPAC’s 
DMC Subcommittee (Griffin, 2008; R. Schwartz, 2013).  
Each county has further initiated its own distinct set of reforms. Often, seemingly 
effective DMC reduction programs in one county are replicated in the other four 
jurisdictions. As the primary recipient of MacArthur Foundation-led reform since 2005, 
Berks County has put into operation a broad range of DMC reduction initiatives. The 
county’s minority overrepresentation issues primarily involve Hispanic youth due to the 
city of Reading’s rapidly growing Hispanic population. As a first response to language 
and cultural barriers disadvantaging Hispanic youth, the Berks County juvenile court 
translated important documents into Spanish, hired in-court translators, provided court 
and probation staff with cultural sensitivity training, and expanded Spanish language 
educational resources (Ibid). Next, revised risk assessment instruments were introduced 
to curb the county’s disproportionate rates of minority youth detention and placement. 
Addressing the county’s 80% detention rate, a revised detention assessment tool has 
limited the use of “zero-tolerance” policies for offenses like auto-thefts and adjusted 
point values to encourage the release or referral of youth to detention alternatives 
(Steinhart, 2008). Placement decision-making guidelines for probation violators have also 
been modified to include more community-based sanctions supported by empirical 
evidence. Finally, the county established an evening reporting center. Serving an average 
of ten youths per night, the evening reporting center operates as an alternative to secure 
detention and out-of-home placement (R. Schwartz, 2013). According to Models for 
Change estimations of these interventions, detention decreased by 60% while out-of-
home placements have declined by 67%. The overwhelmingly beneficiaries of these 
processing changes have been Hispanics and African Americans (Shoenberg, 2012). 
Allegheny County and Lancaster County have followed Berks County in pursuing 
institutional reforms targeting youth detention and placement. Under the auspices of the 
  
 
104
MacArthur Foundation, both counties have adopted new detention risk assessment 
instruments that privilege less restrictive outcomes for minority youth (Griffith et al., 
2012). Allegheny County has furthered this focus by sponsoring the National Coalition 
for Juvenile Justice’s failure to adjust study. This initiative documented the experiences 
of minority youth ejected from non-secure placement programs and subsequently 
committed to secure facilities until an alternative placement could be determined (Ibid). 
The study has been a touchstone for restructuring placement decision-making to ensure 
programs avoid adjustment failures and better meet youth needs (Griffin, 2008). It has 
also inspired rethinking of Allegheny County probation officials’ use of secure detention 
as a sanction for delinquent youth in place of commitments to secure confinement 
facilities (Puzzanchera, Knoll, Adams, & Sickmund, 2012).  
In Lancaster County, an evening reporting center housing an average of ten 
youths per day has reportedly contributed to declines in the county’s detained minority 
youth populations (Shoenberg, 2012). The county has buttressed these reforms by 
cultivating relationships with community organizations. Given the high concentration of 
churches, county officials actively work with local stakeholders to provide needed youth 
and family services (DMC/Juvenile Justice Action Network: A Project of Models for 
Change, 2010). To illustrate, the county’s Juvenile Probation Office has joined the Intra-
City Progressive Pastoral Association and County Council of Churches in holding 
strategic planning forums concerning juvenile delinquency prevention. The forum has 
brought together over 50 houses of worship throughout the county. Churches have also 
been instrumental in supporting diversionary programs. First Presbyterian Church of 
downtown Lancaster, for instance, has hosted the city’s Youth Aid Panel, a board that 
informally handles low-level offending youth diverted from formal juvenile court 
processing (DMC/Juvenile Justice Action Network: A Project of Models for Change, 
2011).  
In Dauphin County, DMC intervention has largely retained its community-based 
focus. This jurisdiction contains the state’s sole DMC-specific, educational program for 
youth. Within its city school district predominantly educating African American youth, 
middle school students receive ten lessons of instruction about issues of minority group 
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involvement with the juvenile and criminal justice systems. The curriculum is intended to 
inform youth about the unfortunate facts of minority overrepresentation in the American 
criminal justice system and proactively instill lessons about a citizen’s various 
interactions with law enforcement and criminal courts. For example, students learn about 
their rights, protections, and responsibilities as citizens when they encounter criminal 
justice officials (Harrisburg School District, 2010). More recently, the county has 
considered investing in institutional reforms. In 2011, the county officials received funds 
to launch its own evening reporting center, confirming a growing state-wide interest in 
changing youth confinement practices.   
Finally, Philadelphia County has endorsed two additional DMC intervention 
strategies aimed at policing and placement following probation violations. Extending the 
minority-law enforcement forum idea, the county has instituted a DMC training 
curriculum for new and experienced Philadelphia Police Officers. The training program 
centers on cultivating cultural competency and promoting better communication with the 
city’s minority youth population. The Police Academy Curriculum contains four modules 
of training. These sessions instruct officers about interactions with youth that promote 
positive assertions of authority (Philadelphia Working Group of the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Crime and Delinquency DMC Subcommittee, 2009) In just the past five 
years, the curriculum has trained over 700 police officers (Shoenberg, 2012). 
Philadelphia County too has sought to redefine sanctioning for juvenile probation 
offenders through a graduated sanctions court. The graduated sanctions model is 
premised upon the idea that sanctioning for previously adjudicated delinquents can come 
in the forms of additional home and community-based intervention, more intensive 
delinquency adjustment programming like boot camp or drug treatment, or severe 
correction like commitment to a secure facility (Bilchik, 1998). In Philadelphia County, 
most juveniles violating probation are subject to out-of-home placements due to 
relatively minor infractions like truancy, failed drug tests, or missed appointments. Since 
the court’s creation in 2008, approximately half of all probation violators have 
successfully completed probation and avoided long-term placement. The court serves 
about 75 youth at given time (Shoenberg, 2012).  
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In all, review of Pennsylvania’s historic reception of the DMC mandate and its 
recent DMC reduction activities illuminate two qualities of the state’s DMC intervention 
strategy. Even under the original DMC mandate concerning confinement practices, 
Pennsylvania juvenile justice officials have agreed that minority overrepresentation must 
be checked at all decision-points. Current reforms reflect this priority from improving 
minority youth-police communications and making courtroom procedures more culturally 
accessible to redefining criterion for out-of-home placements. Secondly, reforms must be 
measurable and responsive to racial disproportionalities. Prior to OJJDP’s 
pronouncement making assessment a core part of DMC compliance, Pennsylvania 
juvenile justice officials consistently endorsed efforts to evaluate their interventions and 
shape their future plans. As DMC Subcommittee chair Dan Elby observed, “Everything 
we do is data-driven” (Griffin, 2008, p. 3). While preliminary evidence of DMC 
intervention success in certain counties seems promising, whether DMC intervention has 
altered minority youth processing remains a pressing question. 
 
Data 
 
Given the advantages Pennsylvania offers in discerning the influence of the DMC 
mandate, this study uses de-identified juvenile processing records collected by the Center 
for Juvenile Justice Training and Research (CJJT&R), a division of the Pennsylvania 
Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission (JCJC) that manages state juvenile court statistics. 
These records date from 1985 to 2011. This dataset contains over 1.5 million juvenile 
delinquency cases involving new allegations, disposition reviews, and placement reviews. 
New allegations refer to cases involving initial complaints and charges of delinquency 
(Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, 2008, p. 32). Disposition reviews and 
placement reviews involve previously adjudicated delinquency cases. Following a 
disposition, juvenile court judges may call for a review hearing determining a youth’s 
compliance with court orders and general rehabilitative progress “at any time”. 
Disposition review hearings are held for modifying commitments, transferring youth to 
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more secure facilities, determining permanency, and monitoring sexually violent juvenile 
offenders. When a child is ordered to be removed his/her home or placed in a residential 
facility, a placement hearing must be held every six months until commitment is 
completed (Ibid, p. 131). 
 Analysis for this project focuses on cases involving new allegations of 
delinquency dating from 1997 to 2011. These data begin with the referral of a youth to a 
juvenile court and capture all subsequent processing stages until the imposition of a 
disposition. The longitudinal span of these data allow for processing trends before and 
after Pennsylvania’s implementation of DMC intervention in 2005. All 67 counties also 
report their case outcomes to JCJC every year during this period. These data permit 
statewide analyses of juvenile justice decision-making that currently do not exist in 
academic studies of the current DMC mandate.  
To form a baseline for juvenile processing in Pennsylvania, two additional 
datasets are used to discern state arrest and population patterns. Arrest data collected by 
the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program were downloaded from the National 
Archive of Criminal Justice Data. Juvenile arrests were aggregated by county and year 
from “Agency-Level Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race” monthly reports for 1997 through 
2011 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Population data were generated from the 
National Center for Juvenile Justice and OJJDP’s Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 
1990-2012 website. This analysis tool was designed to make county, state, and national 
population estimates readily available to researchers and practitioners assessing youth 
processing practices. Easy Access data are based upon the National Center for Health 
Statistics intercentennial estimates of the U.S. resident population. Easy Access 
population estimates are employed given their accepted use by OJJDP in official state 
DMC assessments (Sickmund, Sladky, & Kang, 2014).  
 
Dependent Variables 
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The dependent variables of interest involve processing at four stages: petitioning, 
adjudication, disposition to placement (hereafter placement), and disposition to secure 
confinement (hereafter secure confinement). Processing in the Pennsylvania juvenile 
justice system begins at the referral stage. The majority of referrals to juvenile courts 
come from police, but referrals may also originate from schools, probation departments, 
social agencies, district magistrates, different juvenile courts, relatives, and other 
sources.30 Following a referral, an attorney from the Commonwealth or a juvenile court 
intake official decides whether an allegation of delinquency warrants additional review. 
Cases can be handled formally by a juvenile court with the filing of a petition.3132 
Conversely, cases can be diverted out of the juvenile court system if informal adjustment 
“would be in the best interest of the public and the child” (Pennsylvania Juvenile Court 
Judges’ Commission, 2008, p. 42). The petitioning stage is coded according to whether a 
youth is recommended for formal processing.  
All petitioned cases are then subject to an adjudicatory hearing. If the juvenile 
court finds that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act, the youth is adjudicated as 
delinquent. Youth who are not deemed delinquent typically have their cases dismissed, 
                                                 
30 Between 1997 and 2011, approximately 23% of all cases involved non-police referrals into the 
juvenile justice system.  
31 In this study, cases transferred to criminal court are removed from the petitioning and 
adjudication stage totals.  
32 Due to the inability to connect processing records with arrest and other referral information, 
this study does not examine whether formally filed charges deviate from alleged offenses 
described by intake officers, police, or other referring entities. Because prosecutorial discretion 
has mixed effects on the treatment of minority youth (Bishop, 2005; Kempf-Leonard & 
Sontheimer, 1995; Leiber, Bishop, & Chamlin, 2011; Leiber & Jamieson, 1995; MacDonald & 
Chesney-Lind, 2001), it possible minorities may incur disadvantages (or possibly advantages) not 
simply in terms of whether a petition is filed, but also with regard to the charges contained within 
the petition. Harsher charging decisions may also have down-stream impacts at adjudication or 
disposition, known as cumulative disadvantage (Pope & Feyerherm, 1990). This limitation is 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
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informally adjusted, or handled by consent decree. Adjudication is coded to separate 
substantiated cases from unsubstantiated cases.  
Upon a determination of delinquency, the court must determine what disposition 
(sentence) to impose in a case. In Pennsylvania, dispositions are driven by the question of 
whether an adjudicated youth is “in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation” 
(Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, 2008, p. 120). The juvenile court 
must specifically determine whether to sanction a youth within his/her community or 
remand the youth to an out-of-home placement. Delinquency adjustments within a 
community include probation, fines and costs, consent decrees, warning and counseling, 
continuance of previous disposition, and other sanctions. Placements are reserved for 
youth who have committed serious offenses, home lives disruptive to rehabilitation, or 
substantial needs for treatment in institutional care (Pennsylvania JCJC Benchbook 2008, 
p. 120). This placement stage is coded to denote whether youth are disposed to sanctions 
within the community or out-of-home placements. 
Among youth recommended for out-of-home placements, the juvenile court must 
determine to send a youth to a secure facility or non-secure residential program. 
Commitments to non-secure residential programs are diverse. These public and private 
programs include group homes, youth development centers, drug and alcohol treatment 
facilities, outward bound programs, and boot camps, among other institutions. Secure 
confinement is reserved for the most intensive cases, in which the less restrictive options 
do not seem viable. As a guiding principle in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system, 
secure confinement is to be kept to a minimum length of time consistent with the 
rehabilitation needs of the child and protection of the public (Pennsylvania Juvenile Court 
Judges’ Commission, 2008, p. 119). Initial commitments to secure confinement cannot 
exceed more than four years or the length of incarceration an adult committing a similar 
offense would incur (Ibid). On average, less than one percent of all cases carry a 
disposition of secure confinement. In this study, out-of-home placement decision-making 
is referred to as the secure confinement stage, which is coded to distinguish between 
commitments to secure and non-secure institutions.  
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Independent Variables for Assessments of Hypothesis I 
 
 To test the first hypothesis that DMC intervention decreases the importance of 
race in predicting processing outcomes, this study will follow extant empirical research 
on racial disparities in the juvenile justice system (Bishop, 2005; Davis & Sorensen, 
2013; Leiber et al., 2011). This study relies on measures of race, other demographic 
characteristics, social conditions, and legal factors. The demographic characteristics 
include age and sex. Age is a continuous variable. Sex is a dichotomous variable 
(female=1 and male=2).  
Social conditions are measured by three variables. School status reflects the 
enrollment of a youth in school (0=yes and 1=no). Non-attendance in school has been 
shown to elevate a youth’s odds of receiving formal court review and harsher dispositions 
(Bishop, 2005; Kempf-Leonard & Sontheimer, 1995; Leiber, 1994). Natural family status 
is gauged by whether the child’s natural parents are married (0) or divorced or separated, 
never married, or other (1). This ordering of family statuses follows prior literature 
indicating children with less traditional family structures are often perceived as requiring 
additional adjustment and supervision from the state (Bishop & Frazier, 1996). Finally, 
Living arrangements denote whether the child lives with two parents (0) or a single 
parent, relative, foster parent, other guardian (1). This categorization scheme likewise 
seeks to capture perceptions of instability within a child’s home environment that often 
produce more punitive outcomes for youths (K. L. Kempf, Decker, Bing, Safety, & 
Group, 1990; Leiber et al., 2011) 
 Legal factors are measured by three variables.33 Number of charges is an interval 
variable ranging from one to seven. All charges are then classified according to a 77-
                                                 
33 A key legal variable contained in the data is type of legal representation (Guervara, Spohn, & 
Herz, 2004). Certain counties document whether a juvenile waived their right to representation or 
were represented by a court appointed attorney, a public defender, or a private attorney. Studies 
are divided over whether the presence of counsel is a mitigating (Carrington & Moyor, 1990; 
Ferster, Courtless, & Snethen, 1971) or aggravating factor (Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, 2002; 
  
 
111
point severity index developed by the National Juvenile Court Data Archive that builds 
upon Wolfgang’s Crime Severity Index (Wolfgang et al., 1985). This severity index has 
been employed in previous studies to analyze juvenile processing in Hawaii (MacDonald, 
2001, 2003) and Ohio (Wu, 1997). Severity of charge reflects the most serious charge a 
youth faces on this index. Grade of charge measures whether the most serious charge is a 
felony (0) or a misdemeanor (1).  
Lastly, three dummy variables measuring race are constructed (1=yes and 0=no). 
These variables are based upon four, mutually exclusive racial identities consistently used 
in processing records across time: black, Hispanic, white, and other. Black denotes 
whether a youth identifies as African American, white for whether he or she identifies as 
Caucasian, and Hispanic for whether he or she identifies as Hispanic or Latino. Other 
distinguishes those of Asian, Native American, multiracial, or other descent. 
 
Independent Variables for Assessments of Hypothesis II 
 
To ascertain whether DMC intervention reduces minority youth processing as the 
second hypothesis proposes, this study primarily relies on two dummy variables 
corresponding to the development of DMC reduction programs. The first variable, period, 
denotes whether a case was processed after DMC intervention began (1=yes and 0=no). 
The second variable, intervention, represents whether a county implemented DMC 
intervention strategies (1=yes and 0=no). As discussed in the analysis plan, the 
interaction between these variables is important to consider using non-experimental 
methods like difference-in-differences estimation.  
This study further introduces several sets of demographic, sociopolitical, and 
juvenile justice characteristics of counties. A first set of controls account for six county 
conditions related to rates of juvenile delinquency. The youth poverty rate measures the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Duffee & Siegal, 1971; Feld, 1991) in juvenile court decision-making. Given substantial 
missingness, particularly at the petitioning stage, this variable is omitted from subsequent 
empirical analyses.  
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percent of youths living below the poverty line per 100,000 residents in a county (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 2012b). Percent urban corresponds to the percent of a total county 
population living in urban areas. For these county-level variables, cases handled between 
1997-1999 are matched with 1990 Census data while 2000-2009 and 2010-2011 cases are 
matched to 2000 and 2010 Census data, respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012a) 
Next, high school dropout rate measures the proportion of secondary-school students 
who drop out during a school year (Pennsylvania State Data Center, 2012) while 
unemployment rate approximates each county’s annual, non-seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Two youth population 
measures are likewise included: general youth population estimating county youth 
populations ages 10-17 reported by OJJDP (Puzzanchera, Sladky, & Kang, 2014) and 
juvenile arrest rate measuring juvenile arrests per 1,000 youth population (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011).  
A second set of punitiveness variables seek to capture county orientations towards 
juvenile crime. Percent Republican measures the percent of voters registered as 
Republican and proxies for political conservatism. Politically conservative communities 
prompt local criminal justice agencies to mete out harsher carceral and non-carceral 
punishments (Helms, 2009; Huang, Finn, Ruback, & Friedmann, 1996; Myers & Talarico, 
1987). Imprisonment rate measures the number of county court commitments to the state 
prison per 100,000 residential population and gauges a county’s propensity to issue harsh 
sanctions to offenders (Pennsylvania State Data Center, 2012).  
A third set of variables approximates racial group representation in arrests and 
referrals. Specifically, the number of African American/white youths arrested and the 
number of African American/Hispanic youths referred into the juvenile justice system are 
used to directly control for changes in the frequency of cases handled in the juvenile 
justice system. Due to unreliability of Hispanic youth arrest figures in the Uniform Crime 
Reports data, the number of white youths arrested is employed because most Hispanics 
identify as white (Mauer & King, 2007).  
A final set of controls takes into consideration the average characteristics of cases 
handled by a county. The mean traits of all cases and youths processed by a county are 
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calculated for each year. These variables are simply county-aggregated measures of 
demographic, legal, and social factors used to evaluate the study’s first hypothesis.  
 
On Prior Record of Referral 
 
As a key caveat, prior record of referral is one legal factor omitted in the 
empirical analyses. This limitation stems from a deliberate choice to examine processing 
outcomes for the entire state of Pennsylvania rather than a select set of counties. Because 
this dataset contains all juvenile processing records since 1985, this study could readily 
match new allegation records for youth offending between 1997 and 2011 to earlier 
records using fixed characteristics (i.e. birthdate, race, sex). Given the juvenile justice 
system’s age of jurisdiction (10 to 21 years old), construction of prior record in this way 
should be valid as the data should contain all previous records of the oldest youth who 
began to be processed in 1997. Prior record, however, is only available for 65 of 
Pennsylvania’s 67 counties. Chester County failed to report one year of processing 
outcomes (1991) and Philadelphia County records are missing from 1986 to 1996. Since 
Philadelphia County is vital to understanding juvenile processing at the state level, 
omitting it from empirical analyses would provide a false portrait of the DMC mandate’s 
consequences. Nevertheless, since omission of prior record has been demonstrated to bias 
coefficients of racial variables (Bishop & Frazier, 1996; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 
1998b), robustness checks are completed for the counties permitting the construction of 
prior record to assess the validity of coefficients without controls for previous referrals. 
These are included in Appendix 13.  
 
Analysis Plan 
 
Analysis of the DMC mandate's consequences proceeds in two parts. First, 
minority overrepresentation in Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system is examined 
between 1997 and 2011. Proportions first distinguish the racial composition of youth 
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processed at various decision-points along the state’s juvenile justice continuum. Relative 
Rate Indices measuring the rates of minority youth’s and white youth’s movement 
through the juvenile justice system are also presented. After displaying these statewide 
trends, racial disproportion is then evaluated within the 5 DMC intervention counties and 
62 non-intervention counties using percentages. These descriptive statistics will form the 
baseline for comparing minority youth processing within these two jurisdictions.  
In the second part of this analysis, three sets of multivariate analyses are used to 
isolate the effects of DMC intervention on juvenile processing: continuation ratio logistic 
regression models, bivariate probit models, and difference-in-differences models. Across 
these three sets of empirical methods, the consequences of DMC intervention are 
approximated by separating processing outcomes into two temporal periods: 1997-2004 
and 2005-2011. The year 2005 marks the point when MacArthur Foundation in 
conjunction with the state of Pennsylvania began implementing large-scale DMC 
reduction programs. The year also captures approximately seven years of decision 
outcomes for each period, providing an opportunity to longitudinally review of minority 
youth processing. Separate empirical models are run before and after the beginning of 
DMC intervention. Coefficients from these regressions can be compared to determine if 
the relative influence of any factor changes between these intervention periods 
(Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). Attention is given to understanding 
youth processing in the entire state of Pennsylvania as well as comparing the decision-
making of DMC intervention counties and non-intervention counties. Sorting cases into 
DMC intervention and non-intervention county sets helps to disentangle processing 
changes due to DMC reduction activities from those resulting from other statewide 
factors.  
As a diagnostic measure for the multivariate tests, Appendix 6 to Appendix 8 
contain summary statistics of the characteristics of cases referred to the juvenile justice 
system for Pennsylvania, DMC intervention counties, and non-intervention counties. 
Bivariate correlations were also estimated to determine collinearity among key 
independent variables. Correlations among these variables are acceptable, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern (see Appendix 10). Appendix 9 displays summary 
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statistics of the county-level characteristics of jurisdictions containing or lacking DMC 
reduction programs. 
The first two sets of multivariate analyses seek to distinguish the relative 
importance of race in juvenile justice decision-making. If state intervention as a result of 
the DMC mandate is meaningful as the study’s first hypothesis conjectures, race should 
become a less relevant factor in processing decisions in these models. The approaches of 
these models to juvenile court decision-making, however, are distinct. Continuation ratio 
logistic regressions are employed to predict a youth’s advancement to more punitive 
points along the juvenile justice continuum. The continuation ratio method assumes that 
youth cannot reach a certain decision-point in the juvenile justice system without first 
passing through all previous points. For instance, a youth cannot be remanded to secure 
confinement without first being petitioned, adjudicated, and disposed to placement. In 
mathematical terms, assume Pr (y = m | x) is probability of being in stage m given x and 
Pr (y > m | x) is the probability of being in a stage later than m. The continuation ratio 
model can be expressed in terms of log odds by:  
 
    ! =  " |    ! >  " | $ =  %& +  (  )*  " = 1 * , − 1 
 
  This approach constrains βs to be the same across decision-making stages and 
allows intercepts to differ given the constant term %& (Feinberg, 1980). The coefficients 
associated with each independent variable are then interpreted as increasing or decreasing 
a youth’s odds of closing their case at one stage to being handled and ending case review 
at a later stage (Long & Freese, 2006). In this study, advancement within the juvenile 
justice system is measured by four movements from 1) referral to petitioning, 2) 
petitioning to adjudication, 3) adjudication to disposition to placement, 4) disposition to 
placement to commitment to secure confinement.  
To get a closer approximation of the significance of race in juvenile processing, 
bivariate probit model with selectivity bias are subsequently used to identify the criteria 
influencing a youth’s likelihood of petitioning, adjudication, placement, and secure 
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confinement. The standard probit model approximates a latent variable, y*, representing 
the underlying propensity for how juvenile justice officials handle a case at each 
processing point (MacDonald, 2001; Montmaequette, Mahseredjian, & Houle, 1996). 
This latent variable is related to observed independent variables by the following 
structural equation  
 
!(∗ = βx( +  0( 
 
where i is an observation and ε is an error term (Long & Freese, 2006). Because the 
dependent variable of this equation is never observed, one must examine binary outcomes 
determining whether cases were handled affirmatively or exited out of the juvenile justice 
system. For example, at the petitioning stage, the probit model estimates the underlying 
tendency of recommending a case for formal processing when a binary outcome 
(petitioned or not petitioned and diverted out of the juvenile court) is observed. A similar 
logic applies to the adjudication, placement, and secure confinement stages. Thus,   
 
!( = 1  1      if !(
∗ > 0
  0     otherwise 
 
With one independent variable, the latent-variable model for a binary outcome is 
approximated by  
  
Pr! = 1 | x  = Pr ε >  −8α +  βx | x 
 
The error term ε is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of 1.  
Ordinary probit models, however, can suffer from problems of selection bias. As 
a one moves toward later processing stages, cases become more homogeneous and 
distinct from cases exiting at previous decision-points (Berk, 1983). Empirical models 
should therefore attempt to account for the non-random selection of cases at each 
processing stage by distinguishing the probability a case is included in a sample of a 
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previous stage (Leiber, 2003). For instance, assessments of the factors affecting 
delinquency determinations at the adjudication stage should control for the probability 
youth are selected for formal court processing (i.e. petitioned). In juvenile justice 
research, Heckman's two-step procedure is a commonly applied corrective (Kempf-
Leonard & Sontheimer, 1995; Leiber et al., 2011). The effectiveness of the Heckman 
correction, though, rests upon good exclusion restrictions. Such variables help to predict 
selection within a particular sample, but they do not affect the outcome variable. A flaw 
in criminological scholarship is overuse of the Heckman correction due to the omission 
or poor theoretical motivation of chosen exclusion restrictions (Bushway, Johnson, & 
Slocum, 2007).  
Given the lack of available exclusion restrictions in this dataset, this study uses 
bivariate probit models and controls for selection bias by employing a "bounding 
approach" utilized by MacDonald (2001) and Klepper et al. (1983). Examining two 
decision-points at a time, the method makes assumptions about the correlations between 
the error terms of the models predicting decision-making at each stage. The bivariate 
probit models use two observed binary outcomes variables y1 and y2 that estimate two 
underlying propensities to a handle a case, y1* and y2*, where 
 
!:( = 1  1      if !:(
∗ > 0
  0     otherwise 
 
!;( = 1  1      if !;(
∗ > 0
  0     otherwise 
 
and   
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 0:( and 0;( are assumed to be distributed normally with a correlation coefficient, ρ 
(rho) (W. H. Greene, 2003). Specifically,  
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 If advancement from the first stage is non-random and not accounted for in one’s model 
of decision-making at the second stage, the error terms of these two stages will be 
correlated due to selection bias (i.e. ρ ≠ 0) (W. H. Greene, 2003). The magnitude of 
selection bias, however, is not known. The bounding approach addresses this limitation 
by fixing the degree of correlation between the disturbance terms of the first stage and 
second stage models, encapsulated by rho. By setting rho at different values, a range of 
coefficients for each independent variable are generated that contain an estimate of the 
coefficient if correlation between the two stages were known apriori (Klepper, Steven et 
al., 1983, pp. 75–76). This analysis fixes rho at 0 and .9. While rho equaling 0 assumes 
no relationship exists between error terms of these two stages, a rho value of .9 accounts 
for strongly correlated error terms. Effectively, this bounding approach gauges the 
sensitivity of coefficients under varying degrees of selection bias (MacDonald, 2001).   
Controlling for these fixed rhos, the bivariate probit models estimate values of β1 
and β2  a using maximum likelihood function. The maximum likelihood function of this 
model is given by  
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where F is the bivariate normal distribution’s cumulative distribution function (W. H. 
Greene, 2003). Cases that exit the juvenile justice system at the first stage do not 
contribute anything to the maximum likelihood function. Bivariate probit models control 
for selection bias between 1) petitioning and adjudication, 2) adjudication and placement, 
and 3) placement and secure confinement. For reference, stage-specific logistic 
regressions without selection bias corrections displaying the odds of being petitioned, 
adjudicated, placed, and securely confined are provided in Appendix 14 to Appendix 17  
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Finally, difference-in-differences techniques are utilized to determine whether 
DMC intervention has altered the number minority youth processed in Pennsylvania 
while attempting to account for other related processing changes during this period. The 
study’s second hypothesis asserts DMC intervention has accomplished this end. The 
difference-in-differences method is a technique used to discern the effect of a treatment 
in a non-experimental setting. Following experimental design, outcomes from one group 
receiving a treatment are compared with those from another lacking the treatment. These 
treatment and control groups are observed for two periods: pre-treatment and post-
treatment. Differences between the treatment and control are then compared for each 
period. By taking the difference in the differences between these two groups from each 
point in time, the effect of treatment is isolated (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Ashenfelter & 
Card, 1985; Card & Krueger, 1994). In this study, the treatment is DMC intervention. In 
equation form, assume y represents the number of minorities processed at a particular 
stage in the juvenile justice system, period is a dummy variable for the period when 
DMC intervention begins, and intervention is a dummy variable for whether a county 
implemented DMC reduction programs. The difference-in-differences model can be 
written as 
 
! =  	 +  :IJ KJI* +  L	MJ I*N +  L:IJ KJI* ∗ MJ I*N +  0 
 
The coefficient of L: is of primary interest because it multiplies the interaction between 
period (time) and treatment counties (intervene) (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007). From this 
coefficient, the difference in the differences estimate is given by  
 
 LO: = yPQRSTUSVWXYWSVZRS,; − yPQRSTUSVWXYWSVZRS,: − yP[\] USVWXYWSVZRS,; − yP[\] USVWXYWSVZRS,: 
 
If DMC-intervention is successful, difference-in-differences estimates (LOO should reflect 
one of two scenarios. First, minority youth processing can decline within DMC 
intervention counties while such processing diminishes more gradually, increases, or 
holds constant within non-intervention counties. Secondly, minority youth processing can 
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rise or remain stable within DMC intervention counties, but it will grow more rapidly 
within non-intervention counties. In either scenario, difference-in-differences coefficients 
should be negative and statistically significant, suggesting DMC intervention has 
actualized the mandate’s goal of cutting the disproportionate number of minority youth 
processed by the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system.  
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CHAPTER SIX - DOES RACIAL DISPARITY REFORM WORK? : THE CASE OF 
THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT MANDATE II (FINDINGS) 
 
This chapter presents findings related to minority overrepresentation in the 
Pennsylvania juvenile justice system and the impacts of the Disproportionate Minority 
Contact (DMC) mandate of 2002 on processing outcomes. The chapter is divided into 
two parts. The first part of this chapter introduces descriptive statistics of juvenile 
processing in Pennsylvania. It first displays the percentages of minority youth processed 
at various stages along the juvenile justice continuum from 1997-2011. It then compares 
the rates at which minority youth progress through the juvenile justice system relative to 
those of white youth using a federally required measure called the Relative Rate Index. 
Lastly, this section describes racial disproportion in the processing outcomes of counties 
implementing state-sponsored DMC reduction programs (hereafter, DMC intervention 
counties) and counties lacking such activities (non-intervention counties). After 
identifying Pennsylvania’s disproportionate minority youth processing issues, the second 
part of the chapter turns toward the present research’s hypotheses that state intervention 
in response to the DMC mandate has successfully diminished minority overrepresentation 
by 1) reducing the importance of race as a decision-making factor and 2) decreasing the 
number of black and Hispanic youth handled at each stage of the juvenile justice system. 
It discusses the results of three multivariate assessments of DMC intervention: 
continuation ratio logistic regressions, bivariate probit models with selectivity bias, and 
difference-in-differences estimations. Support is found for this study’s two hypotheses, 
suggesting DMC intervention has been effective in curtailing racial inequalities in the 
juvenile justice system.  
 
Part I: Descriptive Statistics of Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania 
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Statewide Juvenile Processing Trends: Percentages  
 
To begin to evaluate the success of the DMC mandate as a racial disparity reform 
in addressing minority overrepresentation, a statewide examination of juvenile processing 
trends is necessary. Table 5 to Table 10 show the annual and average percentages of 
minority youth processed at the arrest, referral, petition, adjudication, placement, and 
secure confinement stages from 1997-2011. In accordance with the official racial 
categories used by the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system, each table distinguishes the 
percent of youth who identified as black, white, Hispanic, or other (i.e. Asian, multiracial, 
or Native American).  
Although police officers are not directly affected by the DMC mandate, arrest 
represents the first point of contact with the juvenile justice system for most youth.34 
Uniform Crime Report data for 1997-2011 use four racial categories: black, white, Asian, 
and Indian. The latter two categories are merged into an “other” category to better 
approximate the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system’s coding scheme. Given the 
unreliability of figures for ethnicity (i.e. Hispanic/Latino origins), figures for arrested 
Hispanic youth cannot be displayed. At this first decision-point, minority 
overrepresentation is readily apparent. Black youth constitute an average of 13.6% of 
Pennsylvania’s 10-17 year old population, yet represent an average of 36.7% of all youth 
arrests. The proportion of black youth in juvenile arrests has steadily grown throughout 
the mid-2000s. Other youth and white youth are consistently underrepresented in arrests 
(on average, .07% and 62.6%, respectively), relative to their presence in the general 
population (2.5% and 77.9%). Since 1997, white youth make up a smaller proportion of 
                                                 
34 To note, referrals may also be made by schools, family, probation officers, social agency 
officials, district magistrates, and other juvenile courts.  
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Pennsylvania’s arrested youth population, though this change may be largely attributed to 
increasing diversity in the state’s general youth population.35   
At the referral stage, racial disproportion broadly corresponds to patterns in youth 
arrests. The major difference between the referral and arrest populations is the reduction 
in the presence of African Americans and whites due to the introduction of the Hispanic 
category. A slightly higher percentage of other youth are likewise represented, a result 
associated with a greater presence of this group in nonpolice referrals. Examining all 
groups together, minority overrepresentation at the referral stage has enlarged over the 
past 14 years. More recently, a majority of referred youth identify as either black or 
Hispanic. Representation of Hispanic youth alone has doubled since 1997 to nearly 13% 
in 2011. Proportional declines in white referrals outpacing demographic changes also 
contribute to increasing percentages of minorities at this stage.  
Moving toward more formal processing in the juvenile justice system, racial 
imbalances in juvenile processing become more pronounced. Among petitioned cases, 
minorities constitute a larger share of formally processed cases relative to their share of 
referrals. To illustrate, black youth made up 31.2% of referrals, but 39.3% of petitioned 
cases in 1997. Across all years, the proportion of African American youth advancing 
from the referral to petition stage increases by approximately 7%. To a lesser extent, this 
trend holds true for Hispanic and other youth as well. Representation of these two groups 
grows slightly between the referral and petition stages for much of the early 2000s, but 
has leveled off in more recent years.  
At adjudication, racial imbalances among youth deemed delinquent are stark, but 
do not severely worsen from the petitioning stage. On average, overrepresentation of all 
minority groups is somewhat smaller at adjudication (48.7%) than at petitioning (51.6%), 
suggesting racial considerations may play a smaller role in determinations of delinquency. 
That being said, this conclusion does not hold true for all racial groups. For each year 
                                                 
35 From 1997 to 2011, the proportion of white youth in the state’s general youth population 
decreased from 85.6% to 73.9%. This reduction is much greater than the decline in white 
representation among arrested youth.  
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between 1997 and 2011, African Americans become less represented in the state’s 
adjudicated population relative to its petitioned population. By contrast, disproportionate 
representation of Hispanics rises every year during this period. The proportion of 
adjudicated whites meanwhile closely approximates that of petitioned whites.  
The most substantively important and striking portrayals of minority 
overrepresentation are found at the placement and secure confinement stages. Confirming 
extant criminological literature, racial disproportion in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice 
system is greatest at these last decision-points (Bishop, 2005; Pope & Feyerherm, 1990; 
Pope, Lovell, & Hsia, 2002). Since the late 1990s, the average percentage of black youth 
disposed to placement (41.3%) has been over three times larger than the average 
proportion of this group in the general population (13.6%). Overrepresentation of 
Hispanic youth is less distorted, with an average of 10.7% of placed youth being Hispanic 
compared to 6.0% of all Pennsylvanian youth. White representation among placed youth 
has hovered around 45%, though this share has likewise declined during the late 2000s.36  
The racial skew of Pennsylvania’s securely confined youth population is more 
glaring. White youth on average receive just over a third of all commitments to secure 
confinement. For much of the 2000s, African Americans alone received over 45% of all 
secure confinement dispositions. The percentage of Hispanics among the state’s securely 
confined population has consistently fluctuated around 15.0%. Since 2005, the presence 
of African Americans and Hispanics within juvenile secure confinement facilities has 
been enlarging. Although minority youth appear face a cumulative disadvantage in the 
juvenile justice system, the number of securely confined youth is still small relative to 
vast amount of cases handled by the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system. On average, 
just 286 out of over 45,000 youth referred to the juvenile justice system were sent to 
                                                 
36 Appendix 7 and Appendix 8 show changes in the racial composition of non-secure, placed 
populations before and after DMC intervention begins. These figures indicate Hispanics have 
become more represented in most types of non-secure placement programs since the beginning of 
DMC intervention. With the exception of foster care, African Americans make up a smaller 
proportion of non-secure residential programs’ populations since the late 2000s.  
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secure facilities every year from 1997 to 2011, with secure confinement disposition 
reaching a high-point of 418 individuals in 2003. This amounts to less than 1% of 
juvenile delinquency cases ending with commitments to secure facilities.   
 
Statewide Juvenile Processing Trends: Relative Rate Indices 
 
 An alternative approach to analyzing racial disproportion in the Pennsylvania 
juvenile justice system is comparing the rates at which racial groups advance to each 
processing stage. In 2003, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
introduced a new measure of minority overrepresentation called the Relative Rate Index 
(Coleman, 2010). This metric compares the rate at which minority juveniles progress 
from one stage to another relative to the rate at which white juveniles do so. That is,  
 
RRI =[( C2/P2) / ( C1/P1)] 
 
where C stands for the number of youths processed at the current decision-point of 
interest, P represents the number of youths handled at the preceding decision-point, 1 
refers to white youths, and 2 refers to Hispanic, black, or other youths (Blumstein, 1982; 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2014). If a RRI equals 1.00, no 
differences exist in the handling of white youth and minority youth. A ratio above 1.00 
signals overrepresentation of minorities and a ratio below 1.00 denotes 
underrepresentation of minorities relative to whites. Because so few arrested juveniles 
reach the adjudication and placement stages, use of Relative Rate Indices can help to 
adjust for changes in the total number of juveniles processed at different stages and thus 
provide a fuller understanding of a particular stage’s racial composition.37  
                                                 
37 One weakness of this strategy is Relative Rate Indices depend upon both nonwhite and white 
racial groups advancing to another processing stage. For instance, an index cannot be generated if 
only nonwhites (or whites) were placed in secure facilities, which may obscure obvious problems 
of racial inequality. Although statewide analyses usually contain a sufficient number of juveniles 
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 Figure 4 to Figure 9 show annual Relative Rate Indices comparing the movement 
of black, Hispanic, and other youth through various decision-points along the juvenile 
justice continuum from 1997 to 2011. Referral to arrest ratios are initial measures for 
assessing minority overrepresentation. Given available racial categories used in arrest 
data, Relative Rate Indices are generated for other and black youth. These ratios conform 
to the patterns shown from the percentages of minority youth treated at these decision-
points. With the exception of 1997, black youth are slightly more likely to be referred to 
juvenile court beyond their arrest tendencies. Disproportionality in referrals for African 
Americans has marginally increased between 2005 and 2011. Other youth express much 
greater disproportion in their referrals given extant arrest data. Such overrepresentation 
also becomes strong in the late 2000s. These patterns for other youth continue to hold 
when police referrals to the juvenile justice system are compared to arrests (not shown).  
Petition to referral ratios affirm that racial disproportion is exacerbated as youth 
face formal court processing. Minority youths generally receive formal court review at 
higher rates than white youths. Referred black youth consistently experience formal 
processing at a higher rate than referred white youth given an average Relative Rate 
Index of 1.25. Between 1997 and 2010, overprocessing of African Americans somewhat 
diminishes. This narrowing of the petitioning ratio gap is far more pronounced for 
Hispanic and other youth during this period (average RRI=1.13 and 1.14, respectively).  
 Once again, the adjudication stage presents striking outcomes for minority groups. 
Although the overrepresentation of black youth grows from arrest to petitioning, black 
juveniles are generally adjudicated as delinquent at a lower rate than white peers (average 
RRI= .86). Until the early 2000s, black and white youth were deemed delinquent at 
similar rates. The rest of this period is marked by an underrepresentation of black youth 
as delinquents. Hispanic youth are marginally more likely than white youth to be 
adjudicated while other youth are likewise slightly underrepresented in delinquency 
                                                                                                                                                 
of all races to compare the handling of groups at the most punitive stages, the lack of available or 
reliable Relative Rate Indices may present more problems for reviews of county or local-level 
practices (Piquero, 2008).  
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determinations. As seen at petitioning, overprocessing of Hispanic youth tends to decline 
throughout the 2000s (average RRI= 1.07). These ratios and previous percentages of 
delinquent minority youth suggest adjudication may be a vital stage for reducing 
disadvantages for minority groups.  
 Finally, placement to adjudication and secure confinement to adjudication ratios 
disclose the state’s most severe problems with minority overrepresentation. Hispanic 
youth show the highest rates of overrepresentation in all placement programs and secure 
confinement facilities with average Relative Rate Indices of 1.27 and 2.43, respectively. 
Even after being adjudicated a lower rate than whites, black youth are also slightly more 
likely than white youth to be remanded to placement (average RRI = 1.17). This 
disproportion intensifies for commitments to secure confinement (average RRI = 1.81). 
Placement and secure confinement ratios, however, are less stable for other youth. Other 
youth fluctuate between being highly underrepresented to severely overrepresented in 
placement decisions without consistent patterns. Such instability may be a result of the 
small number of cases involving other youth.  
Although minority overrepresentation is clear among placements and 
commitments to secure confinement, RRI figures for these stages have dramatically 
dropped for all minority groups since the late 1990s. Overprocessing of Hispanic youth 
has fallen by nearly 25% in placement dispositions and 67% in secure confinement 
commitments. Rates of African American youth dispositions to placement and secure 
confinement similarly declined by 11% and 23%, respectively. These reductions in 
minority youth processing stages are obscured by only examining the proportional 
representation of these groups among the state’s placed and securely confined 
populations.  
   
DMC Intervention and Non-Intervention Counties’ Juvenile Processing Trends 
  
While percentages of processed youth and Relative Rate Indices attest that 
minority overrepresentation in juvenile justice is a demonstrable concern, it is crucial to 
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consider whether such racial imbalances have been responsive to policy reform in recent 
years. Since the 1970s, Pennsylvania has stood as a leader in developing juvenile justice 
interventions that comply with JJDPA requirements  (Griffith et al., 2012; Hsia & 
Hamparian, 1998; K. Kempf, 1992; R. Schwartz, 2013). As previously described in 
Chapter 5, the state has recently introduced a series of programs targeting minority youth 
processing that meet the demands of the DMC mandate of 2002. State-sponsored DMC 
interventions have been launched in five counties: Allegheny, Berks, Dauphin, Lancaster, 
and Philadelphia. To evaluate the consequences of DMC intervention, comparisons in 
minority youth processing must be drawn between these 5 DMC intervention counties 
and 62 non-intervention counties.  
As a first step, racial disproportion in the juvenile processing of DMC 
intervention counties is examined. Table 11 summarizes changes in the racial 
composition of processed youth from referral to the petitioning, adjudication, placement, 
and secure confinement stages. The referral stage is selected as a reference population 
because it is the first processing stage under the direct control of juvenile justice officials. 
Table 11 illuminates several aspects of minority youth processing within DMC 
intervention counties. Most minority youth cases originate from Philadelphia and 
Allegheny Counties. These cases primarily involve African Americans. In fact, nearly 
80% of all minority youth processed between 1997 and 2011 in DMC intervention 
counties are black. Moreover, racial disproportion tends to worsen as referred youth 
advance through the juvenile justice system. Minorities overwhelmingly make up each 
intervention county’s placed and securely confined populations. To illustrate, the 
proportion of Hispanic and black youth swells by 14.4% among Berks County’s placed 
youth population and by 26.6% among the county’s securely confined youth population. 
These expansions are complemented with 13.1% and 24.9% declines in white youth 
representation at these stages, respectively.  
Table 12 replicates racial composition figures for processed youth in non-
intervention counties and the entire state. Two additional trends become evident. First, 
approximately 60% of all cases handled by the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system 
derive from non-intervention counties. Nearly 1/3 of all cases involving African 
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Americans and slightly less than half of all cases involving Hispanics also come from 
non-intervention counties. This distribution of cases will make any processing shifts 
within DMC intervention counties prominent in statewide decision-outcomes. Secondly, 
while minority youth presence is greater at the referral stage in DMC intervention 
counties, the racial composition of processed youth in non-intervention becomes more 
racially disparate at later decision-points. Growth in the overrepresentation of African 
Americans and underrepresentation of whites at the placement and secure confinement 
stages in non-intervention counties nearly doubles these trends in DMC intervention 
counties. This finding not only illustrates racial disproportion affects all parts of 
Pennsylvania, but also encourages additional probing into the importance of race in 
decision-making across DMC intervention and non-intervention counties.   
 
Part II: Multivariate Assessments of the Consequences of DMC Intervention  
  
  Given the pervasiveness of minority overrepresentation at the state-level as well 
as within DMC intervention and non-intervention counties, multivariate statistical 
techniques can shed light upon any changes in the treatment of minority youth following 
implementation of DMC mandate intervention. These methods move past percentages 
and RRIs described in the previous section by identifying racial differences in youth 
handling while controlling for important legal factors, social conditions, and demographic 
characteristics. Three sets of empirical methods are discussed in this section: continuation 
ratio logistic regressions, bivariate probit models with selectivity bias, and difference-in-
differences estimations. The first two methods test the study’s first hypothesis that DMC 
intervention has moderated the influence of race as a factor in processing decisions. The 
third method tests the study’s second hypothesis that intervention has actualized the 
DMC mandate’s stated goal of reducing the disproportionate number of minority youth 
handled at all decision-points along the juvenile justice continuum.  
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Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression Model Assessments 
 
Full Sample (1997-2011) Models  
 
 Continuation ratio logistic regressions predicting advancement from the referral to 
the secure confinement stage are first used to assess the influence of race in juvenile 
justice decision-making. Continuation ratio logistic regressions are initially run on all 
cases processed by the state of Pennsylvania, counties with DMC intervention, and 
counties lacking intervention between 1997 and 2011. For these three jurisdictions, three 
models are then estimated. The first model includes demographic, social conditions, and 
legal factors without any race variables. The second model only contains race variables 
(black, Hispanic, and other). A third (full) model includes all legal, social conditions, 
demographic, and race variables. 
Table 13 presents the results from these full sample regressions. Reviewing all 
cases handled in Pennsylvania, it becomes evident cases advancing to later stages share 
common characteristics. Legal factors like severity, grade, and number of charges are 
expectedly key predictors in moving cases to more punitive processing stages. 
Demographic characteristics and social conditions, however, also affect processing 
outcomes. Older youth and males have a greater likelihood of advancing to later stages of 
juvenile processing. Youth who do not live in a two-parent household, do not have 
married parents, and currently attend school are likewise more likely to face further 
processing. The magnitude and direction of the demographic, social conditions, and legal 
factors’ coefficients remain unchanged between the full model and first model omitting 
race variables. Of paramount interest, race wields significant influence over decision-
making. Across all three jurisdictions, black status and Hispanic status are significant 
predictors of additional processing. Controlling for all relevant factors, being Hispanic 
and being African American Pennsylvania elevate a youth’s odds of entering later 
processing stages by 8.0% and 3.0%, respectively. Racially other status, though, has no 
discernible impact on advancement. To note, these findings accord with those of 
Appendix 13 that runs continuation ratio models for 65 counties in Pennsylvania with and 
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without prior record information (see the previous chapter’s discussion on prior record 
data limitations). Inclusion of prior record in these models does not significantly bias the 
estimated impacts of being black or being Hispanic on advancement in juvenile 
processing.  
Analogous results are evident among DMC intervention and non-intervention 
counties. For both county sets, more severe, felony, and a higher number of charges are 
strongly associated with further juvenile processing. Age, sex, and social conditions 
continue to affect advancement in similar directions. These county sets only differ with 
regard to family status, which has little or no impact in DMC intervention counties’ 
processing decisions. Again, being black and being Hispanic are associated with greater 
higher odds of advancement, though Hispanic status is somewhat less important in 
counties with DMC reduction programs.  
 
Pre-DMC Intervention (1997-2004) and Post-DMC Intervention (2005-2011) Models 
 
In light of these full sample findings, the next step is to discern whether DMC 
intervention alters the role of race in juvenile justice decision-making. Separate 
continuation ratio logistic regressions are run before and after the beginning of DMC 
intervention. Coefficients from these regressions are then compared to determine if the 
relative influence of any factor changes between these intervention periods (Paternoster 
et al. 1988). While outcomes are analyzed for the entire state of Pennsylvania, processing 
decisions are again reviewed for the DMC intervention and non-intervention county sets 
in an effort to better discern where intervention has its greatest impacts.  
Continuation regression logistic regression models predicting advancement in 
juvenile processing before and after DMC intervention in these three jurisdictions are 
shown in Table 14. At the state level, the weight of legal characteristics in decision-
making is largely unchanged across time. Youth with more serious cases from a legal 
perspective still tend to progress forward through the system. Youth with less traditional 
social conditions also tend to receive harsher sanctions, but the effects of family and 
school status diminish over time. Age and maleness considerably heighten a youth’s odds 
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of advancement, but only sex becomes more prominent in post-DMC intervention 
decision-making. Moving toward evaluating the consequences of DMC intervention on 
state minority youth processing, African American and Hispanic youth are significantly 
more likely advance to later processing stages across all periods. Yet some remarkable 
patterns appear in the post-DMC intervention period. Being black and being Hispanic 
become substantially less salient features in decision-making following intervention. 
Specifically, the odds of advancement decrease by 6.4% for African American youth and 
24.5% for Hispanic youth. These declines are highly significant (p < .01), indicating race 
has become less predictive of advancement to more punitive decision-points since DMC 
intervention began.  
Case processing outcomes of DMC intervention and non-intervention counties 
affirm these developments. In both county sets, the roles of legal characteristics and 
social conditions in contributing to additional juvenile processing are generally constant 
over time. As one exception, school status had more influence in decision-making within 
DMC intervention counties before 2005. While being male becomes a stronger predictor 
of advancement for DMC intervention counties over time, age has weaker effects on 
advancement in non-intervention counties the post-DMC intervention period.  
The most striking pre/post DMC intervention results concern race. Prior to any 
intervention, being black and being Hispanic do raise a youth’s odds of advancement 
regardless of where his or her case is processed. These disadvantages of minority status, 
however, become somewhat attenuated over time. Within non-intervention counties, a 
Hispanic youth is 11.7% less likely to receive further juvenile processing in the post-
DMC intervention period. The odds for advancement for black youth remain the same. 
As anticipated, more prominent changes occur in counties implementing DMC reduction 
programs. Black and Hispanic statuses become significantly less defining features in a 
youth’s movement through the juvenile justice system. Since the introduction of DMC 
intervention, a black youth’s odds of advancement fall by 2.5%. More surprisingly, a 
Hispanic youth actually becomes less likely than a non-Hispanic peer to face additional 
processing. This change in the magnitude and direction of the Hispanic coefficient is 
highly significant (p < .01).  
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Bivariate Probit Model with Selectivity Bias Assessments 
 
 While the continuation ratio logistic regression method exposes the changing 
significance of race in a youth’s movement through the juvenile justice system following 
DMC intervention, race may have varying degrees of influence at each processing stage. 
Rather than running one model predicting advancement in juvenile processing before and 
after DMC intervention, bivariate probit models are used to identify the effects of race 
and other relevant factors on adjudication given a petition for formal court review, 
placement given a determination of delinquency, and secure confinement given a 
disposition to placement during these periods.  
Processing outcomes associated with these three pairs of decision-making stages 
are examined for the entire state, DMC intervention counties, and non-intervention 
counties. For each jurisdiction, two sets of bivariate models assuming different levels of 
correlation between the two decision-point stages of interest (i.e. ρ = 0 or .9) are 
subsequently generated to account for selection bias and judge the sensitivity of 
coefficients estimates (Klepper, Steven et al., 1983; MacDonald, 2001). For reference, 
stage-specific logistic regressions without controls for selection bias are presented in 
Appendix 14 to Appendix 17. The findings of these models generally parallel the results 
of the bivariate probit models.  
Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17 display the first set of bivariate probit model 
results predicting delinquency determinations following the filing of a petition in the pre- 
and post-DMC intervention periods. These tables show processing outcomes for all 
counties, counties with DMC reduction programs, and counties lacking such programs, 
respectively. Looking at the models of all three tables, the influence of demographic, 
social conditions, legal, and race variables on petitioning and adjudication outcomes is 
generally consistent across varying levels of correlation between these two decision-
making stages. The direction and significance of pre/post DMC intervention differences 
between the coefficients associated with these variables are also similar, signaling the 
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conclusions about DMC intervention should hold true under different levels of possible 
correlated and omitted variables.  
 At the petitioning stage, grade of offense, age, family status, school status become 
less important in state petitioning decisions after DMC intervention begins. Similar 
patterns are found in counties containing DMC reduction programs, though living 
arrangements acquire more importance in recommendations for formal court review. 
Petitioning practices remarkably diverge between the pre-DMC and post-DMC 
intervention periods with respect to race. In general, being non-black and being non-
Hispanic correspond to lower likelihoods of petitioning. Nonetheless, the relative weight 
of racial factors in petitioning decisions changes over time. Hispanic youth experience a 
dramatically reduced risk of petitioning in the post-DMC intervention period. While such 
reductions are seen in all three jurisdictions, Hispanic youth in DMC intervention 
counties become significantly less likely than non-Hispanic peers to be petitioned. 
Substantial declines in the salience of African American status also take place for the 
entire state and DMC intervention counties. Black youth in non-intervention counties, 
though, continue to face the same elevated chances of receiving formal court review. 
Another noteworthy pattern corresponds to racially other status. At the state level and 
within non-intervention counties, other youth are initially more likely to receive formal 
court recommendations in the pre-DMC intervention period. This likelihood diminishes 
in more recent years, suggesting the relevance of race in decision-making may change in 
the absence of official DMC intervention. 
Continuing review of Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17, processing at the 
adjudication stage likewise appears to change following DMC intervention. For all 
Pennsylvania counties, social conditions and grade of charge become less predictive of 
delinquency determinations. Males face greater odds of adjudication in the post-DMC 
intervention period. Similar trends are found in DMC intervention counties. Adjudication 
decisions in non-intervention counties meanwhile become less reliant on age and family 
status. More pertinently, transformations in the roles of race are apparent in each 
jurisdiction. Across the entire state, African Americans become substantially less likely 
than non-African Americans to be deemed delinquent following DMC intervention. 
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Being black in non-intervention continues to enhance a youth's chances of adjudication 
across the different intervention county sets. Adjudication decisions of all jurisdictions 
become less dependent upon Hispanic status in the post-DMC intervention period. 
Hispanic youth of DMC intervention counties, however, become less likely to be deemed 
delinquent than non-Hispanic peers.  
Moving to the sanctioning of youth, additional shifts occur in placement decision-
making following DMC intervention. Table 18, Table 19, and Table 20 present bivariate 
probit models pinpointing case characteristics affecting the likelihood adjudicated youth 
are disposed to out-of-home placements rather than community sanctions.38 Changes in 
adjudication practices reflected in these models accord with previously discussed findings.  
Examining statewide dispositions, sex bears more weight on out-of-home 
placement outcomes in the post-DMC intervention. Living arrangements also become 
somewhat less pertinent in placement decision-making. Placement outcomes notably 
differ with regard to race between the pre- and post-DMC intervention periods. Since the 
introduction of DMC reduction programs, African Americans are significantly more 
likely to receive community (rather than out-of-home placement) sanctions. Hispanic 
youth continue to have a higher likelihood of out-of-home placement, but Hispanic status 
is far less determinative of recent dispositions.  
Breaking down placement decision-making by DMC reduction activity reveals 
age, sex, and grade of charge have differential impacts on placement decisions over time. 
In review of racial factors, DMC intervention counties are primarily responsible for 
producing the state’s racially egalitarian shifts in placement outcomes. Being black and 
being Hispanic in intervention counties are associated with lower likelihoods of out-of-
home placement in the post-DMC intervention period. Conversely, African American 
status and Hispanic status in non-intervention counties become more strongly tied to out-
of-home placements during this period.  
                                                 
38 The sample for these two stages only contains petitioned cases. Multivariate probit modeling is 
not completed for this point, so the bivariate probit models of placement decisions given 
adjudication do not account for selection bias between the petitioning and adjudication stage. 
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Table 21, Table 22, and Table 23 display a final set of bivariate probit models 
predicting commitments to secure confinement given an out-of-home placement 
decision.39 As seen with adjudication outcomes, factors associated with out-of-home 
placements in these models are broadly consistent with aforementioned estimates. The 
contrast between DMC intervention and non-intervention counties in diminishing the 
importance of race in placement decisions, however, becomes more stark. As Table 23 
shows, the adverse influence of minority status in non-intervention counties does not 
change whatsoever.  
The underlying factors of secure confinement decisions tend to be consistent over 
time. After DMC intervention begins, age becomes less predictive and grade of charge 
more predictive of state secure confinement commitments. Like previous decision-points, 
the disadvantages of minority status are attenuated at the secure confinement stage. Black 
and Hispanic youth have higher odds of being remanded to secure confinement, but such 
youth are less likely to be confined than similarly situated peers sanctioned just a few 
years earlier. Reductions in the salience of a youth’s characteristics personal 
characteristics, including sex and race, are particularly marked for DMC intervention 
counties. Within counties lacking DMC intervention, reductions in the likelihood of 
secure sanctioning are inconsistent across models for Hispanic youth, but not for black 
youth whose odds of commitment to secure facilities remain unchanged.  
 
Difference-in-differences Model Assessments 
 
A Basic Difference-in-differences Estimation Approach  
 
While continuation ratio logistic regression and bivariate probit models indicate 
                                                 
39 As previously seen with the adjudication to placement models, the sample for the placement to 
secure confinement models only contains petitioned cases with a determination of delinquency. 
These models do not account for selection bias from petitioning to adjudication and from 
adjudication to placement.  
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DMC intervention has mitigated the detrimental influence of race in decision-making, it 
remains unclear whether intervention has also reduced the disproportionate number of 
processed minority youth as the DMC mandate stipulates. Difference-in-differences 
estimation techniques explored in this last section seek to empirically test the study’s 
second hypothesis that DMC intervention has successfully achieved the policy’s stated 
ends.   
Following the language of the DMC mandate, changes in the number of African 
Americans and Hispanics processed at each decision-point are assessed. Focus is given to 
African Americans and Hispanics due to the size of these populations and the previously 
established significance of these racial statuses in processing decisions. These outcome 
measures offer distinct insights into the impacts of DMC intervention. Compared to 
assessing the relative importance of racial factors in processing decisions as an outcome 
variable, the number of minority youth handled at each point provides an absolute 
measure of youth movement through the juvenile justice system. It may also more closely 
respond to the concerns of juvenile justice officials, who must maintain a sense of how 
many minorities enter and exit from local juvenile justice systems in order to comply 
with federal requirements.  
Table 24 offers an initial glimpse into understanding changes in minority youth 
processing following DMC intervention. This table presents difference-in-differences 
estimates of the average numbers of African Americans and Hispanics petitioned, 
adjudicated, disposed to placement, and remanded to secure confinement in DMC 
intervention and non-intervention counties before and after the introduction of DMC 
reduction programming. These estimates do not include any controls or regression-based 
adjustments. Prior to implementing DMC programs, DMC intervention counties on 
average handle an extraordinarily high number of cases involving African Americans and 
Hispanics relative to non-intervention counties. Disparities in average caseloads are most 
apparent at the placement and secure confinement stages. Once DMC intervention begins, 
however, these two county sets take distinct processing paths. Far more African 
Americans and Hispanics are processed in non-intervention counties at all decision-points. 
Minority youth processing concurrently drops within DMC intervention counties. As a 
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net result of these dynamics, contractions occur in the minority youth processing 
differences among DMC intervention and non-intervention counties. With the exception 
of petitioned African Americans, such reductions in the average number of Hispanic and 
black youth handled at each decision-point are highly significant (p <. 01). DMC 
intervention therefore seems to curtail the disproportionate processing minority youth 
across juvenile justice continuum.  
Pre- and post-intervention averages identified by these basic difference-in-
differences models can be further broken down by year to show the trajectory of minority 
youth processing over time.  Figure 10 and Figure 11 present the predicted average 
numbers of Africans Americans and Hispanics processed by DMC intervention and non-
intervention counties at four decision-points for 1997 through 2011.40 The plotted lines 
visually represent the relationship between DMC reduction programs and the size of the 
juvenile justice system’s minority youth populations. These figures plainly show a 
narrowing in the processing practices between DMC intervention and non-intervention 
counties. While counties with DMC reduction programs continue to handle a large 
number of cases involving Hispanics and African Americans, average minority youth 
populations at each decision-point in these jurisdictions are getting smaller. Meanwhile, 
minority youth processing in non-intervention increases across the juvenile justice 
continuum. The growing convergences in the decision-making trajectories of DMC 
intervention and non-intervention counties are particularly evident at later decision-points.  
Based upon these difference-in-differences estimates, one can also approximate 
the number of minorities exiting the juvenile justice system at earlier stages as a result of 
DMC intervention. The consequences of DMC intervention can be roughly gauged by 
isolating changes in the average processed minority youth populations of DMC 
intervention counties from statewide difference-in-differences estimates. Shifts in the 
                                                 
40 In these figures, the natural log of the average number of minorities processed at each decision-
point is used given the substantially higher number of minority youth handled in DMC 
intervention counties and the consequent need to compare non-intervention and DMC 
intervention counties’ outcomes on a similar scale.  
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average practices of DMC intervention counties are then multiplied by five (i.e. the 
number of counties with DMC reduction programs) to get an annual measure of the total 
number of minorities removed from various juvenile processing stages. For example, 
approximately 629 fewer Africans Americans and 139 fewer Hispanics were adjudicated 
delinquent each year after DMC programs began. Over the course of six years, reductions 
in minority youth processing have been consequential.  
Overall, DMC intervention has led to 1,184 fewer petitions and 7,583 less 
determinations of delinquency among black and Hispanic youth. More crucially, DMC 
programs have allowed 4,731 minorities to remain within their communities rather than 
received sanctions of out-of-home placement. Over 250 minority youths were not sent to 
secure confinement facilities. These figures translate into reductions in intervention 
counties’ minority youth populations at petitioning by 2.2%, at adjudication by 27.4%, at 
placement by 51.0%, and secure confinement by 35.4% relative to their pre-DMC 
intervention populations.  
 
A Minority Youth Population-Weighted Difference-in-differences Estimation Approach 
 
Because difference-in-differences models of Table 24 lack any controls or 
adjustments, differences among DMC intervention and non-intervention counties could 
be overdrawn. More rigorous empirical difference-in-differences modeling can help to 
further isolate the consequences of DMC intervention. One criticism of this basic 
difference-in-differences approach is that processing outcomes from counties with 
predominantly white youth populations are accorded equal weight as those from racially 
diverse jurisdictions. To address this concern, black and Hispanic youth population 
weights privileging jurisdictions with larger general minority youth populations should be 
incorporated into the difference-in-differences models. Relatedly, initial difference-in-
differences models do not control for relevant factors that correlate with outcome 
variables. Weighted difference-in-differences models should thus include various sets of 
control variables.  
Table 25 displays minority youth population weighted difference-in-differences 
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estimates of changes in the number of black and Hispanic youth processed before and 
after DMC intervention. It presents results for five models. To form baseline estimates, 
Model I contains no controls. The remaining four models include various sets of 
covariates. While the constitutive variables of these sets are described in Chapter 5, these 
sets correspond to 1) conditions related to juvenile delinquency, 2) county punitiveness, 
3) racial group representation in arrests and referrals, and 4) average annual 
characteristics of cases handled within a county. Each model incrementally introduces 
various sets of control variables with Model V being a saturated model.    
 As Table 25 exhibits, the inclusion of population weights throws processing 
differences under DMC intervention into stark relief. Relative to the basic difference-in-
differences estimates of Table 24, population weighted difference-in-differences 
coefficients are markedly larger in magnitude and generally move in the direction that the 
DMC intervention has alleviated minority overrepresentation. Across all models in Table 
25, the numbers of processed black and Hispanic youth plunge for almost every stage 
after the development of DMC reduction programs. Highly significant differences in the 
processing trajectories of the non-intervention and DMC intervention county sets do 
expectedly decline as models become more saturated with controls.  
 
A Fixed County-Year Effects Difference-in-differences Estimation Approach 
 
A limitation of the basic difference-in-differences approach is the inability to fully 
control for county-specific and year-specific particularities in the treatment of juveniles. 
Fixed effects regression modeling addresses this problem by treating the values of 
explanatory variables as non-random quantities and assuming each model’s error terms 
are fixed constants (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). In a juvenile justice context, a fixed 
county and year effects model presumes youth processing and relevant factors 
influencing juvenile court operations in a locality are not entirely random over time. Such 
modeling, however, only permits the inclusion of relevant time-variant control variables.  
Results for fixed county and year effects difference-in-differences regression models are 
presented in Table 26. Once again, each model introduces an additional set of controls 
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culminating in Model V containing all relevant factors. The fixed effects coefficients 
parallel the basic difference-in-differences estimates of Table 24 in size and direction. 
Table 26 generally shows a diminished frequency of African Americans and 
Hispanics being processed since the introduction of DMC reduction programs. Across all 
five models, fewer minorities are adjudicated, placed, and securely confined. 
Recommendations for formal court review appear more resistant to change under DMC 
intervention. Models IV and V featuring variables measuring the size of arrested and 
referred minority populations, however, suggest important shifts in petitioning have still 
transpired. These fuller models demonstrate black and Hispanic youth processing in 
Pennsylvania has fallen considerably since the development of current DMC 
interventions.  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has explored racial disproportion in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice 
system and the consequences of the Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) mandate 
on minority youth processing. This study submits that DMC intervention has successfully 
diminished minority overrepresentation in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system by 
attenuating the importance of race in decision-making and decreasing the number of 
minorities handled at various processing stages. Descriptive statistics first confirm 
disproportionate minority youth processing is a pressing concern in Pennsylvania. 
Percentages of minority youth moving along the juvenile justice continuum plainly 
display African American and Hispanic overrepresentation. Racial imbalances in youth 
processing are most pronounced the more punitive stages of placement and secure 
confinement. Since the passage of the DMC mandate in 2002, black and Hispanic youth 
have increasingly constituted greater segments of each processing stage’s population. The 
relative rate at which minority youth advance to subsequent decision stages, though, has 
somewhat declined. These conclusions inspired further review into whether intervention 
on behalf of the DMC mandate has altered minority youth processing in Pennsylvania. 
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More specifically, this study probed whether processing outcomes varied between 
counties implementing DMC reduction programs and those without intervention. 
Three sets of multivariate methods show DMC intervention is redefining minority 
youth processing Pennsylvania. Continuum logistic regression and bivariate probit 
models support the present research’s first hypothesis that DMC intervention has 
mitigated the significance race in processing decisions. Findings from these models show 
race carries tangible disadvantages in juvenile processing, as minority youth are far more 
likely to have their cases handled at later and more punitive decision-points. The role of 
race in decision-making is not immutable, however. While often still predictive of more 
punitive outcomes, minority status has become a less essential consideration in the 
processing decisions of recent years. Although encouraging decreases in the influence of 
racial factors are visible for the entire state, such progressive shifts are concentrated in 
counties implementing DMC reduction programs. This result accords with Leiber et al. 
(2011)’s conclusion DMC intervention in a single Iowan county can moderate the 
association between minority status and harsher consequences for processed youth.  
Difference-in-differences models aver the second hypothesis that DMC 
intervention has shrunk the number of black and Hispanic youth handled at all decision-
points along the juvenile justice continuum. These reductions endure under population-
weighted models and fixed effects models with various controls. State DMC initiatives 
have thus actualized the DMC mandate’s requirement to cut down the disproportionate 
number of minorities processed in the juvenile justice system. These numeric findings 
align with Davis and Sorensen (2013)’s determination that national black-white 
disparities in commitments to secure confinement have declined after the DMC 
mandate’s expansion.  
Taken together, DMC intervention has been consequential in accelerating racially 
egalitarian processing changes. Intervention has accomplished the DMC mandate’s 
overarching goals of subduing racial inequities in juvenile justice at the state-level. 
Intervention has especially profound impacts for the jurisdictions supporting DMC 
reductions programs. Pennsylvania’s execution of the DMC mandate underscores the 
policy’s strength as a racial disparity reform. Namely, faithful implementation of the 
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DMC mandate can help to restructure ordinary decision outcomes for individual youths 
as well as reshape the size and composition of processed youth populations. The 
implications of the DMC mandate and rigorous implementation of DMC intervention for 
the future of racial disparity reforms in the U.S. criminal justice system are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
 
Limitations of Data and Analyses 
 
The present study has several limitations to keep in mind. First, the de-identified 
processing data only contain cases referred into the juvenile justice system. This 
limitation obscures youth processing at the arrest stage. Because research suggests that 
police arrest and refer minority youth for formal processing at greater rates than 
similarly-situated white peers, selection bias among gender, class, and racial lines may 
have occurred before a case reached the juvenile justice system (Bishop, 2005; Fagan et 
al., 1987; Goldman, 1963; Pope et al., 2002; Thornberry, 1979). Similar racial 
disproportionalities in discipline may be present among non-police referrals, particularly 
those from schools (Horner, Fireman, & Wang, 2010; Skiba et al., 2011; U.S. Department 
of Education, 2014). While the DMC mandate holds juvenile justice bureaucracies rather 
law enforcement and other youth agencies accountable for reducing minority 
overrepresentation, the state’s development of minority youth and police forums, 
educational curriculum, and community partnerships signals a commitment to changing 
youth discipline as part of a comprehensive reform strategy. Whether such intervention 
has shifted arrest and referral practices remains an important question.  
Constraints of the processing data also prevent analysis of minority youth 
overrepresentation transfers to and from criminal prosecution. While the dataset includes 
cases judicially waived to criminal court in its referrals (N = 2,866 or .5% of all cases), it 
does not contain cases legislatively excluded from juvenile court review. Under the 1995 
Juvenile Act amendments or “Act 33,” the Pennsylvania legislature installed a series of 
exclusion provisions that automatically move certain cases committed by juveniles to 
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criminal court.41 Today, a juvenile of at least 15 years of age who is charged with a 
violent crime or an offense with a deadly weapon can be tried as an adult (Pennsylvania 
Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, 2008). Under certain circumstances, legislatively 
excluded juveniles may also submit reverse waivers to have their cases tried in juvenile 
court. In 1996, decertification occurred for approximately 1/3 legislatively excluded cases 
in Allegheny, Dauphin, and Philadelphia Counties (Snyder et al., 1999; Jordan and Myers, 
2008).42  
Transfer waivers could bias empirical results, as these cases sent to and remaining 
within the adult system disproportionately involve minority children (Fagan, 2008a). 
Placement and secure confinement stages may be especially impacted given the severity 
of the allegations associated with these cases. Bias may be a minimal concern, however, 
as most legislatively excluded cases would have been judicially waived from juvenile 
court review under pre-1995 reform conditions (H. N. Snyder et al., 1999).43 
                                                 
41 Before this point, Pennsylvania juvenile courts retained original jurisdiction over all offenses, 
but murder committed by juveniles. 
42 In Jordan and Myers’ analysis of reverse waivers in Pennsylvania, 144 out of 345 legislatively 
excluded cases were decertified to juvenile court. While this study confirmed that white youth 
were overrepresented among successful reverse waivers, race had no significant influence on a 
youth’s likelihood of decertification (2008).  
43 Snyder and Sickmund (2000) specifically examine legislative exclusions and judicial waivers 
three counties between 1995 and 1996. In 1995, these three counties judicially waived 237 
juvenile cases to adult court. When legislative exclusions became operative in 1996, judicially 
waived cases dropped to 157. A total of 473 cases were legislatively excluded and approximately 
135 of these cases led to an adult conviction. Snyder and Sickmund use 135 as an estimate since 
only 109 of these 473 cases led to an adult conviction and many more cases remained open 
during the publication of their study in 2000. They argue the decline in judicially waived cases 
(120) nearly equals their projected number of adult convictions (135) from legislatively excluded 
cases. The primary fault of this study is that Snyder and Sickmund do not provide the adult 
criminal court conviction rates of judicial waivers. The pair seems to assume that judicial waivers 
produce more adult convictions than legislative exclusions, but this is never fully explained.  
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 While analyses of processing data attempt to isolate shifts in the treatment of 
minority youths by controlling for relevant factors, empirical models may not capture 
changes in important subtleties in juvenile processing associated with race. For instance, 
quantitative techniques do not show whether DMC intervention has transformed attitudes 
toward or stereotypes of minority youth that mediate juvenile court decision-making 
(Kakar, 2006; Rodriguez, Smith, & Zatz, 2009). Furthermore, these models cannot show 
to what extent cumulative disadvantage in processing may negatively impact minorities 
handled in intervention counties (Bishop, 2005; Pope & Feyerherm, 1990; Tonry, 2011). 
While disproportionate minority processing may decrease at an aggregate level, small and 
additive penalties associated with race may be difficult to eradicate in the processing 
individuals (Leiber et al., 2011). It becomes important to reassess whether subtler forms 
of disparity and discrimination persist following DMC intervention (Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 
1987).  
Finally, processing data and interpretations of the DMC mandate’s impacts 
originate from a single state. Given its administrative structure, policies, and priorities 
concerning juvenile justice, Pennsylvania is quite exceptional in its compliance with the 
DMC mandate and other JJDPA amendments. Pennsylvania may not then reflect the 
“average” state experience with the DMC mandate. Results from this study may still be 
generalizable to DMC reductions sites within states or other states heavily invested in 
racial disparity issues. These findings from Pennsylvania also underscore the potential of 
an unprecedented racial disparity reform when states take policy implementation 
seriously.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF RACIAL DISPARITY 
REFORM 
 
 This dissertation has explored the political development and consequences of 
policies that attempt to reduce racial inequality in the U.S. adult and juvenile justice 
system. Recognizing the legacy of politics in creating more racially disparate, retributive 
crime controls and in recently decreasing criminal justice operations across the country, 
this dissertation concentrated on understudied political endeavors—symbolic, restrained, 
failed, and landmark—deliberately aimed at diminishing differences in the treatment of 
minority groups at various criminal processing stages. By tracing the trajectory of racial 
disparity reform in the U.S. criminal justice system, this dissertation fills a void in 
understanding how politics engages with the issue of racial equality in criminal justice 
and how far the policy correctives enacted by elected officials can go. This concluding 
chapter will illuminate the implications of this dissertation for scholarly theories of 
criminal justice policymaking, racial justice advocacy, and public policy.  
To recapitulate the dissertation’s key findings, Chapter 2 presented a theoretical 
framework of racial disparity reform. It posited civil rights ideals in American politics 
and electoral and institutional benefits of responding to social problems prompt elected 
officials to take action. Politicians design corrective efforts in response to constructed 
problems of disproportionate impact, discrimination, and disparity. These constructions 
are based upon whether policymakers see the criminal justice system as inconsistently 
and illegitimately applying the law (Blumstein et al. 1983). Four types of reform are 
exploratory, prohibitory, policy-specific, and comprehensive correctives. These policies 
range in scope from undertaking further study of racial influences and restricting the use 
of race as a decision-making factor to creating programmatic interventions in criminal 
processing.  
Chapter 3 applied the racial disparity reform framework to explain how U.S. 
presidents and Congress have responded to racial differences in criminal processing. A 
qualitative analysis of reform developments in capital punishment, racial profiling, and 
youth confinement revealed two findings. First, consensus for reform among national 
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elected officials is forged in light of partisanship, Supreme Court decisions concerning 
the constitutionality of racial considerations, controversial events, and studies of race in 
criminal processing. Second, policymakers’ portrayals of racial inequality engender 
varied policy solutions. Reform in capital punishment has primarily been exploratory, as 
national elected officials have gathered, questioned, and collected again statistical 
evidence of racial disproportion. Prohibitions against racial profiling were developed as 
policymakers came to believe in the prevalence of illegitimate, racially-motivated law 
enforcement practices. Recognition of persistent disparities and discrimination in youth 
confinement ultimately prompted Congress to develop a compulsory, comprehensive 
reform reducing disproportionate minority contact with juvenile justice structures.  
Chapter 4 tested the racial disparity reform framework by examining racial 
disparity reforms in the states. The chapter introduced an original database of policies and 
various corrective measures within these policies enacted by state legislatures and 
executives between 1998 and 2011. At first glance, reforms do not appear to be 
concentrated by geography or political ideology across states. Event history analyses 
uncovered racial disparity reform is a product of ideology and elected officials’ 
responsiveness to racial inequality. Politicians are more likely to promulgate remedial 
policies when racial disparities in arrests and imprisonment widen and courts do not offer 
relief. Policy response is more probable with unified Democratic control of the elected 
branches and a strongly Democratic legislature. These dynamics similarly shape the 
adoption of different types of racial disparity reform measures within policies.  
Chapters 5 and 6 considered whether racial disparity reform can actualize its ends 
of diminishing racial differences in criminal processing. The national Disproportionate 
Minority Contact (DMC) mandate of 2002 has been acclaimed by racial justice 
proponents as a model reform due to its requirement for states to decrease the number of 
minorities coming into contact with their juvenile justice structures. Comprehensive 
reform, as captured by the DMC mandate, is also becoming a more popular intervention 
strategy. Analysis of the policy underscores such political attention is warranted.  These 
chapters determined intervention on behalf of the current DMC mandate has been 
relatively successful in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice system. Pennsylvania is known 
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for its racial disparities in juvenile justice as well as its commitments to redressing these 
problems (Griffith, Jirard, & Ricketts, 2012; Kempf, 1992).  
While descriptive statistics showed persistent overrepresentation of minorities 
throughout the juvenile justice continuum, multivariate statistics revealed important 
egalitarian changes in minority youth processing. Continuation ratio logistic regression 
and bivariate probit models demonstrated that race has become less predictive of harsher 
sanctioning. Being African American and being Hispanic continue to elevate a youth’s 
risk of additional processing. The disadvantaging effect of minority status has still 
decreased since DMC intervention began. Various specifications of difference-in-
differences models further showed great reductions in the size of Pennsylvania’s 
processed minority youth populations. These models consistently indicated statistically 
significant decreases in determinations of delinquency, out-of-home placements, and 
commitments to secure facilities as a result of DMC intervention. Declines in petitions 
for formal court review were much smaller. Because petitioning decisions are largely 
based upon arrests and charging decisions of police officers and prosecutors who are 
unaffected by the DMC mandate, it may be more difficult to legally divert youths out of 
the system at this point. Together, these findings suggest Pennsylvania’s DMC reforms 
like new risk assessment tools, graduated sanctions, and confinement alternatives are 
effective in diminishing disproportionate minority contact. These results align with Davis 
and Sorenson (2013)’s and Leiber, Bishop, and Chamblin (2011)’s conclusions that the 
DMC mandate could produce more racially equal outcomes in juvenile justice.  
 
Implications for Theory 
 
This study’s qualitative and quantitative findings concerning racial disparity 
reform underscore two conclusions for theories of criminal justice policymaking. On the 
one hand, racial disparity reform as a framework helps to capture a more dynamic state of 
thinking about race, equality, and criminal justice. Social science scholarship emphasizes 
the centrality of government in molding notions of race, racial identities, and race 
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relations in society (Hochschild, Weaver, & Burch, 2012; Omi & Winant, 1994). 
Tensions between white supremacist and racially egalitarian ideologies define American 
politics and citizenship in the United States (King & Smith, 2005). The politics of 
criminal justice is undoubtedly marked by racial influences, typically producing policies 
that exacerbate racial divisions in American society (Beckett, 1997; Mauer, 1999; 
Murakawa, 2014; Tonry, 2011). Racial egalitarianism is nonetheless present in criminal 
justice policymaking (King & Smith, 2011). Although scholars have analyzed 
prescriptions to racial problems like racial profiling by law enforcement or 
disproportionate capital sentencing of minorities for decades, no overarching narrative 
anchors the diverse array of race-targeted and egalitarian reforms emerging since the end 
of the Civil Rights Era. Racial disparity reform as a framework encourages scholars to 
see that anti-egalitarian ideologies can produce more retributive, racially disparate crime 
controls, but racial egalitarian ideologies can potentially resolve unfairness in a system 
promising equality under the law. It is crucial to accentuate the racially-conscious, 
progressive elements of crime politics and their manifestation in public policies.  
On the other, criminal justice policies are produced by distinct political processes. 
Scholarship concurs that partisanship and racial fears helped to develop the massive 
criminal justice system known today (Ewald, 2012; Smith, 2004; Weaver, 2007; Yates & 
Fording, 2005). The politics of punitiveness does not generalize all criminal justice 
policymaking, however. Racial disparity reform in national and state politics first 
highlights a greater receptiveness among elected officials to solve racial problems than 
previously thought. Politicians are seemingly not immune to growing minority 
overrepresentation in criminal processing and the importance of government intervention 
to halt it. But elected officials most frequently design weaker responses. Controversial 
events and criminological research help to highlight extant racial problems. Importantly, 
judicial reluctance in redressing racial bias in criminal processing inspires more 
legislative and executive attempts to ensure equal rights protections. Together more 
intensive reforms are designed when racial disparities worsen and courts fail to act. 
Second, racial disparity reform as a framework suggests an alternative role for 
partisanship in criminal justice policymaking. Scholarship on punitive reforms cast 
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Republicans as unwavering in their demands for “law and order,” and Democrats as 
acquiescing to these cries by participating in get-tough efforts (Murakawa, 2014). 
Partisan influences in racial disparity reform are different. Democrats, as the traditional 
champions of racial egalitarianism, are helping to lead a different criminal justice reform 
movement with a degree of success. In the states, Democratic legislatures and governors 
are more likely to enact racial disparity reforms. In the federal government, Democrats 
like the late Senator Kennedy, Representative Conyers, and President Obama have 
pioneered national reform efforts. Republicans too can come to endorse or adopt 
landmark correctives, particularly when unresolved race and criminal justice problems 
are thrust on to the political agenda. By implication, partisan approaches to criminal 
justice may be more complex when different types of reforms are deliberated.  
 
Implications for Racial Justice Advocacy 
 
Several political implications can be drawn from analyses of racial disparity 
reform at the national and state levels. Advocacy on behalf of criminally processed 
minority groups is challenging due to the stigmas, restricted rights, poor resources, 
limited political access, and other disadvantages these citizens face (Strolovitch, 2008; 
Travis, 2002). Yet vast inequalities and explosive moments of injustice keep racial 
problems in criminal justice on the political agenda. To improve chances for success, 
reform proponents might reflect on prior reform initiatives, turn to the elected branches as 
more hospitable venues for change, and use racially-conscious arguments to advance 
their demands.  
Racial justice advocates first should carefully consider previous reform efforts. 
Racial disparity reform in criminal justice is not a new political phenomenon. Looking 
back, some reform has been possible under seemingly less than favorable political 
conditions. Congress enacted measures like the Disproportionate Minority Confinement 
mandate and the GAO study of race and capital punishment at the height of political calls 
to “get tough” on crime. The Bush administration released an unprecedented ban on 
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racial profiling after the September 11th attacks. These policies are often criticized for not 
going far enough. They are flawed because they respond to policymakers’ visions of 
racial inequality as something other than a product of discrimination and disparity. If 
these policies can be understood as A) non-preferred responses or B) incremental change 
in criminal justice, racial justice advocates can glean new insight into racial disparity 
reform politics. With respect to the former understanding, advocates can examine how to 
frame racial inequality in a way that encourages more comprehensive or stronger policy 
responses, thus avoiding undesirable, symbolic reforms. With respect to the latter, 
reformers might also recognize a weak reform might not immediately effectuate change, 
but it may be a stepping-stone for more intensive steps to solve persistent racial problems.  
Additionally, reformers should pursue policy change within the legislative and 
executive branches. The courts have slowly closed their doors to amending racially 
disparate criminal justice practices since McCleskey (Alexander, 2010; O.C. Johnson, 
2007). Although cases like Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015), signal a potential willingness of the courts to 
accept disparate impact claims, new statutes must first be designed to allow for judicial 
correction in the realm of criminal justice. Only some judicial systems have sought to 
improve racial fairness through evaluations and interventions of specialized task forces 
(Neeley, 2008; Norris, 2011). Recent judicial decisions surrounding the tragic deaths of 
Michael Brown, Trayvon Martin, and Eric Garner among others have raised more 
questions concerning the courts’ ability to deliver racial justice. Minimal and 
unsatisfactory amends from the courts have affirmed a role for elected officials in 
addressing rampant racial inequities in the criminal justice system. The findings of this 
dissertation show elected officials do, in fact, respond with policy after such judicial non-
intervention. Recognizing the “hollow hope” of correcting racial injustices in the courts, 
reformers might then call on elected officials to resolve racial issues in criminal justice.  
Finally, racial justice proponents might not rely solely on economic cost 
arguments, but emphasize racial differences highlighted in events or criminological 
research. In today’s policymaking environment, some contend race-neutral, economic 
arguments may be persuasive as outlandish fiscal costs affect the taxpaying all (Dagan 
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and Teles, 2014). Fear rather than fiscal rationality, however, has inspired Americans to 
spend millions on anti-crime measures. Public willingness to pay for such policies could 
even resume with a stronger economy or future crime increases. Qualitative evidence 
suggests controversial events and criminological studies regarding race can help make 
illegitimacies and inconsistencies in criminal justice into pressing political issues. In 
championing criminal justice reform, advocates should not be afraid to invoke evidence 
of troubling racial differences. With such evidence, reform can more strongly appeal to 
people’s self-interests and to their sense of justice (Cole, 2011, p. 46). Such findings 
enhance the problem frames that racial inequality in criminal processing threatens the 
nation’s assurance of equal justice. These realities also show how racial distinctions 
disadvantage offenders, but also afflict their children, family members, and law-biding 
citizens in their neighborhoods. Raising concerns for racial justice can thus move beyond 
cost-based arguments for changing disparate criminal justice practices.  
 
Implications for Public Policy 
 
The study’s assessment of the Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) mandate 
as a racial disparity reform points to two major policy implications. First, a national and 
comprehensive reform can inspire egalitarian change in state juvenile justice operations. 
The DMC mandate, like other racial disparity reforms, may have developed as a result of 
political pressures from a few professional advocacy organizations, federal agency 
administrators, and other national experts removed from everyday local and state juvenile 
justice affairs (Tracy, 2002). The policy may also have uneven influence due to 
differences among states in their capacities or willingness to meet the DMC mandate 
(Leiber, 2002). Despite its political origins and implementation challenges, this national 
policy has prompted almost every state to do something about disproportionate minority 
representation within its juvenile justice system. In an environment where racial 
inequalities in the juvenile or adult justice systems do not readily garner remedial action, 
a varying “something” is better than “nothing.”  
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Second, the success of racial disparity reform depends not simply on the 
convergence of political interests and research (Feyerherm, 1995) but on commitments to 
the policy’s ends (Feeley & Sarat, 1980). Faithful implementation of a measure like the 
DMC mandate can reshape justice processes. Without multiple, localized, and diverse 
interventions at various decision-points, unwarranted disparities among processed youth 
populations would likely persist or proliferate. The DMC mandate’s present system-wide 
focus and enforcement through federal funding sanctions has prodded juvenile justice 
practitioners to design meaningful processing changes. By successfully diverting more 
minorities out of the juvenile justice system at every decision-point after arrest and 
reducing the penalty of minority status in individual decision-making, practitioners have 
taken a great stride in accomplishing the more arduous task of eradicating racial 
inequality in juvenile justice. In this regard, the DMC mandate as a mandatory and 
system-wide measure deserves to be deemed a new paradigm for advancing racial 
equality through public policy (O.C. Johnson, 2007). By implication, tying compliance 
with racial disparity reforms to funding may compel other criminal justice bureaucracies 
(e.g. law enforcement agencies) to redesign their decision-making processes based on 
local findings of racial difference. Supplemental initiatives to educate and reorient court 
officials unaffected by funding incentives (e.g. prosecutors) toward evidence-based 
practices can further augment system-change.  
 
Future Research 
 
 This dissertation has examined political attempts to mitigate racial inequalities in 
the U.S. criminal system by focusing on the political development of reforms and the 
effects of policy on justice processing. The study highlights several avenues for future 
research on race, criminal justice, and politics. At the writing of this dissertation, racial 
issues in criminal justice erupted in American society, seizing the attention of the public 
and prompting immediate responses by policymakers. Protests and mass demonstrations 
following the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the Trayvon Martin case, the shooting 
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of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the death of Freddie Gray as a result of 
injuries during his arrest by Baltimore Police Department officers among other troubling 
events have blared demands for racial justice. Two research questions arise from these 
mass demonstrations against racial inequities. Can a “racial justice” consensus develop 
among the public? Polling evidence suggests the public can believe in the excess and 
brutality of the criminal justice system, but large partisan, ideological, and racial 
divisions exist over the treatment of minorities by criminal justice officials (Pew 
Research Center, 2013, 2014, 2015)? Even if divisive, does mass mobilization affect the 
policy decisions of elected officials and/or criminal justice officials regarding race and 
criminal justice practices? Examining contemporary public opinion and mass 
mobilization for racial justice is crucial, as similar forces gave rise to law and order 
politics that left an enduring mark on criminal justice policymaking. 
 Discontents with extant criminal justice policies among elected officials have 
recently become clear as well. Policymakers have done more to scale back criminal 
processing during the last five years than at any other point in history (Savage & Goode, 
2013). Elected officials of various backgrounds are now seeking to formulate new 
criminal justice policies, including racial disparity reforms. The Bipartisan Summit on 
Criminal Justice Reform featuring former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senator Cory 
Booker, and Attorney General Eric Holder represents a major stand by lawmakers to 
resolve the problems of the American legal system. Future research might explore the 
ways in which policymakers sign on to criminal justice reform. For instance, how might 
diverse interest groups united in their calls for reform, such as the Center for American 
Progress and Koch Industries, influence elected officials to fix a broken a criminal justice 
system (Hulse, 2015)? This question is especially important for racial disparity reform, as 
elected officials may react differently to different frames of racial inequality and the two 
major parties may be polarized on issues of race and criminal justice.  
 The major public policy challenge of effectively promoting more racial equality 
in the criminal justice system also remains. A priority for future research is to distinguish 
promising policies and practices for change. Social science literature on race and criminal 
justice has primarily focused on the failure, if not willful inaction, of policymakers to 
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promulgate any meaningful correctives to extant disparities. Nevertheless, elected 
officials are increasingly looking to experts and scholars to provide policy answers. From 
the recommendations of the Obama Administration’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing to mandatory evaluations of state disproportionate minority contact reform 
activities, research has a vital role in shaping criminal justice policy at this time of 
uncertainty. As new reforms are introduced, future research should attempt to isolate the 
impacts of specific policy interventions in the name of promoting more racially fair 
criminal processing. For instance, are policy revisions to drug laws as impactful on racial 
disproportionalities as amendments to violent crime laws? Such studies should take care 
in tracing policy implementation in hopes that the conditions promoting success (or 
failure) can be replicated (or avoided).  
Looking ahead, complete abolition of racial inequalities in adult and juvenile 
justice processing will require great reenvisioning of American sentencing and 
imprisonment practices. Yet exploration of previous racial disparity reforms in U.S. 
national and state politics shows elected officials can still institute social change. Soss, 
Fording, and Schram (2011) observe, “racial disparities do not flow directly from social 
structures. They depend ultimately on what specific human agents decide and do in the 
process of governing,” (p. 14). Racial disparity reform involves engagement in the 
politics of criminal justice, yet resultant policies can be key to changing the nature of 
American criminal processing. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Policymakers’ Characterizations of Racial Inequality in the Criminal 
Justice System in Terms of Consistency and Legitimacy44 
 
  Application of Law and Criminal Justice Policies 
Legitimacy of Criteria 
in Decision to Apply 
Law or Criminal 
Justice Policies 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Legitimate 
Procedurally Just,  
Disproportionate Impact45 
 (I) 
Disparity  
(II) 
Illegitimate 
Discrimination 
(III) 
Disparity and 
Discrimination 
(VI) 
 
  
                                                 
44 This framework represents an adaptation and expansion of the Blumstein et al. (1983)’s 
portrayal of sentencing decisions in the U.S. criminal justice system. 
45 A procedurally just system may or may not express issues with disproportionate impact of a 
law on certain populations. Disproportionate effects are assumed to occur as a result of 
discrimination and/or disparity in Quadrants II-IV.  
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Table 2: Types of Racial Disparity Reform Responding to Racial Inequality in the 
Criminal Justice System  
 
  Application of Law and Criminal Justice Policies 
Legitimacy of Criteria 
in Decision to Apply 
Law or Criminal 
Justice Policies 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Legitimate 
Exploratory  
(I) 
Policy-Specific  
(II) 
Illegitimate 
Prohibitory 
 (III) 
Comprehensive 
 (IV) 
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Figure 1: Number of Racial Disparity Reform Policies Enacted by State Elected Officials (1998-2011). This figure displays the 
number of racial disparity reform policies established by state legislatures or executives between 1998 and 2011. Not pictured: Alaska 
and Hawaii with zero policies.  
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Figure 2: Number and Types of Racial Disparity Reform Measures Enacted by State Elected Officials (1998-2011). This figure 
presents the number of exploratory, prohibitory, policy-specific, and comprehensive measures in racial disparity reform policies 
created by state legislatures and executives between 1998 and 2011. Not pictured: Alaska or Hawaii with zero measures.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for All Variables Predicting State Racial Disparity Reform Policy and Measure Enactments 
(1998-2011) 
Variable 
Observations  
(State-Years) 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Dependent Variables       
Policies Enacted 700 1.80 0.08 
Exploratory Measures Enacted 700 0.69 0.04 
Prohibitory Measures Enacted 700 0.50 0.02 
Policy-Specific Measures Enacted 700 0.44 0.03 
Comprehensive Measures Enacted 700 0.11 0.01 
Explanatory Variables       
Unified Democratic Control (0 ‘no unified control of executive and 
legislature by Democrats’ ; 1 ‘unified control by Democrats’)  
686 0.21 0.02 
Change in Percent Democrat in Legislature 686 0.04 0.33 
Democratic Governor (0 'Non-major party or Republican'; 1 
'Democrat';) 
700 0.45 0.02 
Black-White Incarceration Disparity 700 6.25 0.11 
Black-White Arrest Disparity 695 2.37 0.06 
Judicial Racial Disparity Reform Efforts (0 'none’; 0 'ongoing') 700 0.19 0.01 
Log Citizen Ideology (One year lag) 700 3.89 0.34 
Percent Poverty 700 12.53 0.12 
Unemployment Rate 700 5.73 0.08 
Percent Black  700 0.1 0.03 
Log Crime Rate 700 8.37 0.01 
Incarceration Rate 700 0.36 0.01 
  
 
161
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Plots of Survivor Functions of Cox Regression Model of Racial Disparity Reform Policy Enactments in States for 
Selected Variables. These plots show the associated survival functions for enacting a racial disparity reform policy for the variables 
of unified Democratic control, judicial racial disparity reform efforts, black-white disparity in incarceration rates, and black-white 
disparity in arrest rates at the mean of all other predictors. These variables show reform is more likely when Democrats control the 
executive and legislature, judiciaries do not introduce their own reforms, and racial disproportionalities in criminal processing increase.  
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Table 4: Event History Analysis of Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Racial Disparity Reform in States (1998-2011)  
 Enacted Policies Enacted Measures 
Variable 
I. 
First  
Policy  
II.  
All  
Policies 
III. Exploratory 
Measures 
IV. Prohibitory 
Measures 
V.  
Policy-Specific 
Measures 
VI.  
Comprehensive 
Measures 
Unified Democratic Control 2.25 2.21** 4.36*** 0.99 1.13 1.38 
 1.26 0.83 2.05 0.51 0.62 1.25 
Change in Percent Democrat in Legislature 1.01 1.01* 1.00 1.02* 1.01 1.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Democratic Governor  1.41 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.11 2.01 
 (0.57) (0.29) 0.61 (0.43) (0.59) (1.44) 
Black-White Disparity in Incarceration Rates 1.22*** 1.17*** 1.10 1.24*** 1.17** 1.19*   
  (0.09) (0.06) 0.10 (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Black-White Disparity in Arrests Rates 1.40** 1.15** 1.10 1.32** 1.09 0.85 
  (0.22) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.26) 
Judicial Racial Disparity Reform Efforts 0.10*** 0.33** 0.48 0.33 0.25** 0.28*   
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.41) (0.24) (0.16) (0.20) 
Log Citizen Ideology (One year lag) 1.06 0.95 0.68 1.10 1.17 4.54**  
  (0.60) (0.28) (0.38) (0.56) (0.58) (3.07) 
Percent Black 1.08*** 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.05 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
Percent Poverty 0.86*** 0.93 0.89 0.97 0.9 0.85 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
Unemployment Rate 0.97 1.08** 1 1.04 1.13 0.97 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Log Crime Rate 33.90*** 4.31*** 3.53 14.43*** 2.69 2.43 
  (31.22) (2.28) (2.94) (13.04) (2.75) (3.95) 
Incarceration Rate 1.74 0.9 2.21 0.48 0.06 1.54 
 (3.43) (1.02) (4.38) (0.66) (0.11) (4.21) 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -170.63 -379.32 -166.30 -151.03 -133.34 -46.98 
N 300 680 680 680 680 680 
Notes: Hazard ratios are presented for repeatable event Cox regression models. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Race of Juveniles Arrested in Pennsylvania, 1997-2011 
  Black Other White N 
Average % 
Population*  13.6% 2.5% 77.9%   
Arrest %         
Year**         
1997 35.4% 1.0% 63.6% 91,011 
1998 30.3% 0.4% 69.4% 119,911 
1999 31.0% 0.3% 68.6% 98,388 
2000 28.8% 0.6% 70.6% 118,567 
2001 31.3% 0.8% 68.0% 114,910 
2002 33.6% 0.8% 65.6% 118,480 
2003 36.2% 0.7% 63.1% 116,848 
2004 37.7% 0.6% 61.5% 122,398 
2005 41.5% 0.7% 57.7% 117,768 
2006 41.7% 0.6% 57.6% 125,959 
2007 40.4% 0.6% 58.9% 119,407 
2008 40.5% 0.6% 58.7% 115,432 
2009 40.7% 0.6% 58.7% 102,051 
2010 41.8% 0.7% 57.5% 95,191 
2011 40.3% 0.8% 58.9% 83,363 
Average Arrest % 36.7% 0.7% 62.6%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1997-2011). Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
Data [United States]: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race, Summarized Yearly, 1997-2011. 
Washington, DC: FBI.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Table 6: Race of Juveniles Referred to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Justice System, 
1997-2011 
  Black Hispanic Other White N 
Average % 
Population*  13.6% 6.0% 2.5% 77.9%   
Referral %           
Year**            
1997 31.2% 5.5% 0.7% 56.8% 38,449 
1998 29.9% 5.1% 0.8% 60.3% 41,841 
1999 30.8% 5.6% 1.1% 58.7% 42,865 
2000 32.4% 6.4% 1.1% 55.9% 44,007 
2001 33.8% 6.9% 1.1% 53.6% 44,432 
2002 31.4% 6.2% 1.0% 56.6% 41,304 
2003 34.3% 6.0% 0.8% 51.7% 42,561 
2004 37.2% 8.0% 0.8% 52.5% 43,530 
2005 37.0% 10.0% 0.7% 51.3% 46,893 
2006 39.9% 9.7% 0.6% 49.3% 43,939 
2007 39.4% 9.9% 1.1% 48.8% 45,571 
2008 39.8% 9.7% 2.0% 47.6% 43,752 
2009 41.9% 10.3% 1.9% 44.7% 41,560 
2010 39.4% 11.0% 2.2% 45.9% 37,340 
2011 38.0% 12.8% 2.8% 45.2% 33,586 
Average Referral % 35.8% 8.2% 1.3% 51.9%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Center for Juvenile Justice Training and Research. (1997-2011). Juvenile Processing 
Data. Harrisburg, PA: CJJT&R; Juvenile Court Judges Commission.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Table 7: Race of Juveniles Petitioned in the Pennsylvania Juvenile Justice System, 
1997-2011 
  Black Hispanic Other White N 
Average % 
Population*  13.6% 6.0% 2.5% 77.9%   
Petitioned %           
Year**            
1997 39.3% 6.7% 0.9% 53.2% 16,861 
1998 36.8% 5.8% 1.0% 56.3% 18,930 
1999 38.3% 6.7% 1.2% 53.8% 19,878 
2000 39.5% 8.0% 1.3% 51.3% 20,566 
2001 39.7% 8.1% 1.2% 51.1% 19,784 
2002 36.1% 7.4% 1.1% 55.5% 20,147 
2003 42.0% 7.3% 1.0% 49.7% 20,432 
2004 42.5% 8.1% 0.9% 48.5% 21,379 
2005 42.3% 9.1% 0.7% 47.8% 21,940 
2006 44.6% 9.0% 0.6% 45.8% 21,173 
2007 43.8% 9.7% 1.1% 45.2% 22,395 
2008 44.5% 9.5% 1.9% 43.8% 21,294 
2009 46.8% 9.4% 2.0% 41.5% 19,566 
2010 45.1% 9.8% 2.2% 42.7% 17,202 
2011 45.4% 11.1% 2.9% 40.2% 15,179 
Average Petition % 41.8% 8.4% 1.3% 48.4%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Center for Juvenile Justice Training and Research. (1997-2011). Juvenile Processing 
Data. Harrisburg, PA: CJJT&R; Juvenile Court Judges Commission.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Table 8: Race of Juveniles Adjudicated Delinquent in the Pennsylvania Juvenile 
Justice System, 1997-2011 
  Black Hispanic Other White N 
Average % Population*  13.6% 6.0% 2.5% 77.9%   
Adjudicated %           
Year**            
1997 37.6% 7.1% 0.8% 51.3% 15,205 
1998 34.4% 6.8% 0.8% 56.0% 14,988 
1999 34.9% 7.6% 1.3% 53.9% 15,592 
2000 35.8% 8.6% 1.3% 51.9% 16,081 
2001 37.3% 9.1% 1.1% 49.7% 16,660 
2002 33.7% 8.3% 1.0% 54.2% 14,692 
2003 39.1% 7.7% 0.9% 48.0% 16,596 
2004 36.4% 9.1% 0.8% 53.6% 14,009 
2005 37.5% 10.6% 0.7% 51.2% 14,205 
2006 39.9% 10.3% 0.6% 49.2% 14,179 
2007 39.7% 10.4% 0.9% 48.9% 13,663 
2008 40.5% 10.3% 2.1% 47.1% 13,783 
2009 43.7% 9.4% 1.9% 44.9% 12,867 
2010 42.8% 10.7% 2.4% 44.2% 11,136 
2011 43.2% 12.7% 2.7% 41.4% 9,847 
Average Adjudication % 38.4% 9.2% 1.3% 49.7%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Center for Juvenile Justice Training and Research. (1997-2011). Juvenile Processing 
Data. Harrisburg, PA: CJJT&R; Juvenile Court Judges Commission.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Table 9: Race of Delinquent Juveniles Disposed to Placement in the Pennsylvania 
Juvenile Justice System, 1997-2011 
  Black Hispanic Other White N 
Average % 
Population*  13.6% 6.0% 2.5% 77.9%   
Placed %           
Year**           
1997 42.2% 9.2% 0.9% 45.6% 3,894 
1998 40.0% 8.7% 0.9% 49.1% 4,053 
1999 40.0% 9.8% 1.0% 48.0% 4,388 
2000 39.3% 10.4% 0.9% 47.4% 4,287 
2001 40.3% 10.3% 0.9% 46.6% 4,208 
2002 37.8% 9.6% 0.7% 49.8% 3,990 
2003 46.8% 8.7% 1.0% 40.6% 5,573 
2004 37.9% 10.2% 0.8% 51.0% 3,348 
2005 40.1% 10.8% 0.8% 48.3% 3,424 
2006 42.0% 11.4% 0.4% 46.3% 3,623 
2007 40.1% 13.2% 0.8% 45.8% 3,361 
2008 40.0% 12.5% 2.6% 44.8% 3,262 
2009 44.9% 10.0% 2.2% 42.8% 2,697 
2010 42.9% 12.6% 2.7% 41.8% 2,467 
2011 44.9% 13.2% 3.3% 38.6% 2,301 
Average Placement % 41.3% 10.7% 1.3% 45.8%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Center for Juvenile Justice Training and Research. (1997-2011). Juvenile Processing 
Data. Harrisburg, PA: CJJT&R; Juvenile Court Judges Commission.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Table 10: Race of Delinquent Juveniles Disposed to Secure Confinement in the 
Pennsylvania Juvenile Justice System, 1997-2011 
  Black Hispanic Other White N 
Average %  
Population* 13.6% 6.0% 2.5% 77.9%   
Securely Confined%           
Year**           
1997 58.0% 16.4% 0.8% 22.9% 262 
1998 48.8% 14.0% 0.0% 35.8% 293 
1999 47.4% 16.8% 0.0% 34.9% 304 
2000 43.3% 15.3% 0.7% 38.8% 307 
2001 41.4% 16.7% 0.0% 40.5% 348 
2002 41.3% 16.5% 0.3% 40.4% 334 
2003 48.1% 11.2% 1.4% 36.4% 418 
2004 38.6% 14.1% 0.4% 47.0% 249 
2005 50.0% 11.0% 0.0% 39.0% 236 
2006 45.3% 13.2% 0.3% 41.1% 287 
2007 42.1% 18.5% 0.7% 38.7% 271 
2008 50.7% 16.7% 1.4% 31.3% 288 
2009 56.9% 11.5% 2.3% 29.4% 262 
2010 53.9% 16.8% 1.7% 27.6% 232 
2011 49.8% 16.3% 3.3% 30.6% 209 
Average Secure 
Confinement % 47.7% 15.0% 0.9% 35.6%   
 
* Puzzanchera, Charles, Anthony Sladky and Wei Kang. (2013). "Easy Access to 
Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." Online. Available: 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
** Center for Juvenile Justice Training and Research. (1997-2011). Juvenile Processing 
Data. Harrisburg, PA: CJJT&R; Juvenile Court Judges Commission.  
 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding error.  
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Figure 4: Statewide Juvenile Arrest Relative Rate Index for Pennsylvania, 1997-
2011. This index compares arrests per 1,000 10-17 year old general population of black 
and other youth to the arrest rate of white youth.  
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Figure 5: Statewide Referral to Juvenile Court Relative Rate Index for 
Pennsylvania, 1997-2011. This index compares referrals per 100 arrests of black and 
other youth to the referral rate of white youth.  
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Figure 6: Statewide Petition Relative Rate Index for Pennsylvania, 1997-2011. This 
index compares petitioned cases per 100 referrals of black, Hispanic, and other youth to 
the petition rate of white youth.  
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Figure 7: Statewide Adjudication Relative Rate Index for Pennsylvania, 1997-2011. 
This index compares cases resulting in delinquent findings per 100 petitions of black, 
Hispanic, and other youth to the adjudication rate of white youth.  
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Figure 8: Statewide Placement Relative Rate Index for Pennsylvania, 1997-2011. 
This index compares cases disposed to placement per 100 cases with findings of 
delinquency for black, Hispanic, and other youth to the placement rate of white youth.  
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Figure 9: Statewide Secure Confinement Relative Rate Index for Pennsylvania, 
1997-2011. This index compares cases of delinquency disposed to secure confinement 
per 100 cases with findings of delinquency for black, Hispanic, and other youth to the 
adjudication rate of white youth.  
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Table 11: Racial Composition of Youth Moving through Juvenile Justice Systems in 
Pennsylvania’s DMC Intervention Counties 1997-2011 
County 
Racial 
Group 
Average 
General 
Youth 
Composition 
Initial 
Composition Change in Composition* 
    
 
Referral Petition Adjudication Placement Confinement 
Allegheny Black 19.0% 59.2% 2.6% 7.1% 12.3% 18.4% 
  Hispanic 1.4% 0.4% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.4% 
  White 77.6% 38.6% -1.6% -3.2% -8.2% -17.1% 
  Other 2.0% 0.9% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.6% 
  N 124,213 62,397 45,777 20,185 5,266 358 
        
Berks Black 5.5% 14.9% 1.4% 2.9% 5.8% 10.0% 
  Hispanic 18.7% 39.1% -1.7% 4.1% 8.6% 16.6% 
  White 72.4% 44.3% 1.1% -5.8% -13.1% -24.9% 
  Other 1.4% 0.9% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -0.9% 
  N 44,561 21,693 11,275 5,644 2,195 201 
        
Dauphin Black 24.2% 56.9% -0.3% 5.9% 12.0% 20.7% 
  Hispanic 7.6% 8.9% -0.1% 0.7% 0.6% 8.3% 
  White 65.4% 32.6% 0.4% -6.5% -6.1% -20.0% 
  Other 2.8% 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 
  N 28,851 21,373 15,962 7,844 2,360 277 
        
Lancaster Black 4.1% 13.0% -1.2% 1.0% 5.7% 14.4% 
  Hispanic 9.9% 17.4% -3.0% -0.1% 0.5% 6.3% 
  White 83.8% 40.4% -5.2% 0.8% -9.0% -0.2% 
  Other 2.1% 1.1% -0.3% -0.2% -0.5% -0.8% 
  N 58,437 21,025 11,494 9,535 1,835 299 
        
Philadelphia Black 54.3% 73.7% 0.6% -0.5% 0.0% 4.1% 
  Hispanic 13.9% 11.1% 0.0% 0.8% 1.5% 1.7% 
  White 26.7% 13.0% 0.1% 0.0% -0.8% -5.0% 
  Other 5.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% -1.5% 
  N 16,6691 120,931 100,890 39,663 10,688 751 
        
All Counties Black 29.8% 58.7% 4.1% 1.8% 4.5% 5.4% 
  Hispanic 9.8% 11.7% -1.1% 0.6% 2.2% 5.6% 
  White 57.0% 27.4% -2.1% -1.9% -6.1% -9.9% 
  Other 3.2% 1.3% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 
 N 422,753 247,419 185,398 82,871 22,344 1,886 
* Change in composition figures may not add up to zero due to rounding and missing data.  
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Table 12: Racial Composition of Youth Moving through Juvenile Court Systems in 
Pennsylvania, DMC Intervention Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties, 1997-
2011 
County 
Racial 
Group 
Average 
General 
Youth 
Composition 
Initial 
Composition Change in Composition* 
    
 
Referral Petition Adjudication Placement Confinement 
DMC 
Intervention 
Counties Black 29.8% 58.7% 4.1% 1.8% 4.5% 5.4% 
  Hispanic 9.8% 11.7% -1.1% 0.6% 2.2% 5.6% 
  White 57.0% 27.4% -2.1% -1.9% -6.1% -9.9% 
  Other 3.2% 1.3% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 
  N  422,753 247,419 185,398 82,871 22,344 1,886 
  
 
     
Non- 
Intervention 
Counties  Black 4.5% 21.0% 2.4% 2.9% 5.2% 9.1% 
  Hispanic 3.4% 5.8% 0.5% 1.2% 2.3% 5.6% 
  White 90.6% 67.8% 1.0% -2.3% -4.9% -23.7% 
  Other 1.9% 1.2% 0.1% 0.0% 1.0% -0.4% 
  N  763,914  384,213 212,560 130,632 32,532  2,750 
  
 
     
All Counties Black 13.5% 35.8% 5.9% 2.4% 5.5% 11.6% 
  Hispanic 5.6% 8.2% 0.2% 0.0% 2.3% 6.8% 
  White 78.7% 52.0% -3.4% -2.0% -6.0% -16.1% 
  Other 2.3% 1.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.6% -0.4% 
 N 1,186,667 631,632 397,958 213,503 54,876 4,300 
 
* Figures are derived from the differences in the percentage a racial group represents at a 
certain stage and the percentage that group initially constitutes among referrals to the 
Pennsylvania juvenile court system (see also Leiber 2003, p. 68). Change in composition 
figures may not add up to zero due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 13: Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression Results Predicting Advancement in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, 
DMC Intervention Counties, and Non-DMC Intervention Counties, 1997-2011 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Full Model    Model 1 Model 2 Full Model    Model 1 Model 2 Full Model      
Age 0.19***   0.19*** 0.19***   0.19*** 0.18***   0.18*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Family Status 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03* 0.02 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
School Status 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Charges 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black   0.22*** 0.02***   0.17*** 0.03***   0.18*** 0.10*** 
    (0.00) (0.00)   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic   0.17*** 0.07***   0.08*** 0.00   0.20*** 0.16*** 
    (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Other   0.12*** 0.00   0.08*** -0.03   0.11*** 0.05* 
    (0.02) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.03)   (0.02) (0.03) 
Log Likelihood -611034.59 -903108.38 -610993.92 -241610.62 -371185.64 -241598.60 -368385.39 -531633.64 -368208.03 
N 907,458 1,307,080 907,458 356,301 539,143 356,301 551,157 767,937 551,157 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 14: Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression Results Predicting Advancement in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, 
DMC Intervention Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties Before (1997-2004) and After (2005-2011) DMC Intervention 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference   
Age 0.22*** 0.17*** -3.54** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.22*** 0.14*** -5.66*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.15*** 0.19*** 2.83** 0.18*** 0.22*** 2.83*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.09*** 0.07*** -1.41 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.35 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.35 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.05*** 0.02* -2.12** 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.05*** 0.04* -0.35 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status 0.09*** 0.06*** -2.12** 0.15*** 0.08*** -3.13*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of 
Charge -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.25*** -0.23*** 1.41 -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.71 -0.22*** -0.24*** -1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.08*** -0.00 -5.66*** 0.08*** 0.05*** -2.12** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.22*** 0.00 -15.56*** 0.18*** -0.05*** -8.13*** 0.25*** 0.12*** -5.81*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other 0.07* -0.02 -2.01** 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09** 0.02 -1.20 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.06) (0.04)   (0.05) (0.03)   
Log Likelihood -260799.82   -349905.48   -93565.95 -147586.23   -167086.83 -200907.88   
N 388,344 519,114   139,661 216,640   248,683 302,474   
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 15: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Adjudication Given Petitioning 
in Pennsylvania Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Petition 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.28*** 0.18*** -7.07*** 0.27*** 0.18*** -6.36*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.71 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.05*** 0.08*** 2.12** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Family Status 0.08*** 0.02 -4.24*** 0.07*** 0.01 -4.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
School Status 0.08*** 0.04*** -2.83*** 0.09*** 0.04*** -3.54*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.48*** -0.44*** 2.83*** -0.46*** -0.40*** 4.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.34*** 0.19*** -10.61*** 0.31*** 0.15*** -11.31*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.34*** 0.01 -14.76*** 0.33*** 0.00 -14.76*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other 0.18*** 0.04 -3.13*** 0.17*** 0.03 -3.13*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Adjudication    
Age 0.27*** 0.25*** -1.41 0.27*** 0.25*** -1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.22*** 0.26*** 2.83*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 2.83*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.13*** 0.10*** -2.12** 0.13*** 0.10*** -2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Family Status 0.05*** 0.01 -2.83*** 0.05*** 0.02 -2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
School Status 0.17*** 0.08*** -6.36*** 0.17*** 0.08*** -6.36*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.36*** -0.30*** 4.24*** -0.36*** -0.31*** 3.54*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.05*** -0.15*** -7.07*** -0.05*** -0.15*** -7.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.25*** -0.01 -18.38*** 0.25*** -0.02*** -19.09*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Other 0.03 -0.08*** -2.46*** 0.03 -0.08*** -2.46*** 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.02)   
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -196599.00 -265596.11   -168783.73 -242016.69   
N 170,864 239,021   170,864 239,021   
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Table 16: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Adjudication Given Petitioning 
in DMC Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Petition 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.29*** 0.19*** -4.47*** 0.28*** 0.20*** -3.58*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Sex 0.19*** 0.22*** 1.34 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.89 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements -0.02 0.08*** 2.77*** -0.01 0.08*** 2.50*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.16*** 0.00 -4.44*** 0.14*** 0.00 -3.88*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
School Status 0.05** 0.00 -1.77 0.08*** 0.01 -2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.71*** -0.51*** 8.94*** -0.69*** -0.50*** 8.50*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.32*** 0.17*** -10.61*** 0.29*** 0.15*** -9.90*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.17*** -0.15*** -11.31*** 0.16*** -0.16*** -11.31*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other 0.12 0.03 -1.12 0.11 0.04 -0.87 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)   
Adjudication     
Age 0.27*** 0.35*** 5.66*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 4.95*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.27*** 0.35*** 5.66*** 0.27*** 0.35*** 5.66*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.20*** 0.12*** -2.83*** 0.19*** 0.12*** -2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status -0.02 0.02 1.41 -0.02 0.02 1.41 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status 0.38*** 0.13*** -11.18*** 0.37*** 0.12*** -11.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.71 -0.48*** -0.47*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.06*** 0.00 0.00 0.06*** 0.00* 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.04*** -0.01 2.12** -0.03*** -0.02* 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.24*** -0.03* -9.55*** 0.24*** -0.04*** -9.90*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other -0.03 0.01 0.60 -0.03 -0.00 0.45 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)   
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -61570.82 -105979.08   -56216.28 -98839.21   
N 59,258 101,636   59,258 101,636   
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Table 17: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Adjudication Given Petitioning 
in Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Petition 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.26*** 0.16*** -7.07*** 0.26*** 0.26*** -7.78*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.15*** 0.14*** -0.71 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.10*** 0.07*** -1.06 0.10*** 0.10*** -1.41 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.03 0.03* 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status 0.11*** 0.05*** -4.24*** 0.10*** 0.10*** -4.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.34*** -0.41*** -4.95*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.08*** 0.21*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.14*** 0.12*** -1.41 0.13*** 0.13*** -1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.36*** 0.10*** -11.63*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -11.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other 0.16*** 0.01 -2.57*** 0.17*** 0.17*** -2.74*** 
  (0.05) (0.03)   (0.05) (0.05)   
Adjudication     
Age 0.28*** 0.18*** -7.07*** 0.27*** 0.27*** -7.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.19*** 0.21*** 1.41 0.18*** 0.18*** 2.12 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.07*** 0.11*** 1.41 0.07*** 0.07*** 1.41 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.12*** 0.03* -3.18*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.71 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.36*** -0.40*** -2.83*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -3.54*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.71 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.36*** 0.23*** -5.81*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -6.26*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other 0.10** 0.03 -1.40 0.10** 0.10** -1.60 
  (0.04) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.04)   
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -133017.80 -151789.07   -109726.00 -134187.30   
N 111,606 137,385   111,606 137,385   
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Table 18: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Placement Given Adjudication 
in Pennsylvania Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Adjudication 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.19*** 0.23*** 2.83*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.19*** 0.23*** 2.83*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 2.83*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.14*** 0.09*** -2.24** 0.13*** 0.08*** -2.24** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Family Status 0.03* 0.01 -0.89 0.03** 0.01 -0.89 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
School Status 0.18*** 0.07*** -7.78*** 0.18*** 0.08*** -7.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.20*** -0.18*** 1.41 -0.19*** -0.16*** 2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.71 -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.11*** -0.02 -5.81*** 0.13*** -0.01 -6.26*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other -0.08** -0.12*** -0.80 -0.09** -0.11*** -0.45 
  (0.04) 0.23***   (0.04) (0.02)   
Placement     
Age 0.28*** 0.26*** -1.41 0.26*** 0.24*** -1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.25*** 0.29*** 2.83** 0.24*** 0.28*** 2.83** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.20*** 0.10*** -3.54*** 0.20*** 0.11*** -3.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.35 0.08*** 0.05*** -1.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status 0.03** 0.02 -0.71 0.02 0.01 -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.28*** -0.26*** 1.41 -0.29*** -0.29*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.03*** -0.14*** -7.78*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -7.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.19*** 0.05*** -6.26*** 0.17*** 0.06*** -4.92*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other 0.01 -0.00 -0.17 0.03 -0.01 -0.69 
  (0.05) (0.03)   (0.05) (0.03)   
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -132993.11 -175850.02   -124377.39   -165287.24   
N 121,967 170,142   121,967 170,142   
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Table 19: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Placement Given Adjudication 
in DMC Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Adjudication 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.21*** 0.33*** 5.37*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 5.37*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Sex 0.25*** 0.33*** 3.58*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 3.58*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.23*** 0.11*** -4.24*** 0.23*** 0.11*** -4.24*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status -0.07*** 0.03 2.77*** -0.06** 0.03 2.50*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
School Status 0.45*** 0.14*** -10.96*** 0.45*** 0.14*** -10.96*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.30*** -0.35*** -3.54*** -0.30*** -0.34*** -2.83*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.15*** -0.08*** 4.95*** -0.15*** -0.07*** 5.66*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.23*** 0.03* -7.07*** 0.23*** 0.04** -6.72*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other -0.09 0.00 1.12 -0.09 0.00 1.12 
  (0.07) (0.04)   (0.07) (0.04) 
Placement     
Age 0.28*** 0.41*** 4.60*** 0.28*** 0.39*** 3.89*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.36*** 0.43*** 2.47*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.19*** 0.15*** -0.94 0.19*** 0.17*** -0.47 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Family Status 0.05 0.04 -0.24 0.04 0.04 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
School Status 0.19*** 0.14*** -1.39 0.19*** 0.14*** -1.39 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.34*** -0.43*** -3.18*** -0.35*** -0.45*** -3.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.00 0.04*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.05*** -0.02 -2.47*** 0.05*** -0.02 -2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.32*** 0.10*** -7.78*** 0.33*** 0.10*** -8.13*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other -0.01 0.07 0.85 0.02 0.06 0.42 
  (0.08) (0.05)   (0.08) (0.05)   
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -51975.43 -71976.22   -47153.59 -66521.38   
N 47,833 78,196   47,833 78,196   
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Table 20: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Placement Given Adjudication 
in Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Adjudication 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.19*** 0.14*** -3.54*** 0.20*** 0.15*** -3.54*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.15*** 0.19*** 2.83*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.01 0.10*** 3.18*** 0.01 0.09*** 2.83*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.15*** 0.02 -4.60*** 0.15*** 0.02 -4.60*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status -0.00 0.03* 1.34 0.01 0.03** 0.89 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.26*** -0.29*** -2.12** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.08*** 0.11*** 2.12** 0.08*** 0.10*** 1.41 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.83 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other 0.02 0.03 0.17 -0.00 0.03 0.51 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Placement     
Age 0.28*** 0.18*** -3.54*** 0.25*** 0.16*** -3.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.19*** 0.25*** 2.68*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 4.24*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.19*** 0.09*** -2.77*** 0.18*** 0.10*** -2.83*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.10*** 0.09*** -0.28 0.11*** 0.08*** -1.06 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.35 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.28*** -0.31*** -2.12** -0.29*** -0.35*** -4.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.08*** 0.11*** 2.12** 0.08*** 0.11*** 2.12** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.15*** 0.21*** 1.66* 0.12*** 0.22*** 2.77*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Other 0.05 0.11*** 0.83 0.08 0.11*** 0.42 
  (0.06) (0.04)   (0.06) (0.04) 
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -78797.82 -95484.57   -75218.98 -91920.35   
N 74,134 91,946   74,134 91,946   
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Table 21: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Confinement Given Placement 
in Pennsylvania Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Placement 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.26*** 0.20*** -2.12** 0.26*** 0.20*** -2.12** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.22*** 0.24*** 1.41 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.17*** 0.08*** -3.18*** 0.17*** 0.08*** -3.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family Status 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.35 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.35 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
School Status -0.03** -0.00 1.06 -0.03** 0.00 1.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.23*** -0.20*** 2.12** -0.23*** -0.19*** 2.83*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.11*** -0.00 -7.78*** 0.11*** -0.01 -8.49*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.19*** 0.10*** -3.18*** 0.19*** 0.10*** -3.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other 0.04 0.07* 0.42 0.03 0.06* 0.42 
  (0.06) (0.04)   (0.06) (0.04) 
Confinement     
Age 0.49*** 0.32*** -2.65*** 0.49*** 0.34*** -2.65*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Sex 0.08** 0.07** -0.24 0.07** 0.05* -0.47 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.07 0.01 -0.85 0.09* -0.01 -1.41 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Family Status 0.11** 0.18*** 0.99 0.10** 0.20*** 1.41 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
School Status 0.23*** 0.19*** -0.94 0.20*** 0.17*** -0.71 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Severity of Charge -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.26*** -0.35*** -2.12** -0.26*** -0.36*** -2.77*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.71 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black 0.23*** 0.15*** -2.83*** 0.21*** 0.17*** -1.41 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.45*** 0.23*** -5.19*** 0.42*** 0.22*** -4.71*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Other -0.08 0.02 0.57 -0.02 0.03 0.33 
  (0.15) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) 
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -49854.73 -54312.11   -48644.58 -52462.49     
N 74,651 86,746   74,651 86,746   
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Table 22: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Confinement Given Placement 
in DMC Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Placement 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.24*** 0.31*** 1.65* 0.24*** 0.31*** 1.65 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sex 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.71 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.94 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.53 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.35 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Family Status 0.12*** 0.04 -1.41 0.12*** 0.04 -1.41 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
School Status 0.01 0.11*** 2.36*** 0.01 0.11*** 2.77 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.26*** -0.32*** -2.12** -0.25*** -0.32*** -2.47*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.04*** -0.01 0.00 0.04*** -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.16*** 0.05** -3.89*** 0.16*** 0.05** -3.89*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.29*** 0.15*** -3.30*** 0.29*** 0.14*** -3.54*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Other 0.04 0.08 0.33 0.05 0.07 0.16 
  (0.10) (0.07)   (0.10) (0.07) 
Confinement     
Age 0.47*** 0.39*** -0.75 0.48*** 0.45*** -0.30 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Sex 0.13** -0.01 -1.79* 0.14** -0.01 -2.12** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.14* 0.03 -0.97 0.12* 0.07 -0.47 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Family Status -0.02 0.18** 1.77* -0.03 0.18** 1.98** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
School Status 0.17*** 0.24*** 1.09 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.78 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Severity of Charge -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.16*** -0.39*** -3.59*** -0.18*** -0.42*** -4.24*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Number of 
Charges 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.71 0.03*** 0.02** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black 0.20*** 0.11** -1.41 0.21*** 0.14*** -1.24 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Hispanic 0.45*** 0.14** -3.97*** 0.46*** 0.14** -4.10*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Other -0.45 -0.06 1.00 -0.50 -0.02 1.29 
  (0.36) (0.15) (0.35) (0.13) 
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -17824.47 -18385.28   -17270.80 -17727.24   
N 24,947 30,112   24,947 30,112   
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Table 23: Bivariate Probit Model Results Predicting Confinement Given Placement 
in Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   
Difference 
  
Placement 
  
    
 
  
Age 0.27*** 0.18*** -3.18*** 0.26*** 0.18*** -2.83*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.18*** 0.21*** 1.06 0.18*** 0.21*** 1.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.21*** 0.07** -3.30*** 0.21*** 0.07** -3.30*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Family Status 0.06** 0.10*** 0.94 0.05** 0.09*** 0.94 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
School Status -0.05** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04** -0.05** -0.35 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00** -0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.21*** -0.20*** 0.71 -0.21*** -0.20*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.45 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.45 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.10*** 0.14*** 1.11 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.83 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Other 0.04 0.12** 0.93 0.03 0.12** 1.05 
  (0.07) (0.05)   (0.07) (0.05)   
Confinement     
Age 0.51*** 0.29*** -2.82*** 0.49*** 0.29*** -2.56*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Sex 0.04 0.11*** 1.24 0.03 0.10*** 1.24 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.02 -0.00 -0.20 0.05 -0.04 -0.98 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Family Status 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.00 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.22 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
School Status 0.27*** 0.15*** -2.12** 0.24*** 0.14*** -1.77* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.00* 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.30*** -0.34*** -0.94 -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.71 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Number of 
Charges 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black 0.20*** 0.18*** -0.40 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.24 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hispanic 0.40*** 0.27*** -2.03** 0.33*** 0.25*** -1.25 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Other 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.05 -0.28 
  (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) 
rho (ρ) 0.00 0.00   0.90 0.90   
Log Likelihood -31978.91 -35647.32   -31325.32 -34414.59   
N 49,704 56,634   49,704 56,634   
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Table 24: Number of African American and Hispanic Youths Processed Before and After DMC Intervention in Pennsylvania  
  Pre-DMC Intervention Post-DMC Intervention   
Variable 
Non- 
Intervention 
Counties 
DMC 
Intervention 
Counties 
Non- 
Intervention 
Counties 
DMC  
Intervention 
Counties Difference-in-Differences 
# of African Americans Petitioned 46.43 1565.85 61.37 1533.63 -47.16 
  (23.68) (83.38) (25.31) (89.13) (126.88) 
# of African Americans 
Adjudicated 28.73 764.20 39.27 559.66 -215.09*** 
  (10.06) (35.41) (10.75) (37.86) (53.89) 
# of African Americans Placed 7.89 246.75 10.62 121.03 -128.45*** 
  (3.28) (11.54) (3.50) (12.33) (17.56) 
# of African Americans  
Securely Confined 0.80 18.83 0.99 13.03  -5.99*** 
  (0.25) (0.87) (0.26) (0.93) (1.32) 
# of Hispanics Petitioned 10.55 265.75 19.02 258.69 -15.53 
  (3.84) (13.52) (4.10) (14.45) (20.57) 
# of Hispanics Adjudicated 7.25 158.78 12.88 110.54 -53.86*** 
  (2.11) (7.43) (2.26) (7.95) (11.31) 
# of Hispanics Placed 2.13 54.33 3.66 26.63 -29.23*** 
  (0.66) (2.33) (0.71) (2.49) (3.55) 
# of Hispanics Securely Confined 0.30 5.70 0.38 2.83 -2.95*** 
  (0.09) (0.32) (0.10) (0.34) (0.48) 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
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Figure 10: Annual Predicted Average Number of African Americans Processed in DMC Intervention and Non-Intervention 
Counties, 1997-2011. This figure depicts the association between DMC intervention and the predicted average numbers of African 
Americans petitioned, adjudicated, disposed to placement, and remanded to secure confinement annually for counties with/without 
DMC reduction programs.  
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Figure 11: Annual Predicted Average Number of Hispanics Processed in DMC Intervention and Non-Intervention Counties, 
1997-2011. This figure depicts the association between DMC intervention and the predicted average numbers of Hispanics petitioned, 
adjudicated, disposed to placement, and remanded to secure confinement annually for counties with/without DMC reduction programs. 
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Table 25: Minority Youth Population-Weighted Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
of Changes in the Number of African American and Hispanic Youths Processed 
Following DMC Intervention 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
# of African 
Americans Petitioned 
-599.42*** -320.16*** -215.70***  -327.40*** -368.86*** 
  (3.80) (1.34) (1.37) (0.83) (0.74) 
# of African 
Americans 
Adjudicated 
 -877.00*** -733.25*** -619.55***  -586.76*** -679.04*** 
  (1.61) (1.06) (1.07) (0.97) (0.78) 
# of African 
Americans Placed 
-128.45*** -418.19***  -361.14*** -353.06*** -408.10*** 
  (17.56) (0.63) (0.65) (0.66) (0.52) 
# of African 
Americans  
Securely Confined 
 -20.67***  -18.38***  -17.42***  -16.67*** -24.48*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
# of Hispanics 
Petitioned 
 -119.61*** -26.18*** -3.20*** -82.55*** -82.52*** 
  (0.82) (0.44) (0.43) (0.27) (0.25) 
# of Hispanics 
Adjudicated 
 -166.92*** -112.75*** -97.03*** -83.59*** -87.75*** 
  (0.41) (0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.23) 
# of Hispanics Placed -74.49*** -59.82*** -52.79*** -33.72*** -39.43*** 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
# of Hispanics 
Securely Confined 
 -4.78*** -3.83***  -4.01***  -3.78*** -3.99*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Controls for county, 
year, and county 
conditions related to 
juvenile delinquency No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for county 
punitiveness No No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for racial 
group representation in 
arrests and referrals No No No Yes Yes 
Controls for average 
characteristics of cases 
handled in a county No No No No Yes 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 26: Fixed County and Year Effects Difference-in-Differences Estimates of 
Changes in the Number of African American and Hispanic Youths Processed 
Following DMC Intervention 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
# of African 
Americans Petitioned 
 -47.16* 26.11  27.21 -69.49** -62.22*** 
  (25.07) (25.67) (25.80) (15.87) (15.97) 
# of African 
Americans 
Adjudicated 
-215.08*** -137.44*** -134.27*** -116.81*** -111.53*** 
  (21.25) (21.37) (21.48) (20.29) (20.40) 
# of African 
Americans Placed 
 -128.45***  -82.66*** -80.94***  -71.81*** -70.58*** 
  (12.09) (12.07) (12.13) (12.44) (12.54) 
# of African 
Americans  
Securely Confined 
-5.98*** -4.77*** -4.78*** -4.16*** -4.06*** 
  (0.92) (0.97) (0.97) (1.01) (1.02) 
# of Hispanics 
Petitioned 
 -15.53*** 3.72 5.90 -38.84*** -38.02*** 
  (5.97) (6.01) (6.01) (5.05) (5.09) 
# of Hispanics 
Adjudicated 
-53.86*** -35.42** -33.79*** -58.33*** -58.51*** 
  (5.19) (5.20) (5.20) (4.90) (4.87) 
# of Hispanics Placed -29.23*** -21.77*** -21.18*** -23.14*** -23.24*** 
  (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.06) (2.06) 
# of Hispanics 
Securely Confined 
-2.95***  -2.93***  -2.95*** -2.70*** -2.77*** 
  (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
Controls for county 
conditions related to 
juvenile delinquency No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for county 
punitiveness No No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for racial 
group representation in 
arrests and referrals No No No Yes Yes 
Controls for average 
characteristics of cases 
handled in a county No No No  No  Yes 
 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Coding Process for Racial Disparity Reforms in the States 
Enacted legislation and executive orders were identified as racial disparity 
reforms through a three-step process. First, keyword searches for enacted legislation and 
executive orders between 1998 and 2011 were completed using the terms “minority,” 
“race,” “communities of color,” “racial,” “ethnic,” “black,” “African American,” 
“Hispanic,” “Latino,” “Asian,” “Native American,” “disparate,” “disparity,” 
“discrimination,” “discriminatory,” “inequality,” “unequal,” “bias,” “overrepresentation,” 
“disproportion,” and their variants. Searches were completed using one keyword at a time. 
These keywords broadly fall into two categories: terms describing citizens belonging to 
minority groups and terms defining problems of racial inequality. Within these 
terminology sets, keywords were selected to maximize the number of relevant policies 
targeting racial minority groups (Hochschild, Weaver, & Burch, 2012; Omi & Winant, 
1994) and racial problems commonly identified by policymakers (Blumstein et al., 1983).  
Keyword searches of enacted policies were narrowed to 1998 and 2011. Any 
policy enacted before 1998 or after 2011 was omitted from the sample. Any bill that was 
not adopted into law was also omitted. Enacted policies that were later reversed are 
contained in the sample. For example, the North Carolina Racial Justice Act of 2009 
remains in the sample even though it was repealed in June 2013 (Associated Press, 2009). 
All policies containing these terms were then inspected for their relevance to 
criminal justice issues. Specifically, the section of the enacted policy where the keyword 
is located must be related to 1) the treatment of racial minorities and 2) any aspect of 
criminal processing like arrest, judicial procedure, sentencing, incarceration, jailing, 
youth detention, parole, probation, or policing. To illustrate, the 2003 Illinois Capital 
Punishment Reform Study Committee was tasked with examining several issues in death 
sentencing reforms, including whether revised policies eliminated differences in 
outcomes related to geography and the race of victim (20 ILCS 3929).   
At this juncture, policies affecting racial minorities or racial issues in ways that do 
not relate to criminal justice (e.g. employment regulations, general civil rights 
commissions, health disparities task forces) were eliminated from the sample. Policies 
corresponding to criminal justice issues without explicit regard to race were also 
excluded. For instance, the statutory requirement for parole agencies in Alaska to 
generate reports that consider unjustified disparity in the sentencing of prisoners is not 
included because it does not explicitly consider race (Ala Stat. § 33.16.110). The 
shortcomings of this latter coding decision in measuring the universe of all criminal 
reforms aimed at reducing racial inequalities are addressed in the limitations section of 
Chapter 4.  
Finally, using qualitative data analysis software, provisions within policies were 
coded according to the four types of racial disparity reforms (i.e. exploratory, prohibitory, 
policy-specific, and comprehensive). A policy can possess multiple reform measures, but 
each reform measure is only classified once as one of the four types according to the 
definitions set forth above. To illuminate the coding decision process, consider California 
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Penal Code § 13519.4 that concerns racial profiling. Amended by the legislature in 2000, 
the full section reads as follows,  
 
“13519.4.  (a) The commission shall develop and disseminate guidelines and 
training for all law enforcement officers in California as described in subdivision 
(a) of Section 13510 and who adhere to the standards approved by the 
commission, on the racial and cultural differences among the residents of this 
state. The course or courses of instruction and the guidelines shall stress 
understanding and respect for racial and cultural differences, and development of 
effective, noncombative methods of carrying out law enforcement duties in a 
racially and culturally diverse environment. 
(b) The course of basic training for law enforcement officers shall include 
adequate instruction on racial and cultural diversity in order to foster mutual 
respect and cooperation between law enforcement and members of all racial and 
cultural groups. In developing the training, the commission shall consult with 
appropriate groups and individuals having an interest and expertise in the field of 
cultural awareness and diversity. 
    (c) For the purposes of this section the following shall apply: 
(1) "Disability," "gender," "nationality," "religion," and "sexual 
orientation" have the same meaning as in Section 422.55. 
(2) "Culturally diverse" and "cultural diversity" include, but are not 
limited to, disability, gender, nationality, religion, and sexual orientation 
issues. 
     (3) "Racial" has the same meaning as "race or ethnicity" in Section 422.55. 
    (d) The Legislature finds and declares as follows: 
(1) Racial profiling is a practice that presents a great danger to the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society. It is abhorrent and cannot 
be tolerated. 
     (2) Motorists who have been stopped by the police for no reason 
other than the color of their skin or their apparent nationality or ethnicity 
are the victims of discriminatory practices. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting the changes to Section 
13519.4 of the Penal Code made by the act that added this subdivision that 
more than additional training is required to address the pernicious practice 
of racial profiling and that enactment of this bill is in no way dispositive of 
the issue of how the state should deal with racial profiling. 
(4) The working men and women in California law enforcement risk their 
lives every day. The people of California greatly appreciate the hard work 
and dedication of law enforcement officers in protecting public safety. The 
good name of these officers should not be tarnished by the actions of those 
few who commit discriminatory practices. 
(e) "Racial profiling," for purposes of this section, is the practice of detaining a 
suspect based on a broad set of criteria which casts suspicion on an entire class of 
people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person being 
stopped. 
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     (f) A law enforcement officer shall not engage in racial profiling. 
 (g) Every law enforcement officer in this state shall participate in expanded 
training as prescribed and certified by the Commission on Peace Officers 
Standards and Training. 
(h) The curriculum shall utilize the Tools for Tolerance for Law Enforcement 
Professionals framework and shall include and examine the patterns, practices, 
and protocols that make up racial profiling. This training shall prescribe patterns, 
practices, and protocols that prevent racial profiling. In developing the training, 
the commission shall consult with appropriate groups and individuals having an 
interest and expertise in the field of racial profiling. The course of instruction 
shall include, but not be limited to, adequate consideration of each of the 
following subjects: 
(1) Identification of key indices and perspectives that make up cultural 
differences among residents in a local community. 
(2) Negative impact of biases, prejudices, and stereotyping on effective 
law enforcement, including examination of how historical perceptions of 
discriminatory enforcement practices have harmed police-community 
relations. 
(3) The history and the role of the civil rights movement and struggles 
and their impact on law enforcement. 
(4) Specific obligations of officers in preventing, reporting, and 
responding to discriminatory or biased practices by fellow officers. 
(5) Perspectives of diverse, local constituency groups and experts on 
particular cultural and police-community relations issues in a local area. 
(i) Once the initial basic training is completed, each law enforcement officer in 
California as described in subdivision (a) of Section 13510 who adheres to the 
standards approved by the commission shall be required to complete a refresher 
course every five years thereafter, or on a more frequent basis if deemed 
necessary, in order to keep current with changing racial and cultural trends. 
(j) The Legislative Analyst shall conduct a study of the data being voluntarily 
collected by those jurisdictions that have instituted a program of data collection 
with regard to racial profiling, including, but not limited to, the California 
Highway Patrol, the City of San Jose, and the City of San Diego, both to ascertain 
the incidence of racial profiling and whether data collection serves to address and 
prevent such practices, as well as to assess the value and efficacy of the training 
herein prescribed with respect to preventing local profiling. The Legislative 
Analyst may prescribe the manner in which the data is to be submitted and may 
request that police agencies collecting such data submit it in the 
requested manner. The Legislative Analyst shall provide to the Legislature a 
report and recommendations with regard to racial profiling by July 1, 2002.”  
 
Three reforms can be identified within this section. First, an exploratory measure 
is located in part j, whereas “The Legislative Analyst shall conduct a study of the data…” 
and report to the legislature within two years. A prohibitory measure is found in part f, 
whereas “A law enforcement officer shall not engage in racial profiling.” Finally, a 
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policy-specific regarding the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training’s 
development of culturally sensitive training course is located in part a and continues to be 
described in the remaining subsections. Specifically, “[t]he commission shall develop and 
disseminate guidelines and training for all law enforcement officers in 
California…[stressing] understanding and respect for racial and cultural differences, and 
development of effective, noncombative methods of carrying out law enforcement duties 
in a racially and culturally diverse environment.”  
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Appendix 2: Total Racial Disparity Reform Policy and Measures Enactments by 
State (1998-2011) 
State 
Enacted Policies Enacted Measures 
Year of 
First 
Policy 
Total 
Policies 
Total 
Exploratory 
Measures 
Total 
Prohibitory 
Measures 
Total 
Policy-
Specific 
Measures 
Total 
Comprehensive 
Measures 
AK 2000 3 2 0 1 0 
AL - 0 0 0 0 0 
AR 2003 6 0 3 2 1 
AZ 2001 6 3 1 2 0 
CA 2002 4 2 1 1 0 
CO 2001 5 1 2 1 1 
CT 1999 6 3 1 0 2 
DE 2000 1 0 1 0 0 
FL 2004 5 2 1 1 0 
GA 2000 1 0 1 0 0 
HI - 0 0 0 0 0 
IA - 0 0 0 0 0 
ID 2003 6 3 0 2 1 
IL 2000 1 0 0 0 0 
IN 2001 3 2 1 0 0 
KS 2000 4 2 1 1 0 
KY 1998 3 0 2 1 0 
LA 2001 3 2 1 0 0 
MA 2009 2 2 0 0 0 
MD 1999 9 3 1 2 2 
ME 2000 4 2 0 1 1 
MI - 0 0 0 0 0 
MN 2000 6 2 2 1 1 
MO 2004 1 0 1 0 0 
MS 2001 5 2 1 2 0 
MT 2003 4 1 1 2 0 
NC 2000 5 2 1 2 0 
ND 2003 1 0 1 0 0 
NE 2009 1 1 0 0 0 
NH 2001 4 0 1 3 0 
NJ 2003 4 0 2 1 1 
NM - 0 0 0 0 0 
NV 2000 2 1 0 1 0 
NY - 0 0 0 0 0 
OH 2010 1 0 1 0 0 
OK 2009 1 0 0 0 1 
OR 2001 2 2 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Total Racial Disparity Reform Policy and Measures 
Enactments by State (1998-2011) 
 
State 
Enacted Policies Enacted Measures 
Year of 
First 
Policy 
Total 
Policies 
Total 
Exploratory 
Measures 
Total 
Prohibitory 
Measures 
Total 
Policy-
Specific 
Measures 
Total 
Comprehensive 
Measures 
PA 2000 2 0 1 1 0 
RI 2000 6 2 1 3 0 
SC 2005 3 2 1 0 0 
SD 2002 1 1 0 0 0 
TN 2001 4 2 1 1 0 
TX 2001 4 2 1 0 1 
UT 2002 1 0 1 0 0 
VA 2003 1 1 0 0 0 
VT 2002 2 0 0 1 1 
WA 2002 8 4 2 1 1 
WI 2002 4 2 1 1 0 
WV 1999 8 2 1 2 3 
WY - 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean   1.33 0.69 0.5 0.44 0.11 
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Appendix 3: Poisson Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Racial Disparity Reform in States (1998-2011) 
 
Enacted 
Policies Enacted Measures 
Variable 
I.  
All  
Policies 
II. 
 Exploratory 
Measures 
III. Prohibitory 
Measures 
IV.  
Policy-Specific 
Measures 
VI  
Comprehensive 
Measures 
Unified Democratic Control 0.62** 1.29*** -0.22 0.14 0.43 
 (0.25) (0.44) (0.42) (0.53) (0.65) 
Change in Percent Democrat in Legislature 0.02** 0.00 0.03* 0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Democratic Governor  0.01 -0.25 0.10 -0.03 0.47 
 (0.24) (0.49) (0.36) (0.47) (0.55) 
Black-White Disparity in Incarceration Rates 0.08*** 0.02 0.10** 0.08 0.19*** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Black-White Disparity in Arrests Rates 0.06** 0.04 0.12* 0.03 -0.04 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) 
Judicial Racial Disparity Reform Efforts -0.29 -0.56 -0.22 -0.96* 0.00 
 (0.35) (0.50) (0.49) (0.58) (0.49) 
Log Citizen Ideology (One year lag) -0.12 -0.44 -0.24 -0.05 1.35*** 
  (0.31) (0.50) (0.49) (0.42) (0.50) 
Percent Black 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Percent Poverty -0.05 -0.10** 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
Unemployment Rate 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.00 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Log Crime Rate 0.64* 0.57 1.40** 0.36 0.34 
  (0.38) (0.68) (0.65) (0.61) (0.60) 
Incarceration Rate -0.04 -0.10 0.07 -1.51 0.52 
 (0.81) (1.34) (0.98) (1.35) (1.78) 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -308.20 -189.07 -140.77 -129.56 -72.27 
N 680 680 680 680 680 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Racial Disparity Reform in States (1998-2011) 
 
Enacted 
Policies Enacted Measures 
Variable 
I.  
All  
Policies 
II. 
 Exploratory 
Measures 
III. Prohibitory 
Measures 
IV.  
Policy-Specific 
Measures 
VI  
Comprehensive 
Measures 
Unified Democratic Control 0.69** 1.27*** -0.15 0.12 0.47 
 (0.34) (0.47) (0.45) (0.56) (0.69) 
Change in Percent Democrat in Legislature 0.02* 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Democratic Governor  -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.49 
 (0.26) (0.51) (0.37) (0.49) (0.57) 
Black-White Disparity in Incarceration Rates 0.12*** 0.04 0.09* 0.09 0.20*** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Black-White Disparity in Arrests Rates 0.13** 0.05 0.17 0.04 -0.04 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) 
Judicial Racial Disparity Reform Efforts -0.48 -0.35 -0.44 -0.95 0.00 
 (0.33) (0.58) (0.48) (0.60) (0.52) 
Log Citizen Ideology (One year lag) -0.14 -0.54 -0.12 0.07 1.43*** 
  (0.33) (0.55) (0.53) (0.48) (0.54) 
Percent Black 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Percent Poverty -0.04 -0.09* 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
Unemployment Rate 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Log Crime Rate 0.76* 0.68 1.54** 0.44 0.35 
  (0.41) (0.73) (0.73) (0.67) (0.63) 
Incarceration Rate 0.04 0.79 -0.33 -1.56 0.52 
 (0.91) (1.48) (0.96) (1.46) (1.89) 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -259.05 -143.87 -133.11 -125.52 -71.74 
N 680 680 680 680 680 
Notes: Coefficients are presented for logistic regression models of racial disparity reform enactments. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix 5: Event History Analysis With Additional Factors Affecting the Likelihood of 
Racial Disparity Reform Policy Enactments 
Variable 
I.  
With Black-White 
Homicide Offending 
Disparity 
I.  
With Percent of 
Hispanic Elected 
Officials 
Unified Democratic Control 2.57** 1.87 
 (0.99) (0.73) 
Change in Percent Democrat in 
Legislature 1.01 1.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Democratic Governor  0.98 1.07 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Black-White Disparity in 
Incarceration Rates 1.17*** 1.12**  
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Black-White Disparity in Arrests 
Rates 1.11* 1.18*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Judicial Racial Disparity Reform 
Efforts 0.34** 0.33**  
 (0.16) (0.15) 
Log Citizen Ideology (One year 
lag) 0.92 0.95 
  (0.29) (0.28) 
Percent Black 1.02 1.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Percent Poverty 0.92 0.89**  
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemployment Rate 1.09** 1.07*   
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Log Crime Rate 4.19** 3.63*** 
  (2.48) (1.80) 
Incarceration Rate 0.98 0.75 
 (1.12) (0.80) 
Black-White Disparity in 
Homicide Offending  1.01  
 (0.27)  
Hispanic Elected Officials 
(Percent)  1.04*** 
  (0.02) 
Log Pseudo-likelihood 654 -376.66 
N -351.35 680 
 
Notes: Hazard ratios are presented for repeatable event Cox regression models. 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 6: Summary Measures and Racial Differences in Juvenile Processing 
Outcomes for Pennsylvania, 1997-2011 
    Mean 
Standard 
Error 
I. Demographic Variables       
Age 0.84 0.000 
Sex 1.77 0.001 
II. Social Conditions Variables    
Living Arrangements 0.78 0.001 
Family Status 0.76 0.001 
School Status 1.09 0.000 
III. Legal Variables   
Severity of Charge 37.17 0.024 
Grade of Offense 1.61 0.001 
Number of Charges 2.95 0.003 
IV. Racial Variables   
White 0.52   
Black 0.36   
Hispanic 0.08   
Other 0.01   
V. Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.34   
Petition 0.29   
Adjudication 0.27   
Placement 0.09   
Confinement 0.01   
Post-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.38   
Petition 0.31   
Adjudication 0.24   
Placement 0.07   
Confinement 0.01   
VI. Racial Differences Across Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.40 0.23 0.25 0.28 
Petition 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.33 
Adjudication 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.30 
Placement 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.09 
Confinement 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Post-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.43 0.30 0.43 0.38 
Petition 0.27 0.38 0.26 0.31 
Adjudication 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 
Placement 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Confinement 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Appendix 7: Summary Measures and Racial Differences in Juvenile Processing 
Outcomes for DMC Intervention Counties, 1997-2011 
    Mean 
Standard 
Error 
I. Demographic Variables       
Age 0.84 0.001 
Sex 1.79 0.001 
II. Social Conditions Variables  
Living Arrangements 0.84 0.001 
Family Status 0.82 0.001 
School Status 1.08 0.001 
III. Legal Variables   
Severity of Charge 32.49 0.036 
Grade of Offense 1.47 0.001 
Number of Charges 3.22 0.004 
IV. Racial Variables   
White 0.27   
Black 0.59   
Hispanic 0.12   
Other 0.01   
V. Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.20   
Petition 0.40   
Adjudication 0.28   
Placement 0.11   
Confinement 0.01   
Post-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.30   
Petition 0.44   
Adjudication 0.21   
Placement 0.05   
Confinement 0.01   
VI. Racial Differences Across Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.16 
Petition 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.43 
Adjudication 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Placement 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.12 
Confinement 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Post-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.37 0.24 0.42 0.33 
Petition 0.40 0.48 0.33 0.41 
Adjudication 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.20 
Placement 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Confinement 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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Appendix 8: Summary Measures and Racial Differences in Juvenile Processing 
Outcomes for Non-Intervention Counties, 1997-2011 
    Mean 
Standard 
Error 
I. Demographic Variables       
Age 0.86 0.001 
Sex 1.76 0.001 
II. Social Conditions Variables  
Living Arrangements 0.75 0.001 
Family Status 0.73 0.001 
School Status 1.10 0.001 
III. Legal Variables   
Severity of Charge 40.17 0.032 
Grade of Offense 1.70 0.001 
Number of Charges 2.77 0.003 
IV. Racial Variables   
White 0.68   
Black 0.21   
Hispanic 0.06   
Other 0.01   
V. Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.43   
Petition 0.23   
Adjudication 0.26   
Placement 0.08   
Confinement 0.01   
Post-DMC Intervention   
Dismissal 0.44   
Petition 0.22   
Adjudication 0.25   
Placement 0.08   
Confinement 0.01   
VI. Racial Differences Across Dependent Variables   
Pre-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.36 
Petition 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.27 
Adjudication 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.30 
Placement 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.07 
Confinement 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Post-DMC Intervention White Black Hispanic Other 
Dismissal 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.42 
Petition 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.24 
Adjudication 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.25 
Placement 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Confinement 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Appendix 9: Summary Statistics of DMC Intervention and Non-Intervention 
County-Years in Pennsylvania, 1997-2011 (N = 1020) 
Variables 
DMC Intervention 
Counties 
Non-Intervention 
Counties 
Dependent Variables n Mean 
Standard 
Error n Mean 
Standar
d Error 
# of African Americans 
Petitioned 75 1550.81 217.68 930 53.40 4.23 
# of African Americans 
Adjudicated 75 668.75 89.04 930 33.65 2.85 
# of African Americans Placed 75 188.08 30.66 930 9.17 0.69 
# of African Americans Securely 
Confined 75 16.12 2.11 930 0.89 0.08 
# of Hispanics Petitioned 75 262.45 31.43 930 14.50 1.46 
# of Hispanics Adjudicated 75 136.27 15.07 930 9.88 1.08 
# of Hispanics Placed 75 41.40 5.11 930 2.84 0.32 
# of Hispanics Securely 
Confined 75 4.36 0.52 930 0.34 0.06 
Control Variables         
Youth Poverty Rate 75 17.59 0.89 930 14.65 0.16 
% Urban 75 83.72 1.50 930 45.95 0.86 
Dropout Rate 75 2.66 0.19 930 1.59 0.02 
Unemployment Rate 75 5.41 0.22 930 6.08 0.06 
Total General Youth Population 75 84563 6122 930 15101 574 
Juvenile Arrest Rate 75 105.93 6.49 930 60.86 1.32 
% Voters Registered as 
Republican  75 39.82 1.82 930 48.41 0.49 
Imprisonment Rate  75 150.49 8.98 930 87.30 1.70 
# of African Americans Arrested 75 5978.04 1044.95 930 172.43 13.78 
# of Whites Arrested 75 4523.37 386.76 930 752.56 29.51 
# of African Americans Referred 75 1935.72 257.24 930 86.79 6.16 
# of Hispanics Referred 75 387.49 40.55 930 24.15 2.34 
Mean Sex (0 ‘female’; 1 ‘male’) 75 0.77 0.00 930 0.77 0.00 
Mean Age (0 ‘≤15’; 1 ‘>15’)   75 0.51 0.00 930 0.53 0.00 
Mean School Status (0 
‘enrolled’; 1 ‘not enrolled’) 75 0.10 0.01 928 0.11 0.00 
Mean Family Status (0 
‘married’; 1 ‘divorced, separated, 
never married, or other’) 75 0.79 0.01 929 0.70 0.00 
Mean Living Arrangements (0 
‘two parents’; 1 ‘single parent, 
relative, or other’) 75 0.17 0.00 927 0.19 0.00 
Mean Severity of Offense (1-77 
adapted Wolfgang Severity 
Index) 75 35.36 0.55 930 38.01 0.21 
Mean Number of Charges (1-7) 75 2.71 0.16 930 2.69 0.04 
Mean Grade of Offense (0 
‘felony’; 1 ‘misdemeanor’) 75 1.58 0.02 930 1.68 0.00 
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Appendix 10: Zero-Order Correlations Among Demographic, Social Conditions, Legal, and Race Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Age 1.000 
 
2. Sex 0.0065* 1.0000 
 
3. Living 
Arrangements 
-0.0277* -0.0429* 1.0000 
 
4. Family Status -0.0345* -0.0441* 00.8539* 1.0000 
 
5. School Status 0.1122* 0.0030* 0.0338* 0.0310* 1.0000 
 
6. Severity of 
Charge 
0.0728* -0.1113* 0.0078* -0.0104* 0.0414* 01.0000 
 
7. Grade of 
Charge 
0.0040* -0.1235* -0.0670* -0.0670* -0.0121* 0.4930* 
1.000 
 
8. Number of 
Charges 
-0.0027* 0.1188* 0.0085* -0.0049* -0.0008 -0.4816* -0.4457* 1.000 
 
9. Black -0.0618* -0.0098* 0.2096* 0.2195* -0.0509* -0.1506* -0.1930* 0.1121* 1.0000  
10. Hispanic 0.0008 0.0140* 0.0421* 0.0553* 0.0319* 0.0048* -0.0192* -0.0242* -0.2224* 1.0000  
11. Other 0.0026* -0.0005 -0.0247* -0.0136* -0.0072* -0.0049* 0.0000 0.0049* -0.0829* -0.0331* 1.0000 
 
Note: * p<0.05 
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Appendix 11: Percent of Statewide Non-Secure Placements Involving African American Youth By Type Before and After 
DMC Intervention.  
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Appendix 12: Percent of Statewide Non-Secure Placements Involving Hispanic Youth By Type Before and After DMC 
Intervention.  
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Appendix 13: Continuation Ratio Logistic Regression Results Predicting 
Advancement in Juvenile Processing in 65 Pennsylvania Counties With and Without 
Prior Record of Referral Information, 1997-2011 
  Non-Racial Factors Model Full Model 
  Without 
Priors 
With  
Priors 
Difference 
Without 
Priors 
With  
Priors 
Difference 
  
Age 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.71 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sex 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.71 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 
0.09*** 0.09*** 
0.00 
0.09*** 0.08*** 
0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Family Status 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
School Status 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of 
Charge 
-0.01*** -0.01*** 
0.00 
-0.01*** -0.01*** 
0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of 
Offense 
-0.29*** -0.29*** 
0.00 
-0.28*** -0.28*** 
0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of 
Charges 
0.08*** 0.08*** 
0.00 
0.08*** 0.08*** 
0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black     0.11*** 0.10*** 0.71 
      (0.01) (0.01) 
Hispanic   
 
  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.00 
    
 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Other   
 
  0.03 0.04* -0.35 
    
 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Record N/A 0.07***   N/A 0.07***   
  N/A (0.00)   N/A (0.00)   
Log 
Likelihood -494604.96 
 
-494389.33    -494368.27 -494175.28 
  
N 740,367 740,367   740,367 740,367   
 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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Appendix 14: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Petitioning in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, DMC Intervention 
Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference   
Age 0.46*** 0.30*** -7.16 0.51*** 0.33*** -4.99 0.43*** 0.26*** -6.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.27*** 0.30*** 2.12 0.32*** 0.37*** 1.39 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.09*** 0.13*** 1.41 -0.03 0.15*** 2.81 0.17*** 0.12*** -1.18 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Family Status 0.13*** 0.03 -3.54 0.27*** 0.00 -4.22 0.04 0.06* 0.47 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
School Status 0.14*** 0.07*** -2.47 0.09** 0.02 -1.40 0.18*** 0.09*** -3.18 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Severity of 
Charge -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.83*** -0.80*** 2.12 -1.29*** -0.91*** 10.54 -0.58*** -0.76*** -6.36 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.00 0.20*** 0.23*** 2.12 0.14*** 0.38*** 24.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Black 0.57*** 0.34*** -16.26 0.57*** 0.32*** -6.93 0.23*** 0.21*** -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.57*** 0.01 -15.53 0.27*** -0.25*** -10.40 0.61*** 0.15*** -10.29 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Other 0.30*** 0.06 -2.98 0.22* 0.06 -1.12 0.27*** 0.01 -2.76 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.13) (0.06)   (0.08) (0.05)   
Log Likelihood -88814.72 -119549.41   -23887.74 -47005.99   -63942.75 -71910.201   
N 170,864 239,021   59,258 101,636   111,606 137,385   
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
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Appendix 15: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Adjudication in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, DMC Intervention 
Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference   
Age 0.31*** 0.37*** 2.12** 0.34*** 0.54*** 5.55*** 0.31*** 0.22*** -3.18*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sex 0.30*** 0.38*** 3.58*** 0.40*** 0.54*** 3.88*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 2.12** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.22*** 0.14*** -2.22** 0.37*** 0.18*** -3.80*** 0.02 0.16*** 3.30*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Family Status 0.05** 0.01 -1.11 -0.11*** 0.05 3.20*** 0.25*** 0.03 -5.19*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
School Status 0.29*** 0.12*** -6.01*** 0.74*** 0.22*** -11.63*** 0.00 0.05** 1.39 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.32*** -0.28*** 2.83*** -0.49*** -0.57*** -2.83*** -0.43*** -0.48*** -1.77 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.71 -0.24*** -0.13*** 3.89*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 1.77 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.19*** -0.02 -5.82*** 0.37*** 0.05* -6.40*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.80 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Other -0.13* -0.18*** -0.62 -0.14 0.01 1.20 0.02 0.04 0.18 
  (0.07) (0.04)   (0.11) (0.06)   (0.09) (0.06)   
Log Likelihood -78916.61 -114823.92   -31961.14 -50670.83   -44996.26 -57657.16   
N 121,967 170,142   47,833 78,196   74,134 91,946   
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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Appendix 16: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Placement Dispositions in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, DMC 
Intervention Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference   
Age 0.42*** 0.36*** -1.41 0.40*** 0.55*** 2.08** 0.43*** 0.31*** -2.83*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sex 0.37*** 0.42*** 1.39 0.53*** 0.63*** 1.41 0.29*** 0.38*** 2.12** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.29*** 0.14*** -2.65*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.65 0.36*** 0.11** -3.54*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Family Status 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.35 0.19*** 0.07 -1.30 0.10** 0.16*** 0.94 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
School Status -0.07** 0.00 1.65 0.01 0.20*** 2.97*** -0.09*** -0.08** 0.24 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Severity of Charge 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.40*** -0.34*** 2.12** -0.44*** -0.58*** -2.47*** -0.37*** -0.34*** 1.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of 
Charges 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.06*** -0.01 -4.95*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 2.12** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black 0.17*** -0.01 -6.36*** 0.27*** 0.10** -3.40*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.28 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic 0.31*** 0.18*** -3.06*** 0.48*** 0.26*** -3.11*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 1.54 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Other 0.08 0.11* 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.24 0.08 0.20** 0.88 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.12)   (0.11) (0.08)   
Log Likelihood -43398.86 -46056.04   -14897.90 -15118.51   -28462.67 -30665.15   
N 74,980 86,746   24,994 30,112   49,986 56,634   
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   
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Appendix 17: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Confinement Dispositions in Juvenile Processing in Pennsylvania, DMC 
Intervention Counties, and Non-Intervention Counties Before and After DMC Intervention 
  All Counties DMC Intervention Counties Non-Intervention Counties 
  Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference 
Pre-DMC 
Intervention 
Post-DMC 
Intervention   Difference   
Age 1.00*** 0.51*** -2.88 0.93*** 0.55*** -1.37 1.05*** 0.49*** -2.37 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14) 
Sex -0.19** -0.30*** -0.91 -0.14 -0.70*** -2.93 -0.26** -0.12 0.94 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) 
Living 
Arrangements 0.04 -0.11 -0.85 0.25 -0.16 -1.44 -0.14 -0.09 0.21 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) 
Family Status 0.14 0.40*** 1.41 -0.16 0.39* 1.93 0.38** 0.39** 0.04 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) 
School Status 0.61*** 0.46*** -1.52 0.37*** 0.48*** 0.68 0.77*** 0.42*** -2.75 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Severity of Charge -0.01*** -0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Grade of Charge -0.36*** -0.60*** -2.42 -0.04 -0.51*** -2.76 -0.51*** -0.63*** -0.94 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) 
Number of 
Charges 0.02 0.04*** 1.41 0.01 0.10*** 3.18 0.02 0.00 -0.71 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Black 0.46*** 0.36*** -1.18 0.31*** 0.16 -0.96 0.45*** 0.37*** -0.70 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) 
Hispanic 0.93*** 0.43*** -4.42 0.77*** 0.22 -2.77 0.94*** 0.48*** -2.80 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) 
Other -0.35 -0.07 0.58 -1.24 -0.39 0.78 -0.06 0.01 0.13 
  (0.42) (0.23)   (1.01) (0.41)   (0.46) (0.28)   
Log Likelihood -4979.77 -5632.13   -2164.27 -2046.03   -2794.15 -3570.97   
N 20,685 20,247   7,560 6,384   13,125 13,863   
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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